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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
NATURAL PHENOMENA AS POTENTIAL INFLUENCE ON SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: THE EARTH’S MAGNETIC FIELD 
 
 Researchers use natural phenomena in a number of disciplines to help explain 
human behavioral outcomes. Research regarding the potential effects of magnetic fields 
on animal and human behavior indicates that fields could influence outcomes of interest 
to social scientists. Tests so far have been limited in scope. This work is a preliminary 
evaluation of whether the earth’s magnetic field influences human behavior it examines 
the baseline relationship exhibited between geomagnetic readings and a host of social and 
political outcomes. The emphasis on breadth of topical coverage in these statistical trials, 
rather than on depth of development for any one model, means that evidence is only 
suggestive – but geomagnetic readings frequently covary with social and political 
variables in a fashion that seems inexplicable in the absence of a causal relationship. The 
pattern often holds up in more-elaborate statistical models. Analysis provides compelling 
evidence that geomagnetic variables furnish valuable information to models. Many 
researchers are already aware of potential causal mechanisms that link human behavior to 
geomagnetic levels and this evidence provides a compelling case for continuing to 
develop the line of research with in-depth, focused analysis.  
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 Chapter 1  Introduction 
Humans can retain information, subject it to logical reasoning, and direct their own 
actions rationally. These capabilities serve as the foundation for many conceptions of 
human progress and learning. Indeed, belief in this rationality is so pervasive and 
ingrained in the human self-image that it constitutes a fundamental assumption of much 
of economics and political science. 
However, the world provides any number of individual-level and aggregate-level 
anecdotal examples that strain the ability of social scientists to describe them in terms of 
reason or rationale – daily examples of behavior that is “outside the norm,” surprising, 
shocking, and seemingly pathological. Such actions by individuals or groups threaten the 
influential perception of humanity as reasonable and rational. Any one perplexing 
example in isolation might lend itself to some kind of complex and particularistic 
explanation, but the combined weight of these many troublesome events should motivate 
a search for less-idiosyncratic explanations as to why otherwise rational individuals or 
groups might stray from sensible cause-and-effect behavior. 
1.1 Individual-Level Anecdotes  
Take the case of 19-year-old Derrick Smart. Smart was an average student who 
had no history of trouble, no documented instances of violence or abnormal depression. 
Initially his behavior on 16 November 2000 was no different. He remained home with his 
78-year-old grandmother while the rest of the family left for the day to pursue their 
normal activities, and he assisted the elderly woman throughout the morning, ensuring 
that she was not only comfortable but also entertained. Then, sometime in the afternoon, 
with no known provocation, Smart walked into his grandmother’s bathroom and struck 
her on the head with a mallet, causing extensive brain injury. Leaving her corpse in the 
bath, he promptly changed out of his blood-soaked clothes and placed them in the trash 
compactor but otherwise took no precautions to hide evidence before leaving the house 
for the afternoon. Smart’s father found the body later that evening and called police, who 
arrested Smart that night when he returned home still wearing a bloodstained bandana. It 
was the first instance of violence attributed to the young man, yet despite his attempts to 
cooperate with authorities in other ways, he never could communicate a motivation for 
committing murder at that time or place – other than to report to the police that he had 
been hearing voices (Coleman, 2003). 
Another example of such “out of nowhere” violence is 45-year-old David Crespi. 
He was a senior vice-president in the audit division of Wachovia Corporation, a company 
with $26 billion in annual revenue. Crespi had a large salary, manageable debt, no 
reported marital problems, or concerns, and was on track for a significant bonus and 
promotion at work. On January 20, 2004, while home alone with his twin five-year-old 
daughters, he retrieved a knife from the kitchen and fatally stabbed them 32 times, 
leaving the knife in one of them (WSOCTV.com, 2006). After killing his two children, 
Crespi called 911 and surrendered himself to police, not attempting to escape punishment 
for the murders (News, 2006).  Some considered Crespi unstable before this tragic 
1 
 
 incident since he underwent treatment for depression and had attempted suicide prior to 
that time. However, he previously had demonstrated no violent impulses toward anyone 
else. When asked why he killed his daughters instead of himself by Oprah Winfrey 
during a 2006 interview, his only response was that he had promised his wife he would 
not hurt himself. Neither he nor his doctors ever divulged a motivation for directing 
hostility toward the girls. 
These two cases are far from the only such examples of horrific crimes committed 
by individuals who previously seemed stable and nonviolent. Indeed, the purpose of 
telling them is only to remind readers of the many similar news stories that they might 
have encountered in the news over the years. Inexplicable acts of the most violent nature 
occur all the time. However, lack of reason or rationality does not reside solely in 
individual acts of violence, nor does inexplicable change always move in a negative 
direction. Educators, for example, almost certainly have encountered the unpredictability 
of performance in academic environments – which can fluctuate from one individual to 
the next or from one period to the next, in a manner that defies explanation. Rationality 
may lay the foundation for attempting to understand educational outcomes, but the record 
often undermines such a straightforward approach.  
I offer as an illustrative example the story of John R. Chaney, whose life suddenly 
changed for the better with no apparent catalyst for change in rational calculus. Chaney’s 
academic performance over time exhibited the sort of inexplicable decline and surge that 
frustrates any attempt at explanation. Chaney initially epitomized the sort of student who 
desires to excel academically and has the resources needed to excel but just cannot do it. 
Indeed, he was a model of student failure: Chaney maintained a failing grade point 
average throughout his first year at the University of Louisville, then after two semesters 
transferred to a small liberal-arts institution an hour away where, despite the significant 
change in context, his performance did not improve at all. At the new school, he 
vacillated among majors, struggled academically, and finally graduated with a business 
finance degree and a C- average. After another year, he attempted to get an MBA at the 
University of Louisville and again suffered dismal academic achievement, which sent 
him into the job market for a few years (Chaney J. R., 2007). 
Then Chaney’s performance suddenly changed. He enrolled in an associate’s 
medical program degree in Indiana, not far (geographically or culturally) from the other 
schools where he had languished. Chaney’s grades leapt upward – he earned a B+ 
average – and he scored among the highest in the state on the nursing exams, earning a 
coveted spot in a pre-doctoral Bachelor of Science program in Indianapolis, Indiana 
(acceptance rate below 10%). In interviews, Mr. Chaney could not offer any rational 
explanation as to how things turned around. Little distinguishes the period of his poor 
academic performance from that of his successes – not his economic/financial situation, 
his relationship status, his distance from his family, his living conditions, nor his general 
health and lifestyle (Chaney J. R., 2011). If anything, his underlying health had worsened 
during the period of success; his renewed efforts coincided with (and may have brought 
on) mental, sleep, and other health disorders. Unless we are to assign his slight increase 
in age with what would seem to be disproportionate importance, almost nothing 
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 objectively had changed in Chaney’s life. He is just one of many possible examples of 
how a single individual’s behavior can swing widely over time, defying rational 
explanation, in less-dramatic yet obviously consequential ways. 
1.2 Domestic Group-Level Anecdotes 
One is tempted to dismiss individual-level examples of inexplicable behavior as 
“outliers” or natural stochastic outcomes, anomaly associated with analysis of 
disaggregated behavior. Out of a world population of billions, perhaps several people will 
wake up that day and, by the odds, inexplicably murder someone, or experience a random 
surge in academic ability. However, examples of puzzling irrationality involve aggregates 
of individuals and require an entirely different logic to explain. 
Consider the domain of labor activity. Organized workers often engage in 
irrational and unreasonable activities that in the end yield plainly suboptimal results for 
the actors driving the outcome. One anecdote comes from New York, where the New 
York Transit Authority union decided to institute a labor strike in order to (1) guarantee 
retirement at 55, (2) fight back a possible increase in pension and medical contributions, 
and (3) receive guaranteed paid maternity leave for present and future employees of the 
Authority. Their decision to strike flew in the face of the “Taylor Law,” which forbade 
strikes by city employees. They also lacked advantage: Potential passengers could access 
substitute transportation methods for commuters, making them less dependent on striking 
transit workers. Yet their effort was certain to alienate millions of New Yorkers who 
would need to identify and use those substitute methods – and indeed, city dwellers were 
already expressing a distinct lack of sympathy in the days before the official start of the 
strike. 
Even the international leadership of the Union warned against a strike and 
threatened sanctions against the New York arm if it executed one (New York Times, 
2005). They did so not due to lack of sympathy with the union’s workers, but in large 
part because the Taylor Law left little to the imagination. It created an explicit framework 
laying out disincentives to strike. First, it provided for a $1,000 fine per strike participant 
on the Union. Second, laws required each strike participant forfeit a day’s pay for each 
day on strike. A three-day strike, for example, would cost an employee participating in 
the strike six days of pay. Finally, the law directed prison time for the president of the 
union for contempt of court (New York Times, 2005).  
Bizarrely, the union struck anyway, and the expected penalties swiftly came down 
upon them. In accordance with the Taylor Law, the court imposed a fine on the union for 
conducting a strike – it came to $1 million per day – and imposed a forfeiture of pay for 
employees participating in the strike. The court also declared the Union and its president 
in contempt. The union dragged out this strike for six days but then suddenly, despite 
having received little new information since initiating the effort, the union caved. They 
accepted a deal offered by the city that was the same as had been put forward the day 
before the strike started. Union leaders accepted a plan that increased their contributions 
and maintained the current retirement age. The only significant concession: It added 
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 maternity leave to the workers’ contracts. What was the cost of this poor negotiating 
strategy? Twelve days of lost pay, a $6 million fine to the Union, frustration on the part 
of transit users, restrictions on automatic union dues collections, increased restrictions on 
the right to strike, alienation from the international arm of the union, and a seven-day 
prison sentence for the union president (New York Times, 2005). 
In another example, on the other side of North America, 70,000 Californians 
employed by three food store chains decided to strike to save themselves and future 
employees from having to pay increased health costs. The strike went on for five months. 
During that time, the stores hardly suffered at all: They hired non-union employees, 
continued to offer products and services, and saved much more in wages and benefits 
($1.6 billion) when they lost during the strike (an estimated $1 billion). The workers 
gained little: At the end of the walkout, the final contract gave no raises, increased 
worker healthcare contributions by up to 3% of monthly base pay, significantly reduced 
pension benefits, and reduced starting wages for new employees (Stone, 2004). When 
compared to the conditions offered to the union from management prior to the strike, the 
result was an abysmal failure. 
It is tempting to pass off this error as the sort of mistake that occurs when people 
operate under conditions of uncertainty – yet, as with the strike in New York, this 
California strike was obviously doomed to outside observers. Alternatively, one might 
suspect some kind of institutional explanation, positing that the interests of the leadership 
deviated from that of the regular members, but some kind of failure in the reasoning 
process still would be required to explain the widespread support within the union for this 
failed enterprise. Rather, it is the sort of irrational group activity that commonly appears 
in the course of labor struggles. 
1.3 State-Level Anecdotes 
Aggregate, or collective, irrationality does not rest only in the realm of group-
level negotiating behavior. Governments regularly execute unreasonable policies and 
they carry out irrational policies – policies that offend the sensibilities, values, and ethics 
of the nation itself once they are exposed. Sometimes governments commit the worst of 
these atrocities against their own citizens. Just in the last hundred years, examples include 
genocide (e.g., Turkey and Germany), firing upon protesters and demonstrations (e.g., 
South Korea), and medical experiments that violate the human rights of subjects (e.g., 
various countries, including the United States). 
That governments engage in such abhorrent behavior strains credibility, but at 
least observers might suppose that leaders go too far in the hopes (however slight) of 
increasing their power or authority. What would be even more surprising to people today 
– given the modern tendency to harbor distrust of government – is how willingly the 
victims participated in these state-sponsored acts. Citizen reaction can be irrational to the 
point of seeming to defy all explanation. 
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 The Kurdish reaction to Iraq’s Directive SF/4008 is an example of irrationality.  
The Secretary General of the Ba’ath Party’s Northern Region issued the directive on 20 
June 1987, and designated many areas of northern Iraq as “prohibited regions.” The 
Directive was part of the “Anfal Campaign,” a government initiative named after the 
eighth chapter in the Qu’ran (which describes the triumph of 319 followers of Muslim 
faith over 900 pagans). It targeted general acts of defiance, as witnessed in several 
northern towns in Iraq where citizens had been unhappy with increasing policies of 
governmental repression. 
Clause 5 was the most significant part of this directive. Clause 5 directed that “all 
persons captured in those villages shall be detained and interrogated by the security 
services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be executed after any useful 
information has been obtained from them, of which we should be duly notified.” The 
author of Directive SF/4008 claimed that the “Anfal Campaign” was part of the “final 
solution” to the Kurd problem in Iraq. It seemed to direct the killing of every male of 
military age captured in rural Iraqi Kurdistan (Watch, 1994). 
A directive contains mere words and is the domain in which rationality and reason 
operate, but the mandate those words communicated translated into concrete action. For 
eight months, the Iraqi army detained and resettled men and women from areas in which 
an insurgency was operating against the Iraqi Baathist government of Saddam Hussein. 
Most wound up in a concentration camp called Tapzawa. Immediately upon arriving at 
the camp, guards segregated men and women and evaluated the men according to their 
apparent ability to use a weapon. The army moved those over the age of 15 to men’s 
“barracks,” and in the days that followed, they lived in grossly overcrowded quarters and 
suffered routine beatings. Then, after several days, and with no known additional 
provocation, the Iraqi army trucked the men off to be killed (Human Rights Watch, 
1995). Witnesses stated: 
Some groups of prisoners were lined up, shot from the front, and dragged 
into pre-dug mass graves; others were made to lie down in pairs, sardine 
style, next to mounds of fresh corpses, before being killed; still others 
were tied together, made to stand on the lip of the pit, and shot in the back 
so that they would fall forward into it – a method that was presumably 
more efficient from the point of view of the killers. Bulldozers then 
pushed earth or sand loosely over the heaps of corpses. Some of the 
gravesites contained dozens of separate pits and obviously contained the 
bodies of thousands of victims. (Human Rights Watch, 1995) 
 Much like the vast majority of Jews trundled off to Nazi concentration camps, 
whose passive acceptance of their fate continues to puzzle scholars so many years later 
(Levi, 1995), these more-recent victims also put up little resistance to their imminent 
demise. It bears remembering that these victims were hardly passive or cowardly 
individuals, the Iraqi Army too them from areas and towns conducting an insurgency 
against the government. Yet once in custody, apparently not one of these prisoners 
attempted to fight, to save himself, or to escape. In fact, the accounts of this operation by 
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 Iraqi military personnel highlight how easy, docile, and accommodating the men were, as 
they had expected much stiffer resistance (Human Rights Watch, 1995). That is, the 
behavior of the victims defied rational explanation even to the perpetrators who were 
closest to the event. 
This chilling account is but one example of many other recitations of acts of civil 
war, genocide, and gendercide. During the Yugoslavian civil war, in 1991, the Serbian 
Army shelled large parts of Croatia into submission. Afterward, an alliance between 
Serbia and Bosnian Serbs resulted in a wave of genocidal and gendercidal activities in 
Bosnia against both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. One such event was the 
massacre at a little known place called Brcko, a strategic choke point on the Drina River  
targeted for systematic gender-selective slaughter during the Serbian Offensive in 1992. 
Mark Danner (1998) summarizes the findings of his investigation of this massacre as 
follows: 
During the late spring and early summer of 1992, some three thousand 
Muslims were herded by Serb troops into an abandoned warehouse, 
tortured, and put to death. A U.S. intelligence satellite orbiting over the 
former Yugoslavia photographed part of the slaughter. ‘They have photos 
of trucks going into Brcko with bodies standing upright, and pictures of 
trucks coming out of Brcko carrying bodies lying horizontally, stacked 
like cordwood,’ an investigator working outside the U.S. government who 
has seen the photographs told us (Danner 1998). 
These examples all portray states executing extreme policy decisions against a 
powerless and disarmed citizenry. Not all extreme policies target the weak; states behave 
similarly against capable and armed opponents as well. The history of war reveals 
numerous examples of states descending into war despite conditions that clearly do not 
favor them. A count shows that from 2003 to 2011, the world experienced 43 civil and 
international wars of varying degrees of destruction (Marshall M. G., 2011). Most of 
these conflicts included at least one Great or Regional Power – which is to say, one of the 
sides enjoyed overwhelming military, economic, and scientific superiority. Yet their 
opponents decided to fight rather than to negotiate or surrender. In extreme cases, 
participants see defeat and instead of following the “rules” and surrendering, they 
degenerate into insurgencies and mobilize “suicide” weapons to inflict damage on the 
“victorious” powers. Observers strain to frame the behavior of states, domestic actors, 
and opposition groups as manifestations of rationality. Moreover, while it is possible to 
trace the buildup of hostilities until they result in open conflict, it is much harder to 
identify exogenous sources for the rise and fall of these tensions. To outside observers, it 
seems as though regions or peoples simply descend into madness. 
1.4 System- and Market-Level Anecdotes 
The existence of counter-productive and irrational aggregate behaviors is not 
restricted to domestic and international relations in the political sphere. Counter-intuitive 
and counter-productive trends, not to mention shocks, appear in the economic realm as 
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 well. While not obviously as abhorrent, or even measurable, as civil or international war, 
the consequences resulting from economic volatility can be quite destructive to individual 
welfare.  
World stock markets declined across the world on 19 October 1987. The crash 
started in Hong Kong and spread west through international time zones, sweeping 
through Europe and hitting the New York Stock Exchange’s Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (DJIA) on a Monday. The one-day loss of over 22% sank the DJIA to 1738, 
equating to a 508 point loss – which is to say, the largest one-day percentage decline in 
history (that is, until the day following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, when 
such a reaction may have made more sense). During the 19 October 1987 declines, the 
Hong Kong Index lost 45%, the Australian Stock Market lost 41%, Spain lost 31%, and 
the United Kingdom lost over 26% of its value. 
This crash lacked a structural basis. The market recovered within weeks and for the 
entire year of 1987, the DJIA would increase from a start of 1897 to an end of 1939, for 
more than a 5% gain. If investors agreed under stable conditions that the market should 
be priced between 1897 and 1939, why would it irrationally push prices up as high as 
2246 and then as low as 1738 in a short period? 
Other examples of such excessive optimism and over-investment exist. The most 
recent concerned housing, but the U.S. market repeatedly exhibits wide swings despite all 
of the controls, advice, and experience that would militate against such a thing 
happening. In addition, economic activity more generally follows periods of contraction 
and expansion that are not optimal. Bubbles, recessions, economic collapses, widening 
trade gaps, wild currency fluctuations, and worse result from “irrational exuberance” 
(Bernstein P. , 1998; Greenspan, 1996), from misreading or misunderstanding 
information. Economists have struggled over the years to “describe” or model economic 
expansions, bubbles, and contractions and even develop warning signs that they are 
occurring. However, few can explain what influences humans into making such awful 
decisions, or predict when or where that will happen. 
Many of these economic “problems” appear to result from emotionally charged 
reactions that represent a breakdown in the rational faculties of economic actors. Indeed, 
those economists who do try to explain these events often depend on “relative rationalist” 
and “behavioralist” (Greenspan, 1996) explanations and models that relax the rationality 
assumption underlying much of formal theory. That is, they recognize that the behavior is 
irrational, and struggle to predict when this mass irrationality will appear. 
Second- and third-order effects of economic instability caused by irrational pricing 
in markets also can be harmful. These effects include destruction and loss of capital, 
erosion of buying power, unemployment, and decline in economic activity, erosion of 
human capital, and disruption in interstate economic relations. Economists and 
governments have every incentive to discover the cause of this type of irrational market 
activity and implement rules to mitigate the occurrence and impacts, yet it defies 
explanation.  
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 1.5 Contributions of This Research 
What pushes people and groups into irrational actions? What causes a young man 
to deviate from his normal habits, enter his grandmother’s bathroom, and then slam a 
mallet into her head? What causes a father to choose the specific time when, and place 
where, he kills his young daughters? What causes a people to accept the consensus that it 
is acceptable to round up every male in a village and then kill them, and those men to 
cooperate in their own slaughter? What is it that pushes people into the irrational, 
especially to a point of irrationality that guarantees they will not escape without serious 
consequences? The primary point of this research project is that, while each of these 
events might trace in large part to influences and processes unique to the outcome in 
question, other phenomena could contribute to the occurrence and frequency of such 
events as a whole. 
1.5.1 An Innovative Explanatory Variable 
The primary contribution of this research will be to introduce the sort of predictor 
traditionally neglected in social science. A growing sub-culture of researchers have been 
trying to integrate into their models assorted variables that measure nature’s impact on 
behavior and decision making. Natural processes and variables inform human behavior, 
and several disciplines currently are at work researching how these natural forces could 
play themselves out to result in important outcomes.  Much of this effort has been 
disjointed, dispersed geographically, and spread across various disciplines – but as a 
whole, it suggests the value of extending behavioral research beyond the customary 
social indicators dominant in Political Science and cognate fields. 
This study has chosen one particular explanatory factor to demonstrate the 
possible power, relevance, and usability of environmental variables when integrated into 
social science models and theory: the geomagnetic field (GMF) of the planet. To serve as 
a test case for the potential power of natural influences on human behavior, the GMF 
brings several benefits: (1) The geomagnetic field varies, (2) is easily measured in any 
time scale, (3) is easy to work with, (4) is readily available for free, and (5) is easy to 
integrate into existing and new models. Scientists collect the variable(6) in over 150 
locations around the world, and (7) covers times as short as one second or as long as 
annual averages. Finally, (8) the earth’s magnetic field has several different measures that 
provide both local and system-wide influences that vary not only temporally, but also 
spatially. 
Just as “ecological” theories have had a long life in social and economic science, 
so, too, has the idea that geomagnetic fields have a measurable and varying effect on 
human behavior. A small sub-discipline merging physics, psychology, and biology have 
been at work since the 1970s on these questions. While not garnering a large following 
and constituting no formal association, independent researchers, government agencies, 
and even businesses have been quietly developing research on the possible impact of this 
highly parsimonious, cheap, readily available, and easy-to-use variable. Just as important, 
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 the variable has behind it a compelling theory that, if borne out, could ground traditional 
research agendas that integrate magnetic fields into their models. 
That said, connecting geomagnetic waves to human behavior operates outside of 
existing disciplinary research paradigms, and because the research is still in rudimentary 
stages, readers at this point may be reluctant to accept relationships – even strong 
statistical relationships – as meaningful. I should stress, therefore, that I do not offer the 
earth’s surface-measured magnetic field as a possible replacement for other social-
science explanatory variables. Those explanatory variables generally should not correlate 
with geomagnetic data, so the inclusion of such a variable would not invalidate existing 
relationships found among traditional social science variables. Instead, the inclusion of a 
variable that takes very little in the way of additional resources to collect, gather, or use 
could provide a way of controlling for the volatility that may otherwise make models less 
than compelling and at the same time reduce the estimation error surrounding traditional 
relationships. 
Should overlap exist between geomagnetic data and a conventional explanatory 
variable, such that they do challenge each other, no question of causal order ought to 
arise. The nature of the variable, so obviously outside the influence of most short-term 
human activities, makes it difficult to conceive of a situation in which another social-
science variable could possibly impact it – thereby eliminating much of the concern over 
endogeneity that otherwise might exist with such a novel variable of interest. There might 
be other natural phenomena that correlate with geomagnetic fields. Therefore, it is too 
much to ascribe excessive influence to the precise one used here. Nevertheless, any such 
potential rival would represent no less of a deviation from standard social-science 
explanations; the importance of nature as a whole would hardly be undermined. 
1.5.2 Modeling Volatility 
In an effort to demonstrate the flexibility and usefulness of GMF in social-science 
research, this dissertation will visit a wide range of disciplines and policy interests. The 
intent is not to provide anything like a definitive study of how GMF might influence any 
one social or political outcome causally. Instead, the intent is to display how consistently 
GMF overlaps with such outcomes despite the lack of any obvious explanation as to why 
the causal direction would work in reverse, and despite the lack of any social, political or 
economic “root cause” that plausibly would shape both GMF and the dependent variable. 
Tracing phenomena in the natural world to the observed behavior of human 
beings not only operates outside dominant research paradigms, it can make people 
uncomfortable. They envision men in aluminum-foil hats, or science-fiction stories in 
which the government manipulates people using subliminal messages from their 
television sets or fluoride in their drinking water. Therefore, it is worth stressing: This is 
not a work arguing for determinism, in which nature’s influences make anything happen 
or somehow dictate specific outcomes. Rather, my interest is in what might cause human 
behavior to be especially unpredictable – whether in a good or a bad way. Specifically, I 
propose a source of destabilization that could produce extreme outcomes indirectly by 
9 
 
 interfering with rational cause-and-effect behavior, which would make it more difficult to 
predict (let alone artificially control) social and political outcomes. 
The traditional method of answering the sorts of social and political questions I 
will explore in this research has been to isolate remarkable cases and classify them for 
study. Grappling with these sorts of puzzles normally prompts a scholar to focus on 
explanations for negative or bad events. Disciplines publish work about murder, civil 
war, extreme market losses, and so on. Conventionally, analysts attempt to explain 
variation in these human behaviors through the inclusion of explanatory variables that 
predict specific outcomes. To whatever extent the predictive model fails to establish a 
deterministic outcome, the analysis treats any remaining fluctuation in outcomes as 
stochastic “noise.” 
Isolating the inquiry in that fashion can be unduly limiting, because it implies a 
direct cause-and-effect process challenged by the irrationality of some outcomes. Many 
events, or counts, that researchers study are outlying events along an unmeasured 
spectrum of possible outcomes. For example, murders can represent the countable 
extreme on a continuum running from extremely hostile to extremely benign orientation, 
but research necessarily ignores a swath of that spectrum, resulting in lost information 
and truncated data sets. By focusing on the rise and fall of specific quantities, models 
could miss the important trait of the processes studied that natural phenomena might 
influence volatility, or a dispersion of outcomes spreading out from the “mean” or 
average. In fact, depending on the particular data and the particular model being used, the 
result of ignoring this volatility can go beyond uncertainty and inefficiency, and instead 
through random chance cause a proliferation of “statistically significant” explanations 
that are not true – conclusions that might prompt initiatives and programs that cannot do 
what they intend. 
Human behavior certainly exhibits more than enough volatility to challenge social 
scientists developing predictive models. Theoretically, in a volatile world, there would be 
inexplicable acts of goodness, sacrifice, and love of equal scale to those irrational, and 
often horrendous and inexcusable, behaviors discussed earlier. These “good” acts are 
unlikely to appear in the sort of data available to a social scientist. They might be equally 
irrational and unreasonable but methodologists do not view as remarkable the way we 
view traditional deviance. What becomes reportable, collectable, and observable is when 
a husband commits domestic violence, not when a husband surprises his family with a 
trip to Disney World. 
If quantities rise and fall not only because of factors that directly affect their level, 
but also because of factors that increase or decrease volatility in the underlying (and 
possibly not measurable) orientation of the actors, then both the spikes and the troughs 
will follow a rhythm, a systematic relationship, that common statistical models would not 
identify. With ideal data, analysts would find the pattern in the “error term” of a model, 
and applying physical-world variables should allow analysts to capture volatility that 
otherwise is locked up in the error term of many social-science models. That is, a theory 
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 initially built not on the explanation of (countable) bad outcomes, but instead on the 
sources of volatility, ideally should model this stochastic variation. 
However, commonly studied data rarely allow a comfortable attempt to predict 
volatility. For that reason, explaining variance usually was not feasible in this thesis, due 
to limitations in available data or my toolkit of models. In such cases, I will need to 
follow precedent, and I too will be restricted to using predictive models focused on 
extreme outcomes, allowing the relationship between GMF and some extreme outcome to 
capture the underlying volatility indirectly. Such models still hold value because 
variables that lead to stochastic variation can predict, indirectly, the occurrence of 
extreme events.  
While it may appear that GMF explains events, counts, and other quantifiable 
outcomes, it is important to remember that at the heart of the theoretical argument is 
general volatility. Data on “compelling” cases may be the only thing available to study, 
but not because GMF would fail to exhibit a similar relationship with cases that fall on 
the other end of the continuum of human behavior had they been “collectible” or 
“measurable.” Crime is a good example, in that negative deviant behavior produces a 
visceral emotional reaction and compels research that would help deter it, but crime is 
rare – and the wide variation observed in the modal behavior, the absence of crime, is 
lumped together as an undifferentiated non-event. 
Therefore, while the models presented here often contain dependent variables 
such as crime counts, or counts or probabilities of international disputes or coups, 
analysts ideally evaluates the volatility of these actors that magnetic field variable(s) may 
help to tease out of the error term. In one case, analysis of the volatility in stock markets, 
I do attempt to predict volatility itself rather than just the level or conditional average of 
some countable outcome. 
Finally, concern with temporal autocorrelation is inherent with the use of time 
series data. The use of autocorrelation diagnostics and a deep analysis of such problems 
within the hundreds of models presented is outside the scope of the purpose of this 
presentation. However, periodic discussion of diagnostic results is appropriate in some 
places during the presentation. Depending on the model type and the availability of 
multiple panels diagnostic tests include the autoregessive integrated moving average 
model (ARIMA), the xtpoisson, xtprobit, xtlogit, or xtregression. 
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation will proceed as follows: Chapter Two provides 
a discussion of what the earth’s magnetic field is, and the biological and physiological 
process that may be the mechanism by which magnetic fields might influence human 
behavior. It summarizes the general literature on how magnetic fields may affect human 
mental processes. It also details the physiological processes that occur within the brain 
and the body in response to geomagnetic stimuli. It discusses how neurons and 
information exchange within the brain is impacted by magnetic fields generally. Finally it 
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 summarizes the general state of research into how geomagnetic fields specifically affect 
animal and human behavior and some of the analysis that point to magnetic fields being 
relevant and compelling explanations for various abnormal outcomes. It also explains 
what the geomagnetic field (GMF) is in relation to the environment. It also includes 
discussion of the solar-magnetic field (SMF), which relates to the GMF. The chapter tells 
what causes the earth’s magnetic field, discusses how it varies, breaks the whole into its 
component parts, and defines what those parts are.  
Chapter Three contains examples of simple descriptive models linking magnetic 
fields to a variety of dependent variables. This chapter shows how GMF operates within 
various linear and count models. In many instances, a figure depicted the rage of 
influences of magnetic fields on the dependent variable follow the models. The purpose 
of these models is to provide a compelling argument for the possible significance and 
relevance of natural phenomena variables in social-science models. None of these 
examples will provide much context or theoretical grounding within the specific 
discipline referenced, but will aggregate into a general statement regarding the possible 
direction of relationships and significance. In many cases, the circumstantial evidence 
compels a deeper analysis be carried out in later chapters. 
Chapter Four lays out the theories that deal with inter-state behavior with a focus 
on interstate disputes. This chapter shows how the GMF variable, as a proxy for the 
influence of natural phenomena on actor behavior, may help models dealing with dispute 
initiation, war outbreak, conflict resolutions, and domestic security crises. The chapter is 
full of count, probability, and regression models that capture how the environmental 
variable may relate to different dependent conflict variables. The analysis depicts some 
compelling and intriguing relationships. Many models have accompanying figures 
showing how the relationship looks over different values of the GMF variables. 
Chapter Five’s structure is much like Chapter Four, except this chapter looks at 
one of the predominant questions in criminology research, the motivation, and 
opportunity model of crime, and looks at what happens when analysts add an 
environmental variable to the model. It looks at a wide range of crimes, starting with the 
least violent and ending with murder, and ranging from the city domain to the nation. The 
models attempt to show how the inclusion of the magnetic field variable(s) change(s) an 
established model, and therefore indicate the usefulness of the variable in modeling 
“irrational” and “unreasonable” acts – which means such an explanatory variable can 
enhance the explanatory and predictive power of existing models. Once again, I make no 
implied argument for determinism in the nature of the variable or the models that include 
it. Rather I present GMF as a variable that captures an increase or decrease in volatility of 
human behavioral outcomes by predicting extreme events as environmental conditions 
change over time and space. 
This point is worth emphasizing: Magnetic fields do not cause crime. They do not 
cause one human to end the life of another brutally. I do not argue that just because the 
GMF is a certain measure that another rape must happen. There is no reason to suppose 
that an external force could control someone by manipulating magnetic fields, the way a 
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 mad scientist in pulp fiction might have tried to control someone with “gamma rays.” 
GMF is just a variable that may cause human behavior to suffer from increased 
dispersion away from the mean, away from the rational or reasonable. As the possible 
outcomes move away from the mean, and the distribution of outcomes becomes greater, 
the likelihood of having an extreme act deemed deviant, or irrational, might increase. The 
“deviant” or “irrational” act could be the giving away of one’s kidney to a complete 
stranger. Alternatively, it could be the cutting out of a kidney from a complete stranger in 
a back alley. Unfortunately, for this analysis it is not possible to assemble a complete 
dataset of the full range of positive and negative “deviant” and “irrational” outcomes. 
Instead, we can only work with the half of the distribution that captures the extreme 
negative outcomes. In this case, those outcomes are crimes. 
Chapter Six evaluates volatility directly and evaluates aggregate investor 
behavior. In particular, I will attempt to model the daily volatility of the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average. The chapter uses daily magnetic field measures in models to show 
how environmental variables may be useful on a time scale that is generally beyond a 
researcher’s ability to conduct a parsimonious and affordable analysis. The overall model 
I use is derivative, taken from prior work attempting to explain market volatility using 
Presidential signaling on the economy. Many of the previous Presidential signaling 
models showed a weak, insignificant, or unclear relationship between the President’s 
signals on the economy and the Market’s reaction to these signals. However, , the 
addition of a variable that helps capture the influence of the environment on human 
behavior, perception, and decision making, may be able to give these models more 
inferential power. They may explain a greater amount of variance in stock market moves. 
It may even save a series of political hypotheses that possessed intuitive theoretical 
power but had fallen shy of expectations. 
Chapter Seven, the conclusion, considers some of the broader theoretical 
implications of the intriguing evidence supplied by the empirical chapters. The growth of 
revisionist approaches such as fuzzy logic and chaos theory is a direct response to the 
pesky problem of relatively large error terms and difficulty that “traditional” models 
suffered when attempting to predict outcomes. A natural variable as a possible 
explanation for volatility, or variance, in human behavior may or may not come into 
conflict with these perspectives, which treat variance as acceptable and expected due to 
the uncertainty created by the world itself. This chapter also discusses the possible 
implications of my research for public policy, how it could be relevant to policy creation 
and analysis. Technical information on the sources of data used including the data used to 
construct control variables is included in a Technical Appendix at the end of the thesis. It 
provides this location information, should it be useful to others judging the research 
approach or seeking to replicate any of the statistical work. 
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Chapter 2  Geomagnetic Fields and Political Science 
 While we may not realize it, the sense natural phenomena shapes human behavior 
already pervades human culture and language in a form of integrated acceptance that 
goes well beyond proof’s ability to support. There are several illustrations: the belief that 
(1) temperature influences crime, (2) lack of sunlight correlates to suicide and depression, 
(3) more women get pregnant during the winter, and (4) climate influences work ethic. 
The link between temper and temperature is ingrained throughout the language, as 
seen from phrases such as “hotheads,” “tempers flare,” anger “simmers,” tensions “come 
to a boil” – while, at other times, a situation might “cool down” – in referencing the 
relationship between temperature and violence and crime. Shakespeare illustrates the 
perceived linkage between internal and external temperatures in Romeo and Juliet. 
I pray thee, good Mercutio, let's retire. The day is hot, the Capulets 
abroad, and if we meet, we shall not 'scape a brawl. For now, these hot 
days, is the mad blood stirring. (Act III, Scene 1, Lines 1-4) 
The connection linking anger and violence to temperature appears in scientific 
research. The most detailed study of this relationship, a two-year study of property crimes 
in Minneapolis, Minnesota, looked at 281 different temporal variables, including 
holidays, school closings, time of day, day of week, and temperature, among others. The 
analysts argued that temperature was a significant predictor of property crime events 
(Cohn & Rotton, 2000). Their study found that violence increased with temperature, 
although admittedly only a little: At about 80 degrees Fahrenheit, competing interests of 
aggression and escape started to bend the curve on rising violence versus temperature. 
That is, moderately high temperatures cause people to lash out, but the highest 
temperatures produce such discomfort that people exhibit a flight response. 
Researchers have worked this natural phenomenon into their “opportunity and 
motivation theory” of crime. Opportunity is a function of spending time outside and 
around others. As temperatures rise, more people retreat inside, so opportunity declines 
and crime falls. A re-examination of the Minneapolis data five years later, controlling for 
time of day, documented an increase in the strength of the relationship between 
temperature and assaults (Bushman, Anderson, & Wang, 2005).  The findings do not 
seem to be restricted to the United States, as a similar study of England and Wales found 
a similar relationship (Field, 1992). 
  We believe heat relates to violence against others, but my second example 
suggests that other natural environmental variables correlate to violence against the self, 
such as depression and suicide. The relationship to the lack of light and depression has a 
clinical title: Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD), or winter depression. SAD appears to 
involve a number of potential influence factors such as brain chemicals, ions in the air, 
and genetics. The result is that people are particularly sensitive to the lack of light. 
One line of research regarding SAD explains the relationship as mediated by the 
production of melatonin. A natural variable, light and its availability, is central to 
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melatonin production. Seasonal change compounds this variation, which triggers 
increased production of melatonin during winter months as opposed to summer months. 
Melatonin is one input into the maintenance of circadian rhythms and sleep patterns. The 
air, meanwhile, is full of negative ions in the springtime and not in the winter. 
Researchers have determined that ion therapy, a manipulation of the natural environment, 
proves quite effective at treating SAD. Sufferers sleep on a special conducting bed sheet 
and a stream of negatively charged ions bombard them. No one is sure as to what the 
mechanism and the process is that ties season, light, ions, and sleep together to moderate 
depression. However, researchers are convinced that environmental factors, including 
seasonality, light, and environmental ions trigger SAD. The most effective treatment 
seems to be changing the quality and duration of light exposure as well as the 
concentration of negative ions in the environment. 
Contrary to the situation of Seasonal Affective Disorder and its conclusion that a 
lack of quality light is a contributing factor in inducing depression, a growing body of 
research connects suicide to too much light. Violence against self is connected to 
exposure to too much light in several studies. The Harvard School of Public Health has 
completed research that shows sunlight positively correlated with suicide (Trichopoulos) 
and negatively correlated with the occurrence of schizophrenia in dark-skinned people 
(McGrath). A study in Australia indicated that long, sunny days correlated with suicide 
and not temperature, rainfall, or barometric pressure (Lambert, 2003). The study 
hypothesized that the neurotransmitter serotonin is likely involved. Other research had 
discovered serotonin imbalances in the brains and cerebrospinal fluids of suicide 
completers. Serotonin and melatonin are both sun-influenced hormones. Of course, 
studies has found that several other factors associated with this relationship exist, such as 
the presence of a history of depression among men and neurotic, stress-related, or 
somatoform disorders (Reutfors & al., 2009). 
Trending toward violence against others and self may seem two sides of the same 
coin, in terms of natures’ effect on human behavior. The third example speaks to a 
happier outcome: the generally accepted trend that human conception increases in 
frequency over the winter months. Cultural expressions often attribute observed patterns 
of intercourse and fertility to physical comfort. Consider, for example, the comical 
sentiment expressed in Cole Porter’s “It’s Too Darn Hot” from Kiss me Kate.  
According to the Kinsey report 
ev’ry average man you know  
much prefers to play his favorite sport 
when the temperature is low 
… (Porter, 1948) 
 
Analysis suggests that environmental factors in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries drove seasonality of reproduction. However, in the mid- to late-20th century, 
these environmental factors no longer correlated with seasonality of reproduction. Human 
culture, society, and technology largely overcame the earlier relationship in an 
industrialized nation (Doblhammer, Rodgers, & Rau, 1999). Contemporary seasonal 
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variation in childbirth more likely traces to environmental drivers of hormone production 
(Wehr, 2001). Most research ties the situation to “photoperiodism,” resulting from the 
production of hormones such as melatonin, dopamine, and serotonin. Individual level of 
analysis that controlled for both individual fertility and couple’s sexual activity as well as 
intensity and timing of their activity confirmed these findings. This study collected 
incredibly personal data on couples because of their participation in a systematic program 
of fertility and family planning at 12 clinics throughout Europe. A study found that 
seasonality only mattered for women, aged 27-31, and that in most situations intensity 
and number of sexual encounters during “fertile” periods was the strongest explanation 
for “seasonality” (Rizzi & Dalla-Zuanna, 2007).  
Yet another research program places seasonality of reproduction squarely on the 
body’s production of the hormone kisspeptin. This hormone is produced The body 
produces this hormone in response to environmental conditions such as reduced 
availability of resources, reduced hours of activity, etc., to preserve resources. In humans, 
a deficit in the receptor for kisspeptin has been associated with severe reproductive 
impairment. Kisspeptin also has the power to trigger ovulation in women and testosterone 
production in men (D'Anglemont de Tassigny & Colledge, 2010).  
It seems that technology and hormone production, coupled with the environment, 
drive reproductive behavior in humans. Economists largely accept my final illustration of 
how environmental factors might affect human behavior: that of adverse weather. In 
modern times, there is no compelling reason why individuals must stay home or shop less 
when it is merely rainy outside. Yet economists, economic analysts, and investors 
discount bad earnings and revenue reports as well as poor economic activity if they can 
identify that a region was suffering from rain or snow conditions. 
These adverse conditions can fall far short of blocking access routes or locking 
automobiles into driveways. Just an extended period of rainy weather, or cold and snow, 
can be used to legitimate poor performance of retail or other economic activity. The 
justification is that precipitation alters how individuals feel, motivating them to reduce or 
delay consumption. This drop in spending causes a general decline in local or regional 
economic activity. Short of flooding or blizzard conditions, the effect on people is one of 
altering behavior rather than constraining behavior.  
2.1 Influence of Natural Phenomena in Sociology and Psychology 
The tradition of explaining human actions with reference to the natural world is 
not limited to these commonly discussed examples. Several research programs exist that 
advantage measures of natural phenomena to help explain socially and politically 
relevant human behavior in a thoroughly formal way. Sociology, psychology, and 
biology seem to be the primary disciplines with subfields that utilize models and theories 
with natural phenomena as primary causal variables influencing human behavior. 
Economics and political science have smaller research literatures that evaluate the 
relationship between natural environment and human behavior, but often the direction of 
effect is unclear. Several multi-disciplinary research programs, meanwhile, also exist that 
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focus on natural phenomena and environment as either critical explanatory variables or as 
the dependent variable. 
One of the earliest research programs that correlate human behavior and human 
adaptation to the environment started with Charles Darwin’s research on natural 
selection. The link between Darwin’s concepts and the modern work on natural selection, 
human ecological sociology, and environmental sociology is clear and direct (Huttel, 
2002) and (Catton W. R., 1982). Given that the misuse of Darwinist concepts when 
applied to human society is widely known, I need not belabor that example here. 
Another example: Sociologists assert that spaces and places, because of the 
physical layout and use of area, can evoke emotional responses. These spaces and places 
can also stimulate positive or negative behavioral responses. A 1977 study found that the 
layout and environmental conditions of the physical area in which teachers worked 
correlated to their general attitudes and behavior connected to the school building (Lewis, 
1977). More generally, while social determinism with Sociology became useful as the 
ideas of biological determinism lost traction among researchers – that is, although 
explanatory variables in the categories of social and cultural conditions dominate the field 
-- the rise of the environment movement in the 1960s and 1970s changed that. By calling 
for the application of the “systems perspective” to make new and more relevant and 
complete inferences, scholars brought environmental determinism into vogue (Dunlap, 
2002). 
Human behavioral ecology, as a subset of Sociology, leverages evolutionary 
theories such as natural selection and adaptation to explain expressed traits or behaviors 
that might result from environmental stimuli. In the 1970s, a new research project called 
the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) grew in importance. NEP placed environmental 
variables in the primary role for explaining human behavior. NEP asserts that while 
humans have the capacity for innovation and ingenuity, we still exist in interdependent 
relationships with other species and our natural environment. This program 
acknowledges the influence of social and cultural forces but stops well short of claiming 
social determinism, recognizing cause, effect, and feedback loops in natural ecosystems 
affect humans (Catton & Dunlap, 1978). 
While these assumptions explicitly refer to the impact that changes in 
environment have upon the relations between and among individuals, as well as societal 
relations more broadly, the execution of the Political Ecology research program focuses 
on the material conditions of a society rather than some “natural” biological or physical 
impact on behavior (Walker 2005). This program expresses interest in the impact of 
pollution, natural disasters, pandemics, weather, etc., on human behavior (Blaikie, 1985). 
Several subfields of psychology also leverage the concepts found in ecological 
sociology to define and develop the role of the environment. A subfield of psychology, 
Human Behavioral Ecology, seeks to explain human behavior as a response to ecological 
and social factors in the environment. (Human Behavioral Ecology also appears in 
Anthropology.) It portrays human behavior as resulting from evolutionary changes that 
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responded to both ecological and social conditions. In these research programs, the 
dependent variables are human behavior and human evolution while the primary 
explanatory variables are natural and environmental phenomena or conditions. 
The subfield of Environmental Psychology spans a wide range of research areas, 
including natural environments, social settings, built environments, learning 
environments, and information environments. At its core, the subfield desires to develop 
a model of human nature that predicts how the environmental conditions will affect 
behavior. The goal of such a model is an understanding of how to create environments 
that maximize good behavior and minimize deviancy (Ittelson, Proshansky, Rivlin, & 
Winkle, 1974). One of the first works in this field discussed how the sun and moon 
affected human activity, the impact of extreme environments on human mental and 
emotional processes, and the effects of colors and form in engineering (Hellpach, 1939). 
Evolutionary Psychology (EP) attempts to use the modern evolutionary 
perspective to identify which human psychological traits are evolved adaptations from 
interaction with the environment. The mechanism for the evolution could be natural 
selection, sexual selection, or some other mode of selecting traits. Evaluating the 
physiological mechanisms in the body is the norm in evolutionary biology. The main 
assertion of Evolutionary Psychology (EP) is that the mind possesses a modular type 
structure like that of the body. These structures have different modular adaptations, which 
serve different functions. Evolutionary psychologists assert that many human behavioral 
outputs result from psychological adaptations resulting from interaction with the 
environment (Dunbar, Barret, & Lycett, 2005). Evolutionary adaptations include 
empathy, mate choice, cooperation, etc. (Wright, 1995). 
Similarly, Cultural Ecology examines the relationships between societies and the 
natural environment to include ecosystems and non-human life. The central argument is 
that the environment is a major explanatory variable to explain social organization, 
human institutions, and hence human behavior (Anderson, 2009). Anthropology applies 
Cultural Ecology to explain many strange human behaviors such as hoarding or gifting. 
Cultural Ecology informed subfields of geography primarily through research in how the 
beliefs institutions in a culture regulated its interaction with the environment and how the 
environment frames social behaviors (Butzer, 1978). 
2.2 Geomagnetic Mechanisms of Influence 
A long, established, rich, and very compelling history of the leveraging of 
environmental and ecological variables to explain human behavior exists. In many 
instances such dynamics have become an ingrained part of western culture and much like 
the proposition that democratic nations do not go to war against each other, many of the 
ecological arguments are close to analytical laws. Political Science research has largely 
run in the direction opposite from the other disciplines who accept some influence from 
the ecological component to the human action. Political Science studies the influence of 
human action on ecological components of our world. This thesis challenges that 
orientation, following on traditions in Sociology, Psychology, Economics, and 
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Anthropology by seeking environmental variables that affect human action – albeit 
variables that are quantifiable and relevant to political areas of study. 
The explanatory factor of interest is magnetic fields. These fields permeate the 
space around everyone. Generally, two categories of magnetic field interest me here. The 
first is the Geomagnetic Field (GMF) and the second is the Solar Magnetic Field (SMF). 
The Earth generates its’ GMF, or Earth’s magnetic field, where the outer core and the 
mantle meet. Where the outer core and the mantle meet is the core-mantle transition area 
and imbues the soil and rock with a magnetic field. The interaction of the Sun’s activities 
and the Earth’s Magnetosphere generates the Solar Magnetic Field (SMF). One well-
known result of this effect is the Aurora Borealis seen near the Earth’s poles, but variable 
magnetic fields also reach down to the Earths’ surface. These naturally occurring 
magnetic fields change in intensity over time and space. The absolute intensity of a field, 
the intensity of the field relative to other times and places, and rate at which field 
intensity changes all vary based on the geological characteristics of an area. 
Scientists have long been aware that these magnetic fields influence plant growth 
(Belyavskaya, 2004), animal behaviors (Spalding, Freyman, & Holland, 1971), animal 
navigation (Walker M. M., 2002), and recently it has been hypothesized as influencing 
climate change (Staff, 2009). Until recently, however, few researchers have extended 
those observations to ask whether magnetic fields somehow produce behavioral 
responses among human beings. That relative silence in the social-science literature may 
reflects a general reluctance to hypothesize natural-science influences on human 
behavior, given that there are several mechanisms through which these magnetic fields 
could impose behavioral effects on humans. The most likely is through interaction with 
the human brain, which operates using chemical and electrical signals that a magnetic 
field could alter or obstruct. Interference with these signals would in turn alter the manner 
in which the nervous system interprets, transmits, and codes information. 
2.2.1 Neural Signal Transmission Using Chemicals 
Many of the signals and most of the “thinking” and “deciding” actions that 
humans undertake on a daily basis involve the brain and its neurological systems. 
Generally, neurons communicate signals throughout the brain. Neurons are electrically 
excitable cells that transmit information using both chemical and electrical signals. In 
chemical transmission, neurons maintain voltage gradients across their membranes using 
metabolically driven ion (charged particles) pumps. The membrane potential comes about 
primarily from the interaction between the membrane and the actions of two types of 
trans-membrane proteins embedded in the plasma membrane. The membrane acts as both 
an insulator and diffusion barrier to the movement of ions. Ion transporter/pump proteins 
actively push ions across the membrane to establish concentration gradients across the 
membrane, and ion channels allow ions to move across the membrane down those 
concentration gradients, a process known as facilitated diffusion.  
In the most fundamental example of this, the ion transporter Na+/K+-ATPase 
pumps sodium ions from the inside to the outside, and potassium ions from the outside to 
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the inside of the cell. This establishes two concentration gradients: a gradient for sodium 
where its concentration is much higher outside than inside the cell, and a gradient for 
potassium where its concentration is much higher inside the cell than outside. The 
creation of these gradients is the first place that GMF/SMF could have an influence. 
While the cell’s membrane is resistant to magnetic fields at the very small one micro-
tesla range, GMF and SMF influences typically rise well above these levels, and 
therefore reach strengths are high enough to overcome membrane protections. The thin 
neuron membranes associated with many illnesses could increase the likelihood of 
influences on the neurological “system.” 
 Ion channels embedded in the neuron’s membrane and ion pumps generate 
intracellular-versus-extracellular differences in the concentration of ions such as sodium, 
potassium, chloride, and calcium. This results in changing voltage strength along the 
membrane as concentrations shift on either side of the membrane. Changes in the cross-
membrane voltage will alter the operation of voltage-dependent ion channels. This is the 
second point in the “system” where GMF/SMF can influence the process. Magnetic fields 
should be able to alter the ion concentrations outside the cell, thereby affecting voltage 
changes. Because sizeable voltage changes would generate an electrochemical pulse, or 
“action potential,” magnetic fields could either increase or decrease the number of 
electrochemical pulses generated. 
 This explanation of how magnetic fields affect the operation of the human brain is 
untested, but some research on simpler organisms does provide basic support for such a 
mechanism. For example, research on snails has shown that neurons exposed to magnetic 
fields at different strengths experience significant changes in the excitability and firing 
frequency of neurons. Magnetic fields disrupt normal neuron characteristics and their 
synchronized firing patterns by interfering with the cell membrane’s properties. The 
research indicated that the possible explanation was an effect on both ion channels and 
relative ion concentrations (Moghadam, Firoozabadi, & Janahmadi, 2011). 
The action potential travels rapidly along the axon of the cell. This activates 
synaptic connections with other cells. The signals “arc” across small spaces between 
axons and dendrites between different cells. This is another point in the “system” where 
the magnetic field could disrupt the process. It is possible that the fields could have an 
effect on the ability of ions and electric arcs to travel between the axon and the dendrites 
that allow for the transmission of messages between and among neurons. The effect could 
range from accelerating travel across the gap to retarding it. 
2.2.2 Neural Signal Transmission using Electricity 
In electrical transmission, neurons use electrical synapses. An action potential can 
transmit directly from one cell to another because of direct connection between excitable 
cells. The signal travels across “gap junctions.” The free flow of ions between cells 
enables rapid non-chemical mediated transmission. Special channels ensure that action 
potentials move only in one direction through an electrical synapse. In electrical signal 
transmission, GMF and SMF can affect the conditions in the “gap junction” as well as the 
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conditions in the special channel that ensures signals travel in only one direction. Finally, 
GMF and SMF can affect the ability of the two neurons to generate an action potential 
that results in an electrical transmission of a signal. Electrical synapses exist in all 
nervous systems, including the human brain, although they are a distinct minority 
(Purves, Augustine, Fitzpatrick, & al., 2001). 
2.2.3 The Pulvinar  
Another potential source of geomagnetic and solar magnetic effect is through the 
Pulvinar. The Pulvinar is part of the thalamus in the human brain and exists in a wide 
range of humans, although not in rats. GMF’s ability to operate through the Pulvinar 
would account for a wide range of associations with GMF, including generally high 
levels of violence, aggression, and inability to gain consensus. When Pulvinar are 
affected, it can cause variance in the emotion of fear and responses to threat as well as 
perception of threat. Humans have two routes to activate the center of emotion and threat 
response. One is through the visual and association cortex and another through the 
thalamus, specifically the Pulvinar.  
Although research provides little direct evidence that magnetic fields interfere 
with the functioning of the Pulvinar, the next step in the causal chain, the behavioral 
effects of Pulvinar functioning, has been documented scientifically. Experiments show 
that variance in influence on the Pulvinar has an associated response on the part of the 
individual’s ability to process and respond to images of threats (Ward & Bamford, 2005). 
Other pathologies associated with the Pulvinar are negligent syndrome and attention 
deficits. Negligent syndrome is the inability to perceive or process information located in 
a given relative space. For instance,  
…in an extreme case, a patient with neglect might fail to eat the food on the left 
half of their plate, even though they complain of being hungry. When asked to 
draw a clock, someone with neglect draws a clock showing only the numbers 12 
and 1 to 6, the other side being distorted or left blank. Neglect patients may also 
ignore the contralesional side of their body, shaving or adding make-up only to 
the non-neglected side. (Unsworth, 2007) 
The other main pathology is the general class of attention deficits. The primary 
attention deficit is Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). ADHD is a chronic 
condition that persists throughout an individual’s lifetime. ADHD related symptoms 
generally result in a significant impact on education, employment, and interpersonal 
relationships. Research shows that adults with ADHD are more likely than their non-
ADHD counterparts to experience automobile accidents (Swenson, Birnbaum, Hamadi, 
Greenberg, Cremieux, & Secnik, 2004) and less likely to complete their education 
(Cimera, 2002).  
Adults suffering from ADHD manifest significantly lower rates of professional 
employment, even controlling for confounding psychiatric problems (Anthshel, Faraoane, 
& Kunwar, 2008). Adult ADHD sufferers may reach conditions in which their coping 
mechanisms become overwhelmed. When this happens, some may turn to smoking, 
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alcohol, or illicit drugs. The result is that many adults end up suffering from one or more 
associated psychiatric conditions such as depression, anxiety, or substance abuse. Many 
with ADHD also have associated learning disabilities, such as dyslexia, which 
contributes to their difficulties (Eden & Vaidya, 2008). 
Additional evidence that GMF may have an influence on transient electrical 
anomalies in the brain possibly resulting from hormone changes exists in studies of 
sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) as well as adult cardiac arrhythmias. One study 
looked as the cases of SIDS and adult cardiac crisis in Sandury (Ontario) region in 1984. 
A factor analysis showed that 35-40% of the variance in occurrence of SIDS and cardiac 
crisis in the region correlates with variance in the geomagnetic field. The analysis 
indicated that geomagnetic influences on the brain is more relevant to explaining the 
number of SIDS and the number of cardiac crisis than blood than many other 
mechanisms evaluated, including blood flow (O'Connor & Persinger, 2001). 
Another possible mechanism of “action” is in pineal serotonin-N-acetyl 
transference activity and the concentrations of melatonin and serotonin. Exposure to 
magnetic fields can disrupt normal circadian rhythms in rats as a result. Disruptions like 
these have been associated with depressive disorders in humans. If the pineal dysfunction 
in rats because of magnetic fields exists in humans, the dysfunction can contribute to the 
onset of depression or will exacerbate existing depressive disorders (Wilson, 1988). 
2.3 Research and Experiments: Effect on Perceptions 
Regardless of the specific mechanism, most studies examining GMF effects on 
biological systems focus on animals that use the magnetic field to navigate, namely 
creatures such as birds, sharks and sea turtles. Birds and sharks both use the GMF to 
navigate during migration and are affected by changes in these fields (Kimley, 1993), 
(Bastian, 1994), (Kalmijn, Gonzalas, & McCiune, 2002) and (Paulin, 1995). Research has 
shown that artificially manipulating these fields causes birds to be unable to migrate 
(Moore, 1980) and affects interaction with others of its species. In sharks, artificial 
manipulation of the GMF, generally through the placement of the shark in concrete and 
metal tanks, results in agitated behavior, a reduced aggressiveness, confused behavior and 
listlessness, an inability to eat, and eventually death (Kalmijn 1969 and 1982). Likewise, 
GMF has been blamed for whale, dolphin, and shark beaching (Klinowska, 1988), 
(Lohmann, Cain, Dodge, & Lohamann, 2001), (Lohmann, Lohmann, Erhart, Bagley, & 
Swing, 2004), (Semm & Beason, 1990), (Skiles, 1985) and (Phillips, Freake, & Borland, 
2002).  
Research on GMF and SMF affecting humans generally starts with the Russian 
researcher A.P. Dubrov, who was able to conduct research and publish works that 
indicated that the GMF effect on humans was compelling and relevant to decision 
making and hence, rationality (Dubrov A. , 1978) and (Dubrov A. , 1980). After 
Dubrov’s work in the 1970s, Dr. Michael A. Persinger and his protégés account for the 
largest percentage of publications in the area of geomagnetic influences on animals and 
people. Dr. Persinger has been conducting laboratory research “verifying and determining 
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of the contribution of geomagnetic activity and experimentally-induced pulsed magnetic 
fields to brain function and anomalous experiences” since 1981 (Persinger M. A., 2006). 
The growing field looking at geomagnetic effects on humans includes 
experimental and statistical studies and covers a wide range of areas. One of the largest of 
the research programs deals with human cognitive ability and perception. Many oddities 
previously attributed to “paranormal” phenomena could represent the peculiar operation 
of magnetics. For instance, various cultures explain the Aurora Borealis as anything from 
spirits going to heaven, to heaven itself. Cultures attribute the Borealis to dragons, spirits, 
and reflected light. It has only been in recent decades that scientists have been able to 
explain the Aurora (Stamper, Lockwood, & Wild, 1999). Other examples, such as 
“sensing” or seeing UFOs or being haunted, may represent nothing more than magnetic 
interference with the brain’s data processing. Magnetic field variance has been 
statistically correlated with perceptions of UFOs, Ghost (Nichols & Roll, 1999), (Nichols 
& Roll, 2000) and (Spittiswoode & James, 1997), extra sensory perception (Schwartz, 
2006), religious experiences, and even poltergeist episodes (Gearhart & Persinger, 1986). 
Researchers suspect the magnetic field activity created images of the Virgin Mary 
in the minds of people visiting a site in Canada. The site was a former magnetite mine 
that had been accumulating about 15 million gallons of water per month for more than 10 
years. Between 1992 and 1997, seismic activity had moved closer to the location. A study 
of the area found GMF activity that was similar to that created in the laboratory and 
resulted in sensed presences (Suess & Persinger, 2001). An experiment with 16 subjects 
found that 75% of the eight who experienced an above average number of partial 
epileptic-like experiences reported a “presence” when exposed to certain geomagnetic 
fields. None of the eight subjects with a below-average number of partial epileptic-like 
experiences reported a “presence” (Cook & Persinger, 2001). 
Under laboratory conditions, researchers placed 12 men and 12 women under 
varying geomagnetic fields and asked to imagine alien invasions. The results of the 
experiment indicated field strengths affect aspects of imaginings and alter suggestibility 
of individuals (De Sano & Persinger, 1987). In another situation, researchers took 
magnetic field measurements at a house inhabited by two adults who reported above 
average partial epileptic experiences. It was found that magnetic fields were found to be 
correlated with the occurrence of reported “waves of fear,” tactile sensations, nightmares, 
apparitions, and sensed presence (O'Connor, Koren, & Persinger, 2001). A 1992 study of 
pilots found that a relationship existed between helio-magnetic (i.e., solar magnetic field) 
exposure and intensive homeostatic levels accompanied by a decreased functional 
activity of the central nervous system. This led to a sharp decline in flying skills (Usenko, 
1992). 
In another experiment, researchers exposed 53 men and 86 women to weak 
magnetic field for 30 minutes a day over 96 non-sequential days. They recorded their 
experiences after having the field applied. The results showed a statistically significant 
relationship between global geomagnetic fields and incidents of experiences attributable 
to memories. The relationship was gender dependent. Women reported more experiences 
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at lower magnetic values while men reported more experiences at higher values. This 
finding was the basis for re-analysis of 395 separate individual reports of “precognitive 
experiences” over a 100-year period. This reanalysis confirmed that at higher 
geomagnetic field strengths, men reported more experiences than women did, and women 
reported more experiences at lower geomagnetic field strengths (Persinger M. , 2002). 
The previously cited experiments and studies all provide compelling, if somewhat 
problematic, evidence for some sort of effect of geomagnetic fields on individuals’ 
perception of their environment and that the influence may vary with gender. However, 
these influences only indirectly relate to the areas of interest of Political Science, public 
policy, criminology, and Economics. Yet it is easy to see how altered perceptions could 
affect all sorts of outcomes within these domains. 
2.3.1 Effects on Memory 
Beyond immediate perceptions, geomagnetic fields affect memory as well. One 
experiment indicated that GMF affected the details of recall (Michaid & M.A., 1985). In 
another experiment, fifty men and women were exposed to generated magnetic fields or 
to a “sham” field and asked to code statements as being “foreign language” or not. 
Researchers executed a refutation process under experimental and controlled magnetic 
field influence Subjects were evaluated for their tendency to accept refutations of what 
were in fact falsehoods versus their tendency to maintain their correct assessment. During 
magnetic influence, participants accepted twice the number of refutations as true when 
they were false, as did subjects acting in a “sham” field. The results indicate that GMF 
may affect a person’s susceptibility to being convinced or accept false statements as 
being true (Ross, Koren, & Persinger, 2008). This and the previous evidence indicates a 
telling ability of GMF to influence individual perception and memory in ways that moves 
individual understanding, processing, and use of information away from the “logical and 
rational” in ways that have significance to key theories in political science, criminology, 
and economics. 
Even more directly relevant to the study of political science, criminology, and 
economics are two experiments done on rats related to geomagnetic influence on 
aggressiveness and violence. The first, published in the International Journal of 
Neuroscience, discussed three separate experiments on groups of male rats exposed to 
either a “sham field” or a magnetic field. For the last 20 minutes of magnetic exposure, 
researchers recorded the numbers of boxing, biting, mounting, eating, drinking, and 
grooming events for each group. Magnetic fields accounted for between 25 and 50% of 
the variance in the number of biting and boxing events respectively. Magnetic fields did 
not affect other behaviors. The evidence supported group aggression being a function of 
the varying strength of geomagnetic fields (St-Pierre, Koren, & Persinger, 1998). Further 
analysis of the data from these experiments indicated that the geomagnetic effect was 
strongest (statistically) in manifestations of biting, the most violent of the aggressive 
behaviors. After controlling for weak serial correlations, it was determined that the other 
aggressive behaviors could not be definitively correlated with the geomagnetic field. The 
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researchers hypothesized that the effect of the magnetic field manifested itself in the most 
aggressive behavior (St-Pierre & Persinger, 1998). 
2.3.2 Effect on Psychological Health and Well Being 
 Much of the medical and physiological research looking at the effect of magnetic 
fields on the human body has focused on cancer. Unfortunately, in an attempt to get to 
the issue of the relationship between cancer and electrical fields, these studies often 
missed an opportunity to look at mortality, specifically deaths at the hand of self or 
others, in relation to magnetic fields. A study over 21,000 electrical workers in Quebec 
between 1970 and 1988 was one of the first to evaluate electric fields and mortality. The 
study leveraged a control group in order to determine Rate Ratios in causes of mortality. 
In this study the only significant rate ratios, and at the 95% confidence interval, was 
death due to accident and violence in workers exposed to each of three types of fields; 
electric, magnetic, and pulsed electromagnetic fields. Occupational accidents only 
explained a small portion of the risk ratio. Some association, but not significant, was 
found among the fields and brain cancer and suicide (Baris, Armstrong, Deadman, & 
Theriault, 1996).  
A study of 540 adults living near extra-high-voltage transmission lines attempted 
to refute several studies associating fields with depression, suicides, and other adverse 
psychological effects. The hypotheses of the researchers centered on earlier studies 
failing to adequately control or account for confounding variables and having inadequate 
measurements of exposure to fields. The 540 subjects completed neuropsychological tests 
in memory, attention functioning, mental health, and other areas. Researchers took field 
measurements in each room of the subjects’ homes to provide an estimate of total time 
exposure. The researchers used joint multivariate multiple regression, controlling for the 
effects of confounding variables. Their results showed no field effect on memory and 
attention, but a significant association with psychological and mental ailments. There was 
also association with poor coding test performance and adverse psychiatric 
symptomology. These results were independent of the participant’s beliefs about effects 
of electromagnetic fields (Beale, Pearce, Conroy, Henning, & Murrell, 1997). 
 A later analysis attempted to clarify the relationship between fields and the 
suicides among utility workers. Researchers reexamined the previous cohort of 138,000 
male electric utility workers in the United States, focusing on the prevalence of suicide 
among the group. The nested case-control study examined mortality from suicide in 
relation to the workers field exposure. There were 536 suicides among the group and 
5,348 eligible controls. The data indicated an increased odds ratio of around two for 
increased chance of suicide over the control group for lineman and electricians. 
Researchers found a stronger association between field exposure and men under 50 years 
old than for the entire cohort.  Representing a 95% confidence interval the odds ratio for 
men under 50 was 2.12 – 3.63, relative to the control group. A lineman or an electrician 
exposed to electric and magnetic fields in the previous year, controlling for other 
variables, had odds of between two and three ½ times those of the control group of 
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committing suicide in a given year (Van Wijngaarden, Savitz, Kleckner, Cai, & Loomis, 
2000). 
 The amount of evidence supporting a relationship between electromagnetic fields 
and suicides is compelling and growing. Oleg Shumilov of the Institute of North 
Industrial Ecology Problems found that between 1948 and 1997 geomagnetic field 
activity had three peaks every year. He also found that the geomagnetic peaks matched 
the peaks in the number of suicides in the Russian city of Kirovsk (Brahic, 2008). While 
Shumilov was collecting his data, a research project ending in 1994 suggested a 
relationship between depression and magnetic activity. In fact, the analysis showed that 
magnetic activity during the period resulted in a 36% increase in the number of men 
admitted to hospitals for depression (Kay, 1994). 
The Institute of Cancer Epidemiology in Denmark conducted several studies in an 
attempt to show the relationship between these fields and diseases. Publics were 
becoming increasingly concerned with the “fields” they were being exposed to on a daily 
basis, and the growth in use of cell phones was a contributor to public concerns.  
Researchers evaluated all the employees in the Danish electrical industry. The Danish 
Cancer Register did not identify increased cancer risk, as suggested by public concerns. 
However, there did seem to be a link with increased mortality from amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis, or ALS, and field exposure. 
Physiologically, human stress responses and decision-making skills seem affected 
by magnetic fields. Whether the effect is normatively adverse or positive is dependent on 
the type of field, the intensity, the rate of change of the field, and the group or individual. 
It is unclear if the effect of magnetic fields on individuals and groups is enough to drive a 
fully rational individual who is not prone to violence, or suffering from socio-economic 
status conditions that encourage violence, to violent acts. It is also unclear if magnetic 
fields themselves are a powerful enough predictor or causal variable to push safe drivers 
into risky behavior that results in accidents. Likewise, it is unclear the effect of GMF has 
on causing an airline pilot to make mistakes that end in crashes. Further, GMF causing 
groups of business people to fall into irrational and risky investment behaviors seems 
problematic. So too, does GMF is tilting the perception of national leaders and decision 
makers so they initiate and join unwinnable wars. Even asserting GMF has an impact on 
individuals’ consciousness motivating them to vote for candidates who are losing or 
already winning elections seems dubious. Nevertheless, evaluating the estimated effect, 
significance, and goodness of fit of models including GMF provides some evidence these 
effects are real. 
2.4 Government Research on Magnetic Influence 
While the number of medical and social research publications was pointing to a 
substantial relationship between magnetic activity and psychological health, the world’s 
national and trans-national institutions were largely staying away from the debate. The 
closest the research comes to endorsement by an authoritative government body occurred 
in 2006. Admitting to the relationship only after he left his official position in 2006, a 
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former head of the European Geosciences Society asserted that geomagnetic-related 
health problems affected between 10% and 15% of the European population. Also in 
2006, an Australian government funded study found a relationship between geomagnetic 
activity and the count of suicides (2006). While not government sponsored, the South 
African Institute for Health, in an effort to get at the issue of suicide’s relationship with 
magnetic fields, conducted a review of thirteen years of South African suicide data. The 
review demonstrated a link between suicides and geomagnetic activity (Staff, 2006).  
In the United States, the closest that the federal government has come to 
acknowledging an effect of magnetic fields on humans, either psychologically or 
physiologically, is a study of market behavior conducted by the Federal Reserve. This is 
the most authoritative and respected institution to evaluate an aggregate effect of 
magnetic fields on a population’s behavior. A study commissioned by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta showed a relationship between geomagnetic activity and daily 
stock market returns. The research paper found that geomagnetic fields had statistically 
and economically significant effects on daily stock market returns. Increases in activity 
resulted in negative performance for all U.S. Stock Indices (Krivelyova & Robotti, 2003). 
2.5 Magnetic Effect Politics, Economics, and Decision Making 
None of the research conducted to date has asked questions directly related to 
decision-making and behavioral outcomes. The closest the research comes is the Federal 
Reserve study of daily market returns, and even this is indirect. Nevertheless, the 
psychological and physiological studies suggest that magnetic fields would interact with 
the environment and the characteristics of individual and groups, and may contaminate 
the choices made. 
For instance, groups of economic actors have choices to make. One possible set of 
choices leads to accurate evaluation of corporate values and stock prices. Another set of 
choices leads to an inaccurate assessment that overvalues stock prices and corporate 
values. The second set of choices result in an extraordinary increase (or decline) in a 
stock index that is followed by an extraordinary decrease (or increase) when the market is 
in need of correction. The result of the latter would be high volatility, indicating an 
inability of the market to determine a value of the basket of stocks that make up the 
market adequately. Periods of high or low volatility could be associated with magnetic 
activity or measures, as supported by the U.S.’ Federal Reserve’s study. 
The relationship between car accidents at intersections and global magnetic 
actively is an area that has received some attention. The hypothesis is that magnetic fields 
could influence the decision maker’s ability to perceive correctly the conditions in the 
intersection. If the driver correctly perceives the conditions at the intersection, no 
accident will occur regardless of whether the driver races through or slows to stop.  If the 
decision maker incorrectly perceives the intersection and slows to a stop nothing 
probably occurs. If the decision maker incorrectly perceives the conditions of the 
intersection and races through the intersection, then an accident would be probable. This 
example becomes more complicated and the likelihood of accidents arising out of 
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incorrect perception of the conditions at an intersection more likely when one takes into 
account that in a theoretical intersection multiple approaching cars are available at any 
point in time. The more drivers moving through an intersection in a period, the higher the 
probability that one of them would eventually perceive the intersection incorrectly even 
though each may have the same very low probability of misperception (Westerland & 
Dalkvist, 1999).  
Most decisions involving human actors probably revolve around moral situations. 
This is especially true in the recent research indicating that brain stimulation correlates 
with altered morality (2010). The study results showed that stimulating a specific region 
of the brain interfered with participants’ ability to assess hypothetical situations dealing 
with morality. People’s moral judgments actually changed when activity in specific areas 
of the brain were disrupted. The research team used the technique of “transcranial 
magnetic stimulation” to disrupt activity in the right temporoparietal junction of the 
brain. The method applies a magnetic field to a small area of the head, which interferes 
with the brain’s ability to work properly. Participants often perceived as morally 
permissible attempts to harm even when others did not harm, while at the same time 
judging as morally wrong accidents that were not motivated by any attempt to harm. One 
conclusion of the study was that magnetic interference might have resulted in an inability 
to judge intentions, forcing recourse to the outcome as the only understandable variable 
the evaluator could process. In a similar manner, criminals with a reduced ability to 
determine the morality of an action because of the influence of magnetic fields might 
judge acceptability of their potential behavior using inappropriate cues. 
Regardless of how it plays out, the mechanisms are largely the same. Magnetic 
fields that effect perception, while at the same time decreasing individuals resistance to 
suggestion, could create conditions where one may “sense” things that are not real, “feel” 
things that are not connected to reality, lose bearings on their moral or emotional 
compass, and break free of the risk-benefit calculus that normally goes on inside a 
person’s mind.  
2.6 Earth’s Magnetic Field as Explanatory Variable 
The mounting evidence is that earth’s magnetic field may have an effect on 
human psychological, sociological, behavioral, and physiological outcomes. In particular, 
research shows that there may be a relationship between magnetic fields and negative 
human behavior. The implications for magnetic fields as a powerful predictive and 
explanatory variable are wide and varied. 
2.6.1 Cost 
First, the variable is cheap to collect, relatively easy to use and understand, and 
the period of measure can be as short as a second. This means researchers can analyze 
incredibly precise and discrete periods. Unfortunately, since other “standard” social 
science variables do not cover such small analytical periods, its application will be at first 
limited. In the analysis presented in this work, the smallest period analyzed is the day. 
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Second, the prevalence of monitoring stations all over the world and the existence 
of extensive data ranging over 150 years provide a systematic, free, easily attainable, and 
easily used data set. Further, should more precise geological locations need monitoring or 
more expansive area covered in more detailed – such as a series of intersections, 
classrooms, schools, court rooms, etc. – the devices used to measure magnetic fields are 
inexpensive, easy to use, and easy to monitor. 
The ability to collect field data anywhere, its low cost to use, and a temporal 
division as small as one second mean a radical transformation in how researchers should 
view parsimonious models and data collection. The ability to scope down data collection 
to very small and specific geographic and temporal space allows researchers to minimize 
problems of ecological fallacy when using aggregate-level variables (King G. , 1997). 
While the use of field variables, if found to be sufficient to model processes and 
relationships, will not eliminate this problem if other data in the model suffers from it, the 
use of magnetic fields can surely minimize it. Consider revolutionary models that can 
model the day a leader makes a decision to commit a crime using socio-economic 
variables and the values of the Geomagnetic and Solar-magnetic components and indexes 
for that specific day. The availability of detailed hourly, minute, or even by the second 
measures of GMF and SMF could allow the “mapping” of risk acceptance over a detailed 
period. Another example would be to use hourly GMF and SMF data to structure the type 
and nature of learning activities in schools, or court cases, or voting, etc., to the minute or 
hour. Their nature and pervasiveness may mean that including them makes most models 
slightly more complex. However, with the ease of availability of the data, they should 
make the research no more resource-intensive. 
2.6.2 Shifting Theory Away from Problematic Assumptions 
 Another implication from using magnetic fields is that researchers studying 
models that have rational-actor assumptions finally have a variable that should provide a 
useful indicator of when that assumption would be less likely to apply. It is arguable 
models based on rational choice assumptions are perfectly satisfactory without 
accounting for a critical environmental variable that affects the underlying assumption of 
rationality, or that at least introduces additional variance into the phenomenon studied. 
However, such an argument immediately demands a rejoinder that questions the validity 
or necessity of the rational actor. 
It is unknown at this point by reviewing the literature what the extent of any 
interactions are, how important the magnetic field is as a component of each interaction, 
and whether the interaction masks or even replaces the non-magnetic field associated 
independent variables until the models are run and compared. As models and analysis 
indicate later in this work, it is highly likely that fields, as defined by the various indexes 
and components of the Geomagnetic and Solar Magnetic fields, would contribute in 
critical ways to the development of efficient (if not unbiased) models. If this is so, the 
implications for data gathering, model building, and political and social scientists 
understanding of critical social and economic relationships are compelling. 
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2.6.3 Direct influence on Policy Making and Individual Choice 
Transforming costs and altering the framing of principle assumptions of theory 
and hypotheses are compelling enough reasons in most instances supporting the argument 
for the inclusion of this new and relevant variable of interest. A, the case made for the 
value of magnetic field is in terms of policy and application. One such use could mimic 
the smog and ozone warnings that are a regular part of many large cities’ quality of life 
and health programs. Another comparison is weather forecasting and reporting, which is 
an important part of many communities’ crisis preparedness and mitigation programs. 
Magnetic field reporting and modeling can be a critical tool in the policymaker’s toolkit 
for anticipating adverse outcomes, risk taking, and decision-making. One can imagine 
geomagnetic data used when budgeting, allocating resources, districting schools, 
selecting locations for trials, exams, conflict resolutions, etc. With the use of GMF in 
policymaking and analysis, one could try to predict or model where additional acts of 
violence likely would occur, shifting protective resources in response. This would allow a 
more “rational” and sophisticated budgeting process. 
A significant effect by magnetic fields would offer a highly specific and cheap 
method to assist in resource planning and distributions. It would be more scientific than 
“we send police there because crime happens there,” or “we save up overtime for 
holidays because that’s when people commit crime.” By providing a geographical non-
personal profile of where and when crime is more likely to happen, concerns of racial 
and social profiling to apportion resources to combat socioeconomic issues perhaps 
would be curtailed. 
 With GMF fully integrated into the communities’ normal weather and conditions 
reporting, individuals and groups could gain invaluable information that would allow 
better management of time, risk, and safety. What if alongside ozone alerts, smog alerts; 
traffic accident warnings, traffic transit times, and adverse weather warnings, drivers and 
pedestrians had access to route and intersection specific magnetic field warnings. Alerts 
could inform decision makers of intersections that have a higher probability of resulting 
in accidents (Westerland & Dalkvist, 1999), or interchanges, or even high-density traffic 
or pedestrian dense areas. Perhaps traffic lights could adjust in their timing to anticipate 
the heightened risk drivers will race through an intersection. 
In the area of international relations, the locations of summits, conferences, and 
meetings could affect the outcome of these events. GMF may affect Peace and Conflict 
resolution efforts in the locations of the efforts. The choice of magnetic field influences 
that promote cooperation, rationality, and not aggressive agitation could be useful in 
resolving conflicts and disputes. Geo-engineering, landscaping, and creating conditions 
of field activity that promote cooperation, rationality, and suppresses agitation and 
aggression provides information useful  in nation building, policing, community 
development, resolution of ethnic tensions within polities, and encouraging economic and 
social development. Of course, these sorts of precautions would require firm evidence 
that geomagnetic fields influence diplomatic outcomes, but the effect would not need to 
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be particularly strong before it interacts with the dire consequences of failure to be worth 
taking seriously. 
2.7 The Geomagnetic Field 
The impact of the magnetic field in human and policy terms should be 
compelling. A diverse and wide breadth of research in many different disciplines 
provides the foundation for using the Earth’s magnetic field in human and policy studies. 
One cannot yet assert that the depth of analysis, research, and understanding reaches the 
same extent as that breadth, but in some subfields, it goes deep enough to make 
researchers increasingly confident in their studies. The increasing number of authoritative 
and government-sponsored research efforts over the last 20 years demonstrates this. 
Some understanding of what the earth’s magnetic field is, as well as the characteristics 
and nature of its variation, should he possessed before using the variable. Readers not 
interested in the technical side of the data may wish to skip to the next chapter.  
2.7.1 Measures of the Field 
The publication of William Gilbert’s De Magnete in 1600 initiated rigorous 
scientific study of the Earth’s magnetic field. Before that, date people were interested, 
and some studies conducted, but this work started the scientific process of unraveling the 
mysteries of the Earth’s geomagnetic field. Electric currents at the core of the planet and 
high above its surface generate the Earth’s geomagnetic field. All of these currents 
contribute to the “total geomagnetic field.” The geomagnetic field, measured at a 
particular instance at a particular location, is the accumulated manifestations of many 
physical processes occurring everywhere in the world and around the planet out to the 
sun. The analysis in this work uses only a small portion of the information contained in 
the geomagnetic and stellar magnetic fields. The information is limited to that collected 
and studied at ground-based observatories, although space-based observations are 
available to the public. 
 The general measures used to define and describe the magnetic field consist of 
eight different components. The magnetic-field components – labeled X, Y, Z – define 
the Cartesian components of the field north, east, and down. The observatory components 
(H, D, Z) are the horizontal intensity, the declination (i.e., the difference between 
magnetic north and true north), and down. The final component is “I,” or inclination. All 
these components join together to constitute “F” or total field (Jackson, Jonkers, & 
Walker, 2000) and (Bloxham & Jackson, 1993). These values change over time, and at 
different rates, proving sufficiently variable that they are useful to use in models that 
hypothesize physiological and psychological effects on actors. The most common form of 
measurement of the field intensity is the Tesla. In the state of Kentucky in 1976 at the 
earth’s surface, for example, the total intensity varied from 24000 nanotesla (nT) to 
66,000 nT. Other units used in measurement are the Gauss (1 Gauss = 100,000 nT) and 
the Gamma (1 gamma = 1 nT) (Survey, 2010). 
We have traditionally used three primary tools to measure the geomagnetic field. 
The oldest and most widely used is a compass. Compasses can provide measurements of 
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the direction of the geomagnetic field.  Later magnetic variometers collected 
measurements of the Z, H, and B. There were several different types of these variometers 
in use, but all provided similar precision and accuracy of measurement and required 
accurate leveling and stable platforms, limiting them to land. These types of instruments 
were the ones used in geomagnetic stations that provided the older, pre-1945, data in the 
data sets used in studies within this work. Engineers designed these instruments to 
measure within +/- 1nT. This is approximately 1/50,000th of the background GMF. 
Generally, scientists measure the direction of the field in mils or degrees. 
 During the Second World War a new measurement device was introduced and 
used primarily to locate submerged submarines from the air and is known as a fluxgate 
magnetometer. The device was capable of measuring the Z and H component of the field 
under certain circumstances to within +/- 1nT but was much more capable of measuring 
the total field (F), to within +/- 1 nT under most conditions. The modern method of 
measuring the GMF is using a proton precession magnetometer, used for both survey 
work and observatory monitoring. The general precision of the device used in fieldwork 
is within +/- 1 nT for the total field, although greater precision is possible when necessary 
(University of Washington, 2010). This is the primary device used to conduct magnetic 
surveys from the air and is the tool that provides most of the post-1945 data. 
2.7.2 Field Components  
 Measuring the magnetic field is only the first issue with using it in models. Next 
comes knowing what is being measured. The magnetic field is actually an aggregate of 
multiple vector (direction and value) force measurements. For data used in the studies 
contained in this work, the intensity of the total field (F) is described by the horizontal 
(H), vertical (Z), and north (X) and east (Y) component of the horizontal intensity. 
Instruments measure these components in units of gauss, but report in nanotesla, where 
100,000 nT equates to 1 Gauss. The magnetic declination is the angle between magnetic 
north and true north and labeled “D.” The angle is positive in value when the angle is east 
of true north and negative when west of true north. 
Magnetic inclination is the angle between the horizontal plane and the total field 
vector (Metadata Catalogue). If the field is perpendicular to the Earth, then the measure 
of the angle is 90 degrees. Scientists believe that animals in navigation use this angle. 
Magnetic inclination is perhaps the more difficult of the concepts to understand through 
written description. An example may be useful to understand the measurement and what 
it means. In a compass, the needle is freely suspended and capable of spinning around as 
well as moving up and down (when considered parallel to the ground). Magnetic 
declination and the effect of the field lines of the earth result in the needle spinning and 
aligning in a north-south azimuth. The magnetic inclination pulls down on the north-
seeking end of the needle. If the north-seeking and south-seeking ends of the needle were 
equal length and the center of gravity of the needle allowed pivoting up and down, then 
the magnetic inclination would drag one end of the needle towards the ground. 
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The maximum effect is to have the needle pointing directly at the ground, which 
would be a 90-degree inclination or perpendicular to the ground and the magnetic field. 
Modern compasses compensate for this effect by making one end of the compass arrow 
longer (weighted) than the other end so that the center of gravity offsets the general effect 
of the magnetic inclination. In order to do this, most commonly produced compasses 
come in 5 different versions to account for the general inclination of the five 
differentiated bands of magnetic inclination: magnetic north, north magnetic equatorial, 
magnetic equatorial, south magnetic equatorial, and magnetic south (Goulet, 2009). 
Geological and solar events affect declination significantly. A “secular” change 
pattern that can change the declination by one degree every 2 to 25 years is a 
characteristic of the Earth’s poles. For instance, the north magnetic pole has moved over 
1,000 kilometers since Sir John Ross first reached it in 1831. Since mid-2002, the rate of 
displacement has been accelerating. It is currently moving at about 39 kilometers per year 
versus the previous average of 6 kilometers per year (What is Magnetic Declination, 
2010).  
The solar wind also affects declination. This wind distorts the Earth’s magnetic 
field depending on the season and time of day. Generally, the effect increases as one 
moves from the equator to the poles. At the equator, the effect is “generally” negligible. 
In Ottawa, Canada, the effect can be measured at an average of +/- .1 degree of distortion, 
while 500 miles from the north magnetic pole the effect can be a +/- 9 degree distortion. 
2.7.3 Use of Earth’s magnetic field variables in models 
 While the application of magnetic field variables may complicate models and 
require the collection of data on additional cases because of the sheer number of 
geomagnetic components, including primary ground field components as well as a solar 
index component, the effort can be simplified through the use of the total field, F, since it 
is actually an aggregate measure of effect of the initial five components caused by solar 
interactions with the ground level field. It is essentially an index. 
Geomagnetic field measurement effects also are complicated, though “Current 
systems” caused by regular and irregular solar radiation changes. The Space Physics 
Interactive Data Resource hosted by the National Geophysical Data Center is the 
repository for measurements of the interaction of the solar wind with the magnetosphere, 
the magnetosphere itself, interactions between the magnetosphere and the ionosphere. 
Ground stations measure these interactions and effects as a variation for a “normal” quiet 
day on a scale developed in 1938. The scale is quasi-logarithmic logic index of a 3-hour 
period of magnetic activity relative to the “quiet-normal” day for an observatory and is 
the K-index. 
 Analysts transform the K- into a Kp-index. The Kp index transforms the 0 to 9 
range K-index into a scale of thirds of a unit. Researchers refer to the Kp-index as the 
planetary index and it has a value range of between 0 and 27. The planetary index 
measures solar particle radiation by its magnetic effects. Finally, researchers derive a 
three-hour Ap (known as equivalent range) index from the Kp index. The range of the Ap 
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index is from 0 to 32. Solar data is available in one-hour increments from the National 
Oceanic and Space Weather Center. The Space Weather Prediction Center provides 90-
day forecasts and a long-range predication for each solar cycle. Analysts update forecasts 
weekly (Administration, 2011). 
Figure 1 Predicted and Actual Ap Index Values 15 April 2009 to 15 May 2009 
 
 
 Another solar magnetic index used in the studies within this work is a C9 index. 
The C9 index is a transformation of an index called the Cp index, which is a qualitative 
measure of the overall daily magnetic activity from the sun. The qualitative measurement 
is a result of the sum of the eight (one measure every 3 hours for eight measures in 24 
hours) Ap amplitudes. Figure 1 presents a chart of Ap over a 30-day period. Cp ranges 
from 0 to 2.5 and moves within the range in increments of one tenths. Zero represents a 
“quiet” day while 2.5 represent a highly disturbed day. The C9 index transforms the 25-
step (0 to 2.5 in one tenth increments) Cp index into a scale of 0 to 9 with zero being 
“quiet days” and 9 being “highly disturbed” days (Northwest Research Associates, 2009). 
 Existing total force intensity data is available for a number of countries as well as 
cities. The comprehensive data collection offers a variety of magnetic field temporal 
measurements, ranging from mean values every minute to mean values every year. 
Ninety-six different countries have collected GMF data, starting in 1813. Many model us 
the geomagnetic variable as well as the global measure of solar magnetic activity as a 
variable of interest. Researchers refer to these measures as Ap, Kp, and K indexes. 
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Chapter 3  Impact of the Earth’s Magnetic Field 
 The previous chapter established a theoretical framework for the influence of the 
earth’s magnetic field on outcomes involving human behavior. The framework presented 
included both a summary of the literature concerning the possible influence of the earth’s 
magnetic field on human behavior and an explanation of possible mechanisms of 
influence. While both the theory and the literature may be intriguing, neither provides 
evidence that the effect is real or that it would be relevant to any of the issues that 
concern the discipline of Political Science. If there is an effect, it may not manifest itself 
in the relationships that yield political, or politically relevant, outcomes. The effect may 
be small or lacking significance. Once models account for other explanations for variable 
behavior GMF may not be significant, have a noticeable effect, or fit specified models 
well. Thus, the next step in advancing this science must be to subject the ideas to 
empirical testing. 
A time may come when, to establish a solid causal inference able to link natural 
phenomena to socially and politically relevant outcomes, researchers might want to focus 
on one or two especially critical outcomes and probe the question of causality in detail. 
This research is in its infancy, however, so it is unclear whether such research would be 
fruitful or instead represent a dead end. First, scholars need enough circumstantial 
evidence to warrant taking on that research agenda. Providing such suggestive evidence 
will be the burden of the remainder of this thesis. The following chapters evaluate a large 
number of relevant social and political outcomes to evaluate whether the outcomes 
correlate to occurrence of GMF values.. 
3.1 Direct Effects of Geomagnetic Fields 
 The earth’s magnetic fields may influence human behavior not through any direct 
“mind control” but by exerting a destabilizing effect that increases the chance occurrence 
of certain extreme or remarkable events. If so, a survey of statistical models could present 
a trend in correlations as a side effect of how the relationship between magnetic fields 
and human behavior manifests itself in the collected dependent variable. Given the way 
researchers collect data and what data is collected, the pattern resembles a direct effect.  
As discussed earlier, this research hypothesizes that the earth’s magnetic field 
increases the volatility of possible outcomes resulting from human behavior and human 
choice. However, because of the way data is collected as well as what can be observed, 
only one end of the spectrum of volatile behavior is generally “counted.” Although the 
influence of the earth’s magnetic field may increase occurrences of counts in two 
different directions through the “flattening” and spreading out distributions, researchers 
generally only record the counts that are of “interest” and sitting in one tail of the 
distribution. For instance, researchers observe an increase/decrease in robberies, but not 
an increase/decrease in voluntary giving that may accompany the counted increase. 
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While capturing both sides of the volatility dilemma is rare, it could be happening 
inadvertently. For instance, in Michigan many forms of crime are down year-over-year 
(FBI, 2011). Analysts confirmed the trend in mid-year crime reports and they believed 
the trend to have continued into the holiday season near year’s end. While for most of the 
year any news or reports of “non-crime” events increasing or decreasing due to volatility, 
or the direct effect of the magnetic field for that matter, went largely unnoticed. Then 
leading into the holidays events started to be recognized. One such event was the “secret” 
paying off lay-a-way accounts in Michigan K-Marts. Reporters first documented the 
phenomenon in Michigan. Recognition of such acts quickly spread. Anonymous persons 
paid thousands of dollars on others’ law-a-way accounts (Tuttle, 2011). 
Table 1 Changes in U.S. Regional Uniform Crime Reports, 2011 (FBI.gov) 
 
Region 
Violent 
crime Robbery 
Property 
crime Burglary 
Larceny-
theft 
Total -6.4 -7.7 -3.7 -2.2 -4.0 
Northeast -3.6 -2.6 -3.8 -1.6 -4.6 
Midwest -9.7 -8.1 -4.4 -3.2 -5.3 
South -5.8 -8.6 -3.0 -1.6 -3.1 
West -6.6 -10.2 -4.0 -2.7 -3.9 
The increase in both non-murders and murders comes from an increase in 
volatility resulting from the influence of magnetic fields. Analysts expect Volatility to 
affect the distribution on both sides of the mean equally. Models with relationships 
represented by such distributions have an unchanged mean, but a greater probability of an 
event or value found in either extreme of the two-dimensional distribution’s tails. Models 
that do not account for the increased volatility from the influence of the earth’s magnetic 
field will find their distributions “spread out” and “flattened.” The model may also suffer 
from greater unexplained variance and real-life occurrences of extreme behaviors. 
However, the rate of occurrence remains unchanged, or nearly so. 
 Why not measure the variance directly using a heteroskedastic model or some 
method of modeling variance in the effect of independent variables, rather than modeling 
the effect on the dependent variable?  It is possible to conduct heteroskedastic analysis on 
some of the data available for analysis and model variance directly. However, the nature 
of this study is to provide a less-than-exhaustive look at how the earth's magnetic field 
could be affecting some "core" areas of attention. For this purpose, modeling data as a 
simple rate provides a more approachable method that expands the available audience. 
The next step in validating the underlying mechanism of influence is to model directly 
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the variance and determine how much influence of the earth's magnetic field the variance 
captures. This analysis also informs researchers on how other variables of interest affect 
the dependent variable because of the magnetic field's influence on those independent 
variables. For now, the discipline has not yet come to a consensus on the value of such 
models in terms of either time or efficiency (Keele & Park, 2005). Even with the 
introduction of technologies to speed up such analysis (Corneliben, 2005) the use and 
interpretation of these models is problematic, tend to bias under most circumstances, and 
can lead to incorrect inferences (Keele & Park, 2005). 
Anyhow, effects on variance are not the only possible way geomagnetic fields 
could influence outcomes, even if that is the most-likely way. It is possible models suffer 
from effects of omitted variable bias when they do not account for the increased volatility 
resulting from earth’s magnetic field. Debate rages in the discipline concerning the 
validity of concern over omitted variable bias (Achen, 2005) caused primarily by the lack 
of mathematical evidence supporting any sort of predictable effect of omitted variables. 
The problematic methodological solutions for solving the issues of bias due to omitted 
variables fuels this debate (Clark, 2005) and (Gary King, 1994). The default solution is 
“more variables and data,” which is in many instances a problematic tilting at windmills. 
Often more variables and more data are not available, or so costly as to be prohibitive. 
Further, the mathematics of regression may not support additional data yielding what we 
can know as less-biased estimators (Clarke K. A., 2005). More variables may lead to 
mispecified models. More data and more variables, while always welcome, are not 
always a possible solution to methodological problems. 
However, the mathematical evidence points to more problems when omitted 
variable bias is present than when irrelevant variables are included in models. Extraneous 
variables lead to models that are more inefficient. The more the extraneous variable 
correlates with relevant independent variables in the model, the more they will 
unnecessarily drive up standard errors (Voss, 2000).  Establishing that relationships seem 
to exist and remain stable throughout analysis, and in particular that the impact of 
including a geomagnetic variable is statistically significant, would provide reason to 
include such a “control” variable in predictive models. 
 I do not expect that this explanatory variable would dramatically alter most 
research literatures. Theoretically, I have no reason to assert or argue that most of the 
traditional explanatory variables used in models of human behavioral outcomes would no 
longer be significant or relevant. Further, available analysis provides only limited 
evidence suggesting these traditional variables even have their measured effect attenuated 
by the inclusion of magnetic variables in models. One expects, theoretically, that few 
variables are spurious or that the bias of their estimators would be so large as to call into 
question "core" inferences in most literatures. However, the existing state of the research 
program can meet two requirements that including magnetic variables in some models 
may accomplish: 
1. Control for conditions that may be associated with over-dispersion. 
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2. Allow for analysis of new temporal domains, such as the day, and provide an 
available independent variable that allows for models that look at relatively short 
periods of analysis. 
Statistically, we have no way of knowing, without a theoretical grounding, whether the 
earth's magnetic field is an omitted variable resulting in biased estimators or will act as an 
extraneous variable and make existing estimators inefficient. 
The theoretical story of how the earth’s magnetic field operates, what the possible 
mechanisms of influence are, and in what way such a variable could impact models far 
from demonstrates that a causal relationship exists or that it reaches levels that are 
substantively meaningful. The nature of the variable, and the rules governing whether a 
variable is relevant and omitted as well (as it potentially results in biased estimators when 
omitted), provide sufficient reason to argue for the inclusion of the earth's magnetic field 
in models of both individual and aggregate human behavior. 
An omitted variable must have two characteristics: 
1. The omitted variable occurs before the included variables, causally if not 
temporally. 
2. The omitted variable has an influence on the dependent variable. 
It is difficult to argue that the magnetic field is not first among possible independent 
variables. It is naturally occurring, continuous variable, generated by the earth, and not 
influenced by other socially relevant variables. It is safe to say that it is causally prior to 
all other regularly utilized variables even if causally related to a dependent variable. The 
evidence provided in previous research with magnetic fields, while at times mixed, has 
demonstrated a relationship or influence with a diverse set of dependent variables 
representing human behavioral outcomes. 
Further, consistent findings in this work point to strong and compelling influence on 
human behavioral outcomes by the earth's magnetic field. Often, given the nature of the 
earth's magnetic field and its existence as a "first" variable, it would be correlated with 
independent variables that are themselves human behavioral outcomes. For instance, in 
modeling crime, the earth's magnetic field occurs before unemployment and income. 
During this period, the magnetic field correlates at extremely high levels with crime when 
included in a bivariate model. The total local geomagnetic field for Kentucky has an 
average expected effect with a very low probability of zero. The relationship of the field 
strength and the crime index count has a high goodness of fit with a Poisson relationship. 
Similarly, tables shows the magnetic field heavily correlates with unemployment 
(positively) and income (negatively).  
 
38 
 
  
Table 2 Kentucky Crime Index and the Local Magnetic Field 
  Total Local Magnetic Field 
Dependent Variable 
Model 
Type 
Coefficients 
and Standard 
Error 
Significance 
Level Obs 
Psuedo 
R2 
Crime Index 
Kentucky 1970-2008 Poisson 0.212 0.000 *** 20 0.9724 
  0.000562     
 
Table 3 Correlations among Field, Unemployment, and Income 
 Correlation 
 Unemployment Rate Per Capita Income 
Total Local 
Field 0.948 -0.9981 
 
It may be useful to take a small step back and look again at the two possible ways that 
adding magnetic variables could demonstrate its effect on the dependent variables of 
interest. 
3.2 Direct Effects and Omitted Variable 
 Theoretically, if a relationship between magnetic fields and the dependent 
variable exists, it is most likely that the magnetic field variable(s) will have a direct 
influence on the values of the dependent variable. The theory of Occam's Razor 
(Keuzenkamp, McAleer, & Zellner, 2002) argues against suggesting that traditionally 
used explanatory variables are in some way mediating variables transmitting the effects 
of magnetic variables to the dependent variable. Most readers would view such a 
suggestion without any evidence dubiously. However, this is not so much the case when 
hypothesizing a simple and direct relationship. 
Usually analysts assume the following systematic linear relationship between y and X 
variables exists: 
Equation 1 Standard formula for systematic relationships 
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When using matrix expression define the components as: 
 y and ԑ are n x 1 column vectors (i.e. there is only one value of y and ԑ for each 
value of X) 
 X = n x k matrix (i.e. X is all variables and all their values influencing Y) 
 β = k x 1 column vector (i.e. there is one expected value of β for each variable 
composing X) 
We can estimate b, the k x 1 vector of parameter estimates; β, using matrix form as 
b = (X'X)-1X'y = Ay 
If we were unaware of all the explanatory variables that should appear in X, we could not 
use the appropriate formula for y: 
y = Xb + e 
Instead, we would have to split X into two parts, the part that we have collected and 
know about, and the part we have omitted. The formula we work with in this case is: 
Equation 2 Formula of a regression with explanatory variables partitioned 
y = X1b1 + X2b2 + e 
The example of crime in the previous section using this model graphically depicted is as 
follows. 
Figure 2 Graphic of the Magnetic Field as an omitted variable in the model of Crime 
 
In the above formula, y represents all collected values of the dependent variable. 
X1 represents all the values for the collected and included independent variables and b1 
represents all the values for the expected influence of a unit change in each X1.  X2 and b2 
represent the same concepts with different numerical values, while applying to the 
omitted independent variables that should have been included in the formula/model. 
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 If X2b2 is not included in the model, then the omitted information does not 
disappear. Instead, changing the  term and the standard     
independent variables conserves the omitted information. The omission makes one less 
confident in the b1 values and the estimated values of y, Ŷ. It is possible to define the 
impact of the omission on the used independent variable. If we only regress y on X1 
instead on the entire X, then we will not derive the b vector. We may derive a b1 vector, 
but only under specific and stringent circumstances. For ease of reference, consider the b1 
vector that the partial model derives as b1*. One derives this vector as follows: 
Equation 3 Coefficient of effect derived with an omitted variable. 
b1* = (X1'X1)-1 X1'y = A1y 
This formula is the same as its predecessor, except it represents the specific set of Xs that 
generate the b1* in this model, A1 = (X1'X1)-1 X1'. Instead of the correct coefficient for b1, 
the model estimates: 
Equation 4 Formula for the coefficient with omitted variables 
b1* = b1 + A1X2b2 
To determine if these coefficient estimates would be unbiased, the expected value of b1* 
can be derived mathematically. If b1* = b1 then there is no bias from the omission of the 
independent variables. However, as we see below, generally b1* ≠ b1. 
E(b1*) = E(A1y) 
Because X1 is presumed to be a fixed component, so too is A1. 
E(b1*) = A1 E(y) 
Substitute the formula for y for the y component of the formula. 
E(b1*) = A1 E(X1b1 + X2b2 + e) 
Next, distribute the expectation operator. 
E(b1*) = A1 [E(X1b1) + E(X2b2) + E(e)] 
Apply each expectations operator. Remember that X1 and X2 are fixed. The expected e 
term, if all relevant X are included in the model with no omission, is 0. 
E(b1*) = A1 [X1E(b1) + X2E(b2)] 
Distribute A1. The model assumes that b ia unbiased. 
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E(b1*) = A1 X1β1 + A1X2β2 
Remember, AX = I for any X. Substitute the value I for each AX term (with matching 
subscripts) and the following results. 
Equation 5 Estimated coefficient centered on the truth with bias identified analytically 
E(b1*) = β1 + (A1X2)β2 
This demonstrated that under general conditions the expected value of b1, b1*, is the 
unbiased β1 estimator plus the (A1X2)β2 term.  
 Remember the two requirements for omitted variable bias: 
 1. The omitted variable correlates with the dependent variable. 
 2. The omitted variable correlates with the remaining explanatory variables. 
To get out of matrix notation, we can consider the effect of omitted variable bias 
assuming only one omitted variable. This allows focus on the product of two correlations 
versus some n number of correlations: 
Equation 6 Formula for an omitted variable correlating with an explanatory variable 
b* = bry + bro boy 
bro represents the relationship between the relevant explanatory variable and the omitted 
variable. boy represents the relationship between the omitted variable and the dependent 
variable. The formula allows the derivation of a chart of direction of bias and a chart 
showing the effect on magnitude of an omitted variable. 
 
Table 4 Direction of bias of a relevant omitted variable 
  bro is 
  + - 
Boy Is 
+ + - 
- - + 
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Table 4 shows the effect of multiplying values with different combination of 
signs, which is what occurs in the bro boy term. The + sign indicates an increase of the 
value of b* away from its true value, or a positive bias. The – sign indicates a decrease of 
the value of b* away from its true value, or a negative bias. 
 
Table 5 Effect of the direction of bias on the magnitude of the bias 
  BroBoy is 
  
 
+ 
 
- 
 
b1 is 
+     
-     
 
Table 5 shows the effect of the different signs on the magnitude of the bias in b1 as an 
estimator of a unit change in X1 effect on the dependent variable Ŷ. 
3.3 Indirect Effects of Geomagnetic Fields 
 The previous discussions focused on direct effects, with attention to the issue of 
omitted variable bias. Explanatory variables also can have indirect effects. As discussed 
earlier, it may be premature to assert that mediating effects or indirect effects exist in the 
relationship among explanatory variables that include earth magnetic field variables. 
However, it is appropriate to discuss what such a relationship would generally mean and 
what it may look like in any survey of models including magnetic variables if found that 
such a relationship could exist. 
Authors describe the indirect effects in terms of “mediating” variables. Mediating 
variables reside in the “space” between independent variables and the dependent 
variables. Some effects from the independent variable pass through the mediator variable 
and onto the dependent variable. The mediator can act as a lens, increasing or decreasing 
the effect of the independent variable as it passes through onto the dependent variable. 
This is the indirect effect. 
Consider the possibility that magnetic fields influence scores on the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test. Literature indicates that the earth’s magnetic field would affect the test 
taker’s ability to process information, perform high order reasoning, and “intuition”, as 
well as senses of well-being and anxiety that would help a test taker feel confident a lack 
of confidence in derived solutions. This influence would affect precision of solutions 
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generated from like or similar processes performed by test takers. Solutions would take 
longer to devise, and they would be less likely to correct. Repeated attempts to gain 
derived answers to assist in narrowing down possible solutions shows how the influence 
of the magnetic field could result in much less dependable and efficient information to 
solve problems. 
The literature on the influence of geomagnetic fields indicates that the fields may 
have different measures of effect on females versus males. The literature on SAT score 
trends indicates that males and females have differing trends in performance for both 
verbal and math portions of the test. The magnetic field possibly could have an indirect 
effect on SAT scores through the mediation of gender. 
Figure 3 Model of the direct, magnetic field, and indirect, gender, effects SAT scores. 
 
 While magnetic fields may have a direct effect on SAT scores, the possibility 
exists that the magnetic field has an indirect effect. Test taker gender may mediate the 
indirect effect.. The mediation effect could take on any number of possible forms. It 
could be that the variance in derived solutions will be greater in one gender than another 
because of magnetic influence. Alternatively, the variance may shift in one direction or 
another for one gender versus another. Finally, it is possible that magnetic field effects, 
when mediated through gender, reduce the variance of one gender when compared to 
another. Whichever way it works, exclusion of geomagnetic variables would prevent a 
full analysis of test performance. 
3.4 Survey of relationships among fields and outcomes 
A theoretical grounding in the literature, a plausible mechanism for the effect of 
magnetic fields, and a somewhat detailed explanation of how an effect can manifest itself 
in different ways in something as “mundane” as SAT scores begs the question of whether 
the “theoretical” story can be supported with statistical analysis and general inferences 
made from that analysis. Theoretically, one can see how impacting the variation in 
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derived solutions to a question also influences how close the available derived solutions 
across the population would be to actual available options: With an exam, increasing the 
variance in how people derive answers would increase the chance of choosing the wrong 
answer in many cases. Often, therefore, geomagnetic variables would correlate with a 
dependent variable containing outcomes. 
Analysts address this question most simply by using a series of regressions that 
look at the relationship among several different measures of the earth’s magnetic field 
with a wide range of readily available and arguably interesting dependent variables. 
Seeing whether these patterns hold up by the addition of a few traditional, low-
controversy variables also will be possible in this chapter. Later chapters will follow with 
richer and more detailed explorations of full models. Appendix 1 through Appendix 4 at 
the end of this chapter contains the statistical results of the large number of models 
summarized in the chapter. The tables group statistical models by level of complexity of 
the variables included in the models and model type. 
These tables represent a survey of possible correlations among the earth’s 
geomagnetic fields and some dependent variables of interest that cover a wide range of 
social science interest. The first appendix includes models with the Ap and the C9 indices 
as measures of global geomagnetic activity. Analyses treat Ap and C9 as system effects 
in models. The second appendix uses the measure of the Total Geomagnetic Field, the F 
Field, as the only independent variable in the model. The Total Geomagnetic Field is the 
ground level measure of the total effect of the earth’s magnetic field. The third appendix 
breaks the Total Geo-magnetic Field measure of activity down into its localized 
components. Analyses average each of the localized components across polities to 
represent national- and state-level measures of earth magnetic fields. The final appendix 
contains models using various measures of magnetic field as the explanatory variable of 
interest as well as some traditional control variables. 
3.4.1 Discussion of Presentation Tables 
 The two models used in the analysis are linear regression and Poisson count 
models. This survey uses a diverse series of dependent variables to model using magnetic 
fields. The dependent variables fall into several different general categories. These 
categories are economic, social, academic, and political. The economic category includes 
models of the misery index, unemployment, inflation, labor force participation, percent 
change in gross domestic product, labor strike activity, aviation accidents, interest rates, 
and budget deficits. The social category includes models of crime counts in various 
categories such as murder and rape, abortions, and suicide. The academic category has a 
set of models of SAT performance. The political category includes models of Supreme 
Court behavior, changes in national Freedom House scores, aggregate voter behavior in 
the United States, and U.S. election outcomes. There are 110 different models in the 
survey. Based on the preponderance of evidence provided by those models, combined 
with the previous discussion of the causal mechanisms and a review of the relevant 
magnetic research, the survey results compels  further analysis and research. Chapter 
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Four will look at the international relations implications. Chapter Five will look at the 
relationship between different crimes and the earth’s magnetic field. Chapter Six will 
look at the role of the earth’s magnetic field on economic and financial processes. 
 The appendices show two formats of tables. An orientation to the tables may be 
useful to the reader. The first type of table lists the dependent variables of interest in the 
model along the left hand side of the table. Adjacent to the variable name and indication 
of scaling, if applicable, is the type of statistical model used to model relationships; 
regression or Poisson, etc. Along the top of the table are the various independent 
variables used in the models. Within the data information area of the table each 
explanatory variable has their coefficient reported in bold. The standard errors of the 
estimates associated with the explanatory variable are listed and displayed below the 
coefficient and are italicized. Additional data reported in the tables include the level of 
significance as indicated by a number of stars, the number of observations included in the 
sample, and the adjusted R2 of the model. This table does not report information 
applicable to the constant in the models. 
The second type of table lists the explanatory variables of interest in the model along 
the left hand side of the table. Adjacent to the variable name with indication of scaling, if 
applicable, is the type of statistical model used to model relationships; regression or 
Poisson, etc. Along the top of the table are the various dependent variables that the 
explanatory variables are used to model. Within the data information area of the table 
each explanatory variable has its coefficient of affects reported in bold. The standard 
error of the estimates associated with the explanatory variable are listed and displayed 
below the coefficient and are italicized. Additional data reported in the tables include the 
level of significance as indicated by the number of stars, the number of observations 
included in the sample, and the adjusted R2 of the model. This table reports constant 
information for each model. 
3.4.2 The magnetic variables Ap and C9 
Analyses treat Ap and C9 as explanatory system variables. They are measured for 
the whole globe, represent the earth’s magnetic field as a whole, and measure the activity 
of the field at the earth’s surface. They could be considered the ultimate system variable. 
They are also the simplest variables to understand conceptually. The problem they 
present is that they are categorical variables that fit a lot of information and volatility of 
magnetic field values into a tidy range of 0-9 for C9 and 0-24 for Ap. Based on this, one 
would think that the trend for each would be toward very low significance, if any 
significance at all as the effects were “washed out” by lack of variability over the earth as 
in the local measures of the magnetic field. Further, if these measures did happen to 
correlate with some of the relevant outcomes, but did so spuriously, one would not be 
surprised to see unstable or inconsistent measures of effects across models of similar 
phenomena. It may be that the direction of the effect would be unstable across similar 
models as well. 
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However, a survey of the models shows that this is not the case. Ap and C9 tend 
to exhibit significant bivariate relationships in a wide variety of models, and the direction 
and magnitude of effect seems to be relatively stable across models of diverse variables 
of interest. Of the models using system field variables, Ap and C9, 25 out of 38 models of 
the various relationships had either Ap or C9 as a significant variable. It is unlikely that a 
coefficient value different from zero occurs by chance in the sample. Of the 25 
significant magnetic variables, all but two had directions of effect that were in line with 
what one would expect theoretically. Misery Index, unemployment, crime counts, 
abortions, and bond interest rates (higher rates equate to higher measures of systemic 
economic risk) are models where Ap or C9 coefficients are significant and all have 
direction of effects that match expectations based on the literature and hypotheses 
concerning the mechanism of influence.  
In the economic category, neither Ap nor C9 proved to be useful in modeling either 
inflation or percent change in annual gross domestic product (GDP). These models 
accounts for two of the eight total models, five for Ap and three for C9, without 
significant magnetic variable. C9 failed to be significant in a model of daily Argentine 
strikes, but Ap was significant at the .1 level. In every other economic model, C9 was 
significant at a similar or higher level than Ap. C9 also explained more variance in the 
economic dependent variable than Ap in all other economic regression models. See 
Appendix 1. Ap failed to rise to the required level of confidence in modeling the three-
month Treasury bond rate, the Federal Discount rate, or the Federal Funds interest rate. 
However, C9 proves to be significant with a confidence better than .05 and approaching 
.01, for these same models. Many of the “standard” economic indicators correlated with 
the Earth’s magnetic field. The models of unemployment, labor force participation, and 
mortgage interest rates are the dependent variables in models in which C9 explains more 
than 30% of the variance in these variables. 
Table 6 Summary of significant and evaluated models  
Number of times significant out of models ran, by type and total. 
  Economic Social Political Academic Total 
Ap 12/17 10/12 2/4 0/5 23/38 
C9 14/17 8/12 0/4 3/5 25/38 
TOTAL 
GMF 14/16 10/12 1/4 3/5 28/38 
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The social category includes crime counts such as murder and rape, and counts of 
abortions by different demographic groups. In the social category, Ap is significant in 
two more models than C9. However, C9 is consistently significant at higher levels of 
confidence. The only models that Ap fails to be significant is in modeling the number of 
abortions performed on minorities and the proportion of abortions to live births for 
minority women. C9 failed to be significant in the same two models. However, C9 
further fails to rise to significance in two additional models of abortion: proportion of 
abortions to live births for all races of women and the number of abortions performed on 
white women. In these models, Ap is significant and offers reasonable explanatory 
power. See Appendix 1. 
The political category is small and consists only of four different models representing 
two different subjects. The first subject is Supreme Court behavior. These models suffer 
from very small sample size, only 11 observation years, and the dependent variable relies 
on the behavior of a small number of people, so it is no surprise that neither variable of 
interest was significant at better than .1 levels or better. Ap is reported as significant at 
exactly the .1 level of confidence with and an adjusted R2 indicating the ability to account 
for 19% of the variance in Supreme Court Consensus over the 11 observations. The 
second category consists of one model, representing the relationship between the earth’s 
magnetic field and the change in Freedom House Score of international states. Only Ap 
demonstrates a significant with better than .05 level of confidence. C9 does not provide 
information at a confidence level that meets the .1 or better criteria. Temporal 
autoregression diagnostics indicate low impact of temporal autoregression using the 
global Ap index. The significance of the magnetic variable is less than 0.1. However, a 
model using the total field measured by the geomagnetic station in Fredericksburg, 
Maryland as the variable of interest shows a very low likelihood of temporal 
autocorrelation in the model. 
The final category evaluated is academic. This category consists solely of various 
Scholastic Aptitude Test results. Ap fails to rise to confidence levels that meet the .1 
threshold. C9, however, is significant in modeling the total SAT scores of males and 
females, and Male and Female SAT Math scores. Both Ap and C9 fail to model male and 
female SAT Verbal scores. This could be a result of the nature of Verbal test questions. 
Verbal test questions are full of contextual information that assists in correcting for the 
influence of both Ap and C9 as indicated in the earlier example of the magnetic field’s 
effect on decision-making. Female and male math and verbal scores demonstrate a low 
probability of temporal autocorrelation inflating the significance of the geomagnetic 
variables. ARIMA models show the magnetic variables significant below the .05 level 
after accounting for temporal autocorrelation. 
3.4.3 Local Magnetic Variable: The Total Field; F 
 There is one general “local” measurement of the earth’s magnetic field. It is the 
total field, and annotated as “F.” The F field can be broken down into multiple 
components, each representing a vector measurement of the multi-dimensional influence 
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of the earth’s magnetic field. The total field, “F,” is an explanatory variable that aligns 
with the established literature, the possible mechanisms of influence, and the use of 
system variables in the previous section. The total field, “F,” is a measure earth’s 
magnetic field at the local address, city, county, state, country, or other political or 
economic boundary. Analysts can use the total field as a proxy or used as a point of 
inference for the surrounding geographical areas.  The implicit assumption used here is 
that analysts use the “local” measurement in one local in the adjacent areas as a proxy for 
the value of the adjacent location. It is clear that this is not precisely the case as each 
specific geographic location and time will have its own “F” field measurement. However, 
there is limited availability of data beyond the collection point, so for purposes here 
analyses assumes  that the “F” field measurement will not change significantly from the 
point of measure to the point midway between the point of measure and another point of 
“F” field measurement. Over large geographical areas such as continents and oceans, 
there are models that predict the “F” value, as well as the values of the “F” components, 
but this analysis does not use them. Table 7 shows the number of models with F reaching 
significance. 
Table 7 Summary of significant and evaluated models using the F, total field 
Number of Times F Significant out of total models ran by type 
  Economic Social Political Academic Total 
F 1/1 1/1 6/6 4/4 12/12 
 
Dependent variables are evaluated on the size of their impact to the dependent 
variable (coefficient), the level of confidence analysts have the impact of a variable is not 
zero (significance level), and the goodness of fit of the model used to determine the 
relationship among independent and dependent variables The economic category consists 
of only one model; change in annual U.S. Federal budget deficit. This model uses the 
total field measurement near Washington D.C. This model shows that the regression 
explains more than 20% of the variance in the percentage change in budget deficits and 
“F” is significant at better than the .01 confidence level.  
The social category consists of one model; the number of age adjusted suicides. This 
model contains annual data for states of the United States that have monitoring stations 
that have provided “F” values. The analysis averages the “F” values for the year and 
correlate with the number of suicides. “F” is significant at less than the .01 confidence 
level. See Appendix 2. 
The political category consists of a series of models of Supreme Court behavior and 
voting behavior and voter behavior. The Supreme Court behavior models include models 
of the numbers of cases NOT heard by the court each year, the percentage of consensus, 
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the percent of cases affirmed, and percent of cases decided that overruled lower courts. 
All of these models show “F” being significant at least at the .1 level of confidence. Of 
note is the explanatory power of “F” in explaining the variance in the number of Supreme 
Court cases NOT heard, but accepted during the court session, which is more than 70%. 
“F” explains almost 40% of the variance in Supreme Court consensus. These models 
have low likelihood of suffering from temporal autocorrelation; at worse, accounting for 
a time trend reduces field variables to the .1 level of significance. 
As for voter behavior, “F” is significant in models of the change in the percentage of 
votes cast for third party candidates in state elections for the Senate and House of 
Representatives and a model of the probability that the winner of an election is a 
Republican candidate. The model data came from individual states with observatories 
that collected ground level magnetic field data in the form of the “F,” or Total, field. 
Unlike with most of the models reported in this thesis, adjusting for autocorrelation does 
undermine results for the total field measure; voter-behavior models contain time trends 
that, when factored out, leave in doubt whether the correlation with geomagnetic fields 
might be accidental.  These models require a richer, deeper analysis. 
The academic category contains four models of SAT scores; male math, male verbal, 
female math, and female verbal. The Total field, “F”, explains almost 50% of the 
variance in male and female math scores at the state level. It explains much less of the 
variance in male and female verbal scores, even though for all four models the Total 
Field is significant better than the .01 level of confidence. In Appendix 1, the C9 and Ap 
indexes did not rise to significance in modeling national SAT scores. However, at the 
state level in Appendix 2, the Total Field did rise to significance. Male and female math 
and verbal SAT scores suffer little from autocorrelation. Each of the four models has 
magnetic variables of interest significant at .05 or better after applying diagnostics. 
3.4.4 Local Magnetic Variable: Components of the Total Field 
The total field can be broken into a number of components often collected and 
reported by geo-magnetic observatories around the world.  Scientists model these 
components infer and predict them through space and time. At different periods on the 
history of the collection of the components, various individual components have been in 
greater “vogue” than others have, and thereby have been collected more extensively. 
Further, some components are much easier to measure and are more useful. For instance, 
the horizontal field is easily measured using a compass and has been collected for 
hundreds of years. The vertical field is less easily measured and has a shorter collection 
life as a result. To make the issue more confusing different observatories collect different 
components, some observatories change the number and type of components they collect 
as their resources available and customers change over time. However, as the following 
table shows, the components are generally significant in the models they are present in 
across a wide variety of subjects. 
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Appendix 3 shows the influence of the individual components of the Total Field, “F.” 
“F” is composed of various components, some of which have been measured and 
collected extensively, and some of which have not. The components of the Total field are 
the “H,” “V,” “N,” “I,” “D,” “E,” “X,” “Y,” and “Z.” Table 8 shows the number of times 
that each component is significant at the .1 level of confidence or better, followed by the 
total number of times the variable appears in models. 
Table 8 Summary of significant and evaluated models using field components  
Number of times components are significant out of models ran by type. 
  Economic Social Political Academic Total 
H Component 1/2 1/1 11/11 3/4 16/18 
V Component 1/2 0/1  3/4 4/7 
N Component 2/2 1/1  2/4 5/7 
I Component 1/2 0/1 1/1 2/4 4/8 
D Component 0/2 1/1 6/6 3/4 10/13 
E Component 1/2    1/2 
X Component   11/11  11/11 
Y Component   11/11  11/11 
Z Component   9/11  9/11 
 
 There are only two economic models in the economic category. The first is the 
change in the Federal budget deficit. It is a regression model that can potentially explain 
50% of the variance in change in federal budget deficits by the change in the V, N, and I 
components of the total earth magnetic field. The second model is of the federal budget 
deficit in billions of dollars. This model could potentially account for up to 50% of the 
variance in the annual size of the federal budget deficit. The federal deficit model finds 
the H, N, and E components significant at the .1 level of confidence or better. For these 
models the component measurements from the observatory in Fredericksburg, Maryland 
as a dependent variable with budget deficit numbers generated by congressional and 
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presidential budget politics in Washington, D.C. and the nation’s general economic health 
and security situation. 
 There is only one social model within the category of the same name. The model 
is of male suicide counts. The model has only 12 observation years, so it has a very small 
“N” that make the model results problematic. However, the model could potentially 
explain 91% of the variance in the numbers of annual male suicides in the United States. 
This model averages all component values available from observatories throughout the 
United States and the high covariance between the geomagnetic field variable and the 
dependent variable calls for diagnostic analysis and further study before making 
definitive explanatory claims. None of the components was significant in models of 
female annual suicide counts or total gender irrelevant annual suicide counts and is not in 
the appendix. The H and N components were significant at the .1 level and the D 
component was significant at the .05 level. See Appendix 3. 
 There are 11 models in the political category. The eleven models roughly fall into 
the groups of 1) Vote Counts, 2) Vote Percentages, 3) Probability of Winning, and 4) 
Distance between Candidates. The vote count group models the total number of votes 
counted for candidates or parties. The vote percentage models look at the percentage of 
votes that a candidate or party received. The “probability of winning” model examines 
the chance that a party would win based on the sample. The “distance between 
candidates” model has the number of votes between the winning and the losing candidate 
or party as its dependent variable. An interesting note is that almost all components in the 
political model are significant at least at the .1 level and most were significant at the .05 
and .01 levels. Only twice, and both cases the Z component, was a component in a 
political model not significant at least at the .1 level. Both times the Z component was not 
significant involved models of third party voting behavior. 
The group of political models of total vote counts shows interesting results.  The 
model for total number of votes cast in a state during an election for congress that 
includes the common primary components of the total field, H, X, Y, Z, and D, have each 
of the components significant at the .1 confidence level or better and may explain more 
than half of the variance in total votes cast during an election. The same components are 
significant in a model of the number of votes cast for the Republican or Democratic 
candidates in a state during congressional elections. These models may explain more than 
50% of the variance in votes for Republicans or Democrats in an election. Each of the 
five components is significant at the .05 or better level of confidence in all evaluated 
party vote count models. The components do less well when modeling third party vote 
counts. Only the H, X, and Y components are significant and the model explains much 
less variance in vote counts; only 10%. 
The model of “thrown away” votes captures all the votes cast for all of the losing 
candidates and the votes cast for the winning candidate beyond the number of votes 
needed to win. Ideally, if information were available and understood, voters would stop 
voting for the winning candidate as soon as they have enough votes to win. Further, 
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losing candidates would get no or very few votes. It costs to vote and to vote for a 
candidate who is or will lose is not a good investment in resources. The total magnetic 
field components H, X, Y, and Z may explain 18% of the variance in the number of votes 
cast in an election for the losing candidates or cast for a winning candidate beyond that 
which they need to win. All these votes are termed “wasted” and the magnetic field 
components provide some information for explaining the variance in counts of such votes 
using regression models. 
There are three models of percent of votes for candidates 1) the percent of votes 
cast for the winning candidate, 2) the percentage of votes cast for the second place 
candidate, and 3) the distance between the winning and the losing candidate vote counts 
expressed as a percentage of the votes. All the models have each of the explanatory 
variables of interest, H, X, Y, Z, and D components, significant. The Z component is 
significant at the .1 level. The D component is significant at least at the .05 level. The H, 
X, and Y components are all significant at the .01 level. Each of the three regression 
models explains about 24% of the variance in the percentages of the sample. 
Of the models that found geomagnetic or magnetic field variables of interest 
significant most suffered some from temporal autocorrelation. Generally the effect was to 
decrease significance to the next level. Some examples went from .001 to .01 
significance, most went from .01 to .05 significant, a few went from .05 to 0.1, and very 
few were far from significant after diagnostics were applied. Across all the models 
evidence is that temporal autocorrelation is a concern and a deeper analysis is necessary 
before causes identified and controls recommended. Of particular concern were the 
models of voter behavior. 
3.4.5 Magnetic field variables with control variables. 
 The last groups of models in the survey are models that have magnetic field 
measurements as well as some simple control or other explanatory variables of interest 
(See Appendix 4). This should provide some preliminary information as to how magnetic 
variables significance changes in models with other variables of interest. The set of 
models includes two voter choice models (political), two abortion models (social), five 
interest rate models, and a model of the U.S. federal deficit (economic) with the 
categories and significance success and failures depicted. 
The voter choice models in Appendix 4 include the ratio of winner-to-loser votes 
and a control variable for the republican candidate winning the election. The first is a 
model of the relationship between the explanatory variables and the total number of votes 
cast in individual congressional elections. The second models the relationship between 
the explanatory variables and the total number of “Thrown Away” votes. This is the 
number of votes cast to losing candidates or to winning candidates beyond that needed to 
win the election. In these models, the two non-magnetic variables of interest are the ratio 
of votes among the competing candidates and whether a republican candidate wins. 
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The vote-ratio is significant and in the expected direction. Close elections result in 
higher votes cast than in landslide elections. Voters hope that their votes can make a 
difference and fear the outcome if they do not participate. There may be other social and 
peer pressure issues at work as well. Close elections also result in more people “throwing 
away” their vote as they continue to vote for runner up candidates and continue to pile on 
votes to the winner as to ensure victory. During close elections, third party candidates act 
as “spoilers” and get more votes as well, increasing the count of “thrown-away” votes. 
The candidate winning being a republican is significant. 
In the model of total votes cast, the inclusion of the addition of the vote ratio 
variable results in all total field components in the model being significant at the .01 
level. Generally, the significance of the Y and the D component both increased with the 
additional variables over the models without the additional variables. It is less likely that 
the coefficient of influence for the magnetic field variables is zero in the more specified 
model. 
In the modeling of the relationship between components of the magnetic field and 
the total number of votes “thrown-away,” the component values change. First, the 
components H and Y are no longer significant with the inclusion of the new independent 
variables. Second, the X component is significance at better than .01, and its direction of 
affect has changed. Third, the Z component decreases in significance but is still better 
than .01 and the sign of the coefficient was stable. This brings the sign of the X 
component in line with theory. The additional non-magnetic explanatory variables result 
in fewer thrown away votes, but changes the sign of the X component so that it now 
increases the number of thrown away votes as it increases in value. 
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Table 9 Summary of evaluated models using measures of magnetic field with controls 
  Political Social Economic Total 
C9 Index  2/2  2/2 
H Component 1/2  3/6 4/8 
V Component   6/6 6/6 
N Component   6/6 6/6 
I Component   6/6 6/6 
D Component 1/2   1/2 
E Component     
X Component 2/2   2/2 
Y Component 1/2   1/2 
Z Component 2/2   2/2 
Control 
Variables 4/4 4/4 11/12 19/20 
 
There are two abortion models in this part of the survey; total number of abortions 
and the rate of abortions by white women. Each model also included explanatory 
variables for total white people living below poverty and the unemployment rate of white 
people. Both had significant coefficients. More people living below poverty reduced the 
number of abortions while unemployment increased abortions. The rate or number of 
abortions by minority women did not see any magnetic field variable significant, but C9 
was significant in the models of white women presented.  On average analysts expect 
increasing the C9 index, measuring magnetic activity globally, to covary with increased 
abortions and is significant at the .1 level in the model of total number of abortions by 
white women. However, C9’s significance increases to the .05 level of significance in the 
model of the rate of abortions by white women per 1,000 live births. The C9 index is 
associated with increased counts of abortions as well as increases in the rate of abortions 
among white women. Diagnostics indicate that analysis of total abortion counts and 
counts of abortions among white women does not suffer from temporal autocorrelation.  
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However, analysis of abortion counts among minority women does suffer from temporal 
autocorrelation. This requires additional statistical analysis and evaluation.  
The last part of the survey looks at the economic dependent variables. 
Specifically, it looks at six different models that have as their dependent variables 
different measures of risk and uncertainty in the economic realm. Five models depict the 
expected relationship between several magnetic variables and economic variables and the 
different types of bond and interest rates in the United States monetary system. Analysts 
often use interest rates to identify or measure the amount of risk and uncertainty in a 
system. Higher interest is often associated with higher risk as well as higher uncertainty. 
Included in the models are the four components of the total magnetic field, the U.S. 
unemployment rate, and the U.S. inflation rate. In every case, unemployment and 
inflation are associated with an estimated increase in interest rates except in the model of 
the Federal Funds Rate; the rate banks charge each other to borrow money over-night. In 
the model of the Federal Funds Rate, unemployment does not have a coefficient that is 
significant below the .1 level. In almost all the interest rate models, the geomagnetic 
components are significant at the .1 level or higher. Additionally, in almost every case the 
direction of the coefficient of affect is stable across interest-rate models. The H 
component is the only exception to either of these observations. The H component is 
barely significant at the .1 level in the model of 3-year treasuries, not significant at the .1 
level in the corporate AAA rated bond interest rate or the High Grade Municipal Bond 
interest rates. The H component is significant at the .05 level in the model of the interest 
rate that the Federal Reserve charges to banks who borrow money from them. Each of 
these models explains more than 60% of the variance in interest rates. 
 The economic models with additional controls include a repeat of the U.S. Federal 
Deficit model with inflation and unemployment rate included as explanatory variables. 
This model shows the relationship between deficits and magnetic fields is significant; but 
it only contains four of the six magnetic variables included in this model without the 
additional non-magnetic control variables. The two excluded magnetic variables were not 
significant and including them reduced the significance of the other magnetic variables. 
Overall, adding the non-magnetic variables and eliminating the magnetic variables that 
were not significant resulted in a model that accounted for 93% of the variance in the 
U.S. annual federal budget deficits. This is almost twice the model without the additional 
controls could explain.  
There is a model of the annual U.S. budget deficit in billions of dollars. This model 
explains nearly 93% of the variance in the size of the annual U.S. budget deficit. Each 
magnetic component is significant at the .01 level or better and the included variable for 
inflation and unemployment are both significant. Autocorrelation among the magnetic 
fields and unemployment and inflation is a concern. 
Diagnostics results are inconsistent across the different models. There is no general 
trend of the finance models suffering from temporal autocorrelation. Indeed only the 
model of the United States budget deficit and the total field strength measured at 
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Fredericksburg, Maryland demonstrate temporal autocorrelation strong enough to reduce 
the magnetic field significant to well above 0.1. In all other cases, diagnostics indicate a 
low risk of temporal autocorrelation and when present it only results in deflation of 
significance levels to around .05.  
3.5 Enough to continue with detailed analysis? 
 The ultimate answer to the above subtitle must be that, yes, more research is 
warranted given the insights of previous literature, identification of possible mechanisms 
of influence, and a series of intriguing and compelling relationships between magnetic 
fields and outcomes of interest. The sheer number of significant relationships greatly 
exceeds what one would expect given conventional levels of statistical significance, even 
accounting for the tendency of small-n aggregate data to produce correlations. The fact 
that most coefficient signs align with theory, and the potential explanatory power of 
models with magnetic fields, add more strength to the argument that further research is 
necessary. 
The survey of models using magnetic explanatory variables, even though some 
included additional controls, does not offer a definitive answer to whether use of such a 
variable provides value. It neither adequately addresses concerns about the traditional 
causal mechanisms discussed, nor supports a particular theory as to how magnetic fields 
may come to influence outcomes. What the survey does tell us is that over the course of 
117 models of the relationship between measures of the earth’s magnetic field and 
magnetic field activity and the dependent variables of interest, the preponderance of 
relationships not only were so strong that they were unlikely to occur by chance, they 
also offer the potential to increase the explanatory power of existing models. Perhaps the 
most compelling statistic concerning the survey of relationships is the percentage of 
magnetic variables significant and whose coefficients had signs in line with the previous 
literature on magnetic fields: 76% and 87% respectively. However, analysts can only say 
that there is some high level of confidence that the coefficient of effect for most magnetic 
variables in not zero at this time. 
The wide range of outcomes and human behaviors covered in the survey may 
provide sufficient support for researchers to apply a wide range of dependent variables 
involving behavior and choice that increased variance in their dynamics affect. The 
nature of the survey did not allow an in-depth discussion of the theories behind each 
independent variable or for the inclusion more than a cursory example of additional non-
magnetic variables in the models. Further, there was no attempt to tie the subject matters 
together in a thoroughly reasoned and integrated manner. The primary effort was to 
present a series of wide-ranging variables whose measures were available and consistent 
with the period in which the magnetic data were available. The analysis considered 
dependent variables that seemed to play an important role in economic, social, and 
political discourse. 
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Concern about temporal autocorrelation is reasonable given the wide use of time 
series panel data. However, diagnostics demonstrate a trend of no or low risk of inflated 
significance levels because of temporal autocorrelation. There are cases where strong 
temporal autocorrelation seems present, but it appears in models of types and with 
dependent variables similar to those that do not suffer from temporal autocorrelation. 
Further, many models suffer some inflation, but not enough so significance levels rise 
above an acceptable .05 or .1 level of significance. In most cases, a regression model that 
indicates a magnetic field variable is significant at or below the .001 level suffers less 
from temporal autocorrelation than those with significance of .01. 
Table 10 Summary of Survey Findings 
Number of Models 117 
Percentage of Models With Significant Magnetic Variable 76% 
Percentage of All Magnetic Variables with Signs in line with 
Theory 87% 
Percentage of Regression Models With Adj R2 above .20 28% 
Percentage of Magnetic Variables in Models Significant > .1 76% 
Percent of System Magnetic Variables Significant >.1 75% 
Percent of Local Magnetic Variables Significant>.1 77% 
 
A survey of the literature on the effect of magnetic fields and other natural 
variables on human behavioral outcomes, discussed the possible mechanisms of 
influence, and reviewed a reasonable survey of potential relationships between magnetic 
fields and politically, economically, and socially interesting outcomes was discussed. 
Now, a deep analysis of a few issues in a range of disciplines is necessary to say if 
magnetic fields could be playing any real causal role in behavior, outcomes, risk, or any 
other dynamic. In the following chapters, the various measures of the magnetic field 
assists in modeling outcomes in international relations, crime, and economics. 
 
 
 
Copyright © Jackie R. East 2014 
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Chapter 4  State Conflict 
 The scholarship on both interstate and intrastate conflict adopts a variety of 
theoretical perspectives, which in turn divides into competing factions and perspectives. 
Use of magnetic fields in conflict research does not rely on adoption of one or the other 
of these theoretical perspectives, however. This chapter shows how the explanatory 
variable of interest for this research integrates cleanly into most of those competing 
perspectives. 
 Having set the stage for working magnetic fields into conflict research, this 
chapter then turns to testing the usefulness of geomagnetics in empirical models. It 
establishes that magnetic fields do indeed predict measures of conflict, even after models 
include appropriate control variables. 
4.1 Realism 
 Realism has provided a cognitive framework for describing the interaction of 
states since Thucydides’ 5th century B.C. work, History of the Peloponnesian War 
(Thucydides, 1972). Over 2,450 years later, Hans Morgenthau would pick up 
Thucydides’ statements asserting that the basis of the war between Athens and Sparta lay 
in Athens’ concern regarding Spartan power and its rise as a looming threat in the minds 
of Athenians. How would magnetic fields fit into this theory? They would impose their 
effects on the perceptions of states concerning their power relative to the power of others. 
Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations established classical realism (Morganthou, 1965). 
In 1979, in an attempt to bring scientific rigor and systematic analysis to the discipline, 
Kenneth Waltz formulated the adjustments to classical realism that known as neo-
realism. Since the publication of Waltz’ Theory of International Politics, various schools 
of thought has evolved as counter-weights to Classical and Neo-realism’s hypothesis, 
axioms, and almost-laws (Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979).  
 The third generation of realism, termed neo-classical realism in Gideon Rose’s 
“Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy” in the journal World Politics 
(Rose), is noted in the works of Randall Schweller and David Press (Schweller & Press, 
1997), William Wohlforth (Wohlforth), and Aaron Friedberg (Fiedberg, 1993/4). Neo-
classical realism recognizes that domestic, intervening variables are present in the neo-
realist model. In Neo-classical theory, the distribution of power in the international 
system affects foreign policy decisions through an intervening variable of domestic 
perception or domestic incentives related to the international system. An example of this 
would be heavy industrialists encouraging states to purchase weapons, enter into arms 
races, and even threaten war in order to ensure orders for their production or for resource 
industries doing the same to ensure access to unrefined product they can process and then 
sell, such as oil. In this version of realism, the magnetic field, if its effect was real, would 
affect the process where interests first define, then measure, and evaluate their interests. 
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4.1.1 Classical Realism 
 Classical realism identifies the roots of international conflict in an imperfect 
human nature. It is the evil of men and women that allow international conflict to exist. 
Hobbes defines the state of nature as the nature of individuals, which generates conflict; 
social structures that resist such a nature can reduce or eliminate conflict (Hobbes, 1994). 
The magnetic field would influence the perception of individuals’ threat environment. 
People capable of establishing social structures that can resist the state of nature are rare 
and often are overwhelmed in the state of nature. The outcome of international relations 
reflects this and leaves some room for classical realism to accept and integrate non-state 
actors into its theories, as happens later in neoclassical realism (Hobson, 2000). However, 
because classical realism rests on the assumption about the potential of the system to fall 
into conflict, any variable that impedes or enhances the trend towards stability or conflict 
will have relevance. Further, variables that influence the variance of outcomes between 
no-conflict and conflict would be relevant. 
A pair of distinct characteristics describes the international system. Theorists 
following classical realism could incorporate the magnetic field when considering any of 
these characteristics if geomagnetics do influence stability. The first characteristic of the 
system is recognition that the system is a natural environment of conflict. The state, as a 
social construct, mitigates the state of nature through collective security, efficiencies of 
scale, and benefits of collective (i.e. the state) action. This does not translate into 
international cooperation of much breadth or depth. It does translate into “desire” for the 
conditions that allow for collective action. The second characteristic of the system is that 
observers can divide states into two groups based on their motivation. Status-quo powers 
desire or are motivated by mitigating or ending changes in the power distribution of the 
system. Revisionist powers desire, or are motivated by, changing the distribution of 
power in both real terms and perception in order to put themselves in a better position 
within the system. Variables that would affect the ability of the state to measure 
accurately the power distribution within the system would have a direct influence on the 
likelihood of an outbreak of conflict. Here, the magnetic field may have an effect as well. 
 Classical realism explains the struggle for power among nations as the outcome of 
the aggregate desire of people’s desire to dominate others. This desire may relate to the 
effect of the magnetic field, if the field is relevant to human behavior and motivations. 
The state is the manifestation of the aggregate and is the tool used to exercise desires in 
the international system. In this way, the state is the actor on the international stage. 
Morgenthau describes the condition of anarchy provides the freedom for states to act in 
this manner. Without anarchy, the pursuit of power is constrained or eliminated. The 
presence of hierarchy allows for the assertion of a “global leviathan” as a control on other 
states’ tendency to follow through on their desire for domination (Morganthou, 1965). 
Since the state is the manifestation of the will of the people, variables that affect the 
“will,” or “thinking,” of the people are relevant in classical realism. 
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 Evidence provided throughout this work point to the earth’s magnetic field 
influencing people’s thinking processes. As a system variable, it appears  correlated with 
systemic outcomes. The nature of anarchy seems as though the environment whose 
superstructure changes along with geomagnetic fields could influence it. Analysts should 
consider them for system-level models as possible control variables. 
4.1.2 Neo-Realism 
 Neo-realism pinpoints the roots of international conflict in the structure of the 
international system. The structure is one of anarchy, with no “power” or “means” to 
ensure security outside one’s own state. At the same time, the state is the superior level of 
analysis and the primary actor in neo-realism. Hence, it is the interest of the state, and not 
the people who aggregate to make it, that is important. Further, the state is a unitary 
actor; it is not possible or relevant to look at any intervening variables of “domestic” 
politics as they are irrelevant and do not influence the actions of a state pursuing its self-
interest or reduction of its risk through dominance in the international system (Shweller). 
Authors have largely because of methodological development that preceded its most 
relevant years built up Neo-Realism using more rigorous and scientific approaches to 
international relations than classical realism (Sorensen & Jackson, 2003). 
 For Neo-realism, Waltz clearly defines power more narrowly than in previous 
works of classical realism; for Waltz, power is composed of the following characteristics 
(Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979): 
Size of Population 
Size of Territory 
Resource Endowment 
Economic Capability 
Military Strength 
Political Stability 
Competence 
The Neo-realist’s response to why states are in conflict constitutes a challenge to 
classical realism. Neo-realism searches for causation beyond the state. It focuses on the 
system level of analysis. The system determines outcomes. More specifically, the system 
determines outcomes  by the distribution of the specific powers defined by Waltz. The 
primary motivating factor, and the only one that is not transitory, is that all states desire 
to survive. Motivation for survival alone cannot yield power politics as it occurs in the 
current international system, however. The presence of anarchy is essential and the 
relevant characteristic to international relations theory (Waltz, 1979). That being said, it 
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is hard to generalize about this theoretical approach, because a wide range of “Neo-
realist” thought and developments appears across the literature: Robert Jervis and his 
arguments for “Defensive Realism” (Jervis, 1978); Stephen Walt (Walt, 1987), Charles 
Glaser (Glaser C. , 1994/5), and John Mearsheimer with “Offensive Realism” 
(Mearsheimer J. , 2003); and Robert Gilpin with his “Hegemonic Theory” (Gilpin, 1981) 
and (Gilpin & Gilpin, 2001). 
 The international system as defined by the presence of anarchy is not synonymous 
with a “state of war.” Rather, the presence of anarchy creates a state of constant security 
competition (Waltz, 1989), within which states seek out opportunities to take advantage 
of other states (Mearsheimer J. , 1994-1995). In a system like this, each state is constantly 
deciding whether to use force or not in response to other’s actions. This may result in war 
breaking out at any time and with any other state in the system (Waltz, 1979, pp. 111-
112). However, Neo-realists expect that states will analyze each other’s material 
capabilities when assessing the likelihood of mutual conflict (Mearsheimer J. , 1994-
1995, p. 12). States will focus on defensive preparations to overcome the possibility of 
conflict and to overcome the risk of others’ capabilities turned on them (Liberman, 1993). 
 Here lies the irony of the divide between Neo-liberals and classical realists. The 
Neo-realist criticizes the reliance of Morgenthau’s classical realism on the psychological 
assumption that an unquenchable hunger for power drives actors. (Morganthau, 1946). 
However, neo-realists rest their theories on feelings of aversion to war: weariness, 
anxiety, fear of others’ power. It is the psychological factors that they claim results in 
states planning on the possibility of conflict and worst-case scenarios. They’ve replaced 
the human nature of aggression, the heart of classical realism, with human nature of fear 
and generate comparable expectations (Fischer, 1992) – aside from a recognition that 
states may decide to pursue economic capability at the expense of short-term military 
capability (Waltz, 1989). 
Variables that affect the ability of revisionist and status-quo states to perceive 
relative power, as well as variables that induce variance in decision-making outcomes, 
would be relevant to Neo-realist models. Likewise, variables “external” to the system, in 
particular those that affect fear and anxiety, could drive outcomes in Neo-realist models. 
In all of these cases, if the anecdotal and experimental evidence presented in the previous 
chapter is true, then Neo-realism could incorporate a role for magnetic fields creating 
measurable volatility in outcomes that adhere to the Neo-liberal theory. 
Indeed, last chapter’s survey of different models using the earth’s magnetic field 
as variable of interest indicates that these fields may influence the very components of 
state power described by Waltz. This survey demonstrated a possible influence on 
national debt, gross domestic product growth, and national consensus, perceptions of risk, 
national education, inflation, and unemployment. It is conceivable that the earth’s 
magnetic field may also affect how states perceive others in the system. Fields were 
significant in models of Supreme Court consensus. It could be that fields could also have 
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significant coefficients of influence in models of cooperation, optimism, and pessimism 
among states.  
4.1.3 Aggressive Versus Defensive Realism 
 Defensive realism sees defensive coalitions as the only thing standing in the way 
of an international system defined by “clashing despotisms” or a “single world empire” 
(Liberman, 1993). Offensive realists, meanwhile, assert that military action contributes to 
security. The two positions differ as to the commonality of security in the international 
system, with defensive realists more optimistic (Frankel, 1970). 
Stephen Brooks (Brooks, 1997) argues that these competing perspectives on the 
chances of war outbreak underlie differences between the two orientations in how they 
interpret observed international systems. According to Brooks, when we assume a worst-
case scenario – when states are conditioned by the assumption that a rising power 
inevitably will become hostile at some point in the future – then states tend to use 
offensive military action to remove or reduce risk (Brooks, 1997). It is only when a very 
high probability exists that a rising power will use military force to threaten national 
security interests does the threatened state resort to preemptive military force. For that 
reason, variables influencing the perception of the “probability of war” will be especially 
relevant to defensive realism (Brooks, 1997), and if previous research and the literature 
are correct then the earth’s magnetic field could be one such variable. It is likely that with 
increased volatility in outcomes, we will observe more instances of the use of offensive 
military action to pre-empt falsely perceived risks. 
4.1.4 Neoclassical Realism 
Analysis has identified critical divisions in the Neo-realist literature (Brooks, 
1997). Arranged against the Neo-realism of Kenneth Waltz, as described above, is an 
approach termed “Neo-classical realism” (or “postclassical realism”) that despite a 
number of similarities is generally incompatible with his views. Three assumptions 
differentiate the two branches of realism. The first regards whether states make decisions 
based on the probability of conflict or the mere possibility of conflict (Wendt, 1992). The 
second is the issue of discounting the future in favor of the immediate.  
The final distinction concerns state preferences. Neo-realism asserts that the 
possibility of conflict drives the actions of states and that those actions are based on 
worst-case scenarios, that states severely discount the future in favor of short-term 
military readiness, and that military preparedness always trumps economic capacity if the 
two come into conflict. Neo-classical realism argues that states base their decisions on 
their assessments of the probabilities related to security threats. It does not regard long-
term objectives as necessarily less important than short-term military security, and 
recognizes that states trade off some military readiness in exchange for economic benefits 
– as long as the net gain in economic capability is large enough relative to the increase in 
risk resulting from the opportunity cost (Gilpin & Gilpin, 2001). 
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 In Neo-classical, realism system variables and local variables are relevant if they 
influence the assumptions, inputs that drive assumptions, or outcomes of behavior. First, 
variables that influence the perception of states concerning the probabilities of conflict 
would be relevant. Second, variables that influence how inputs into the power 
mechanisms of the state translate into end-state power would be relevant. Finally, 
variables that affect the perception of others and their calculus of other’s power would be 
relevant to Neo-classical models. It is possible that the earth’s magnetic field offers such 
a variable. In particular, fields could affect the perception of states regarding their 
available security, influencing their perception of how flexible they can be. 
4.2 Liberalism and neo-liberalism 
Liberalism has its roots in John Locke’s Two Treatises on Government (Locke, 
1689). This treatise discusses two liberal ideas: intellectual liberty and economic liberty, 
the latter of which includes the right to have and use property. Political economist Jean-
Baptiste Say and Destutt deTracy probably developed the term laissez-faire to reference 
economic liberty, which Rousseau later developed into political economy (Zamoski, 
1993). Rousseau asserted the “natural freedom for mankind” and the importance of the 
social contract. The critical part of Rousseau’s understanding of human nature is that 
individuals know their own interest best. Additionally, sufficient education was enough 
to restrain individuals in society without the need for oppressive government to enforce 
the social contract. He further asserted that the unity of a state arises from the combined 
actions coming out of the consent of the people, or the “national will,” and allows states 
to exist without the pre-existing social and political structures required by such systems 
as aristocracy, feudalism, or monarchy (Durant, 1997). 
Much of liberalism is rooted in the development of economic theory and this is 
where thinkers such as David Hume (Hume, 2009) and Adam Smith (Smith A. , 1759) 
made their primary contributions to liberal theory. Hume believed in fundamental rules of 
human behavior, and that these rules would defeat any attempt to control, regulate, or 
restrict human behavior. The more coercive these efforts were, Hume argued, the more 
individuals would resist them (Hume, 2009). Adam Smith proposed that individuals were 
capable of making both moral and economic decisions without intervention from the 
state. Further, individuals working through an aggregate called the “Market” could make 
quicker and better decisions than government. When citizens were free to follow their 
own initiative states are strongest. He asserted that individual self-interest would motivate 
individuals and allow them to operate in “positive” ways within an unregulated social 
order (Smith A., 1759). 
 Later, the ideas about natural rights would rest on the idea of the categorical 
imperative (Kant, 1993). Immanuel Kant asserted that a natural law existed that was 
superior to whatever received system of reason and morals people inherited or assumed. 
He advocated that fundamental truths were available to underpin systems of knowledge. 
However, in reaction to a series of economic depressions and the challenge of 
Communism, liberalism evolved from the Kantian view to a form of social liberalism of 
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the sort proposed by T.H. Green. Green focused on the interdependence of human beings 
and the need of government to provide health care, education, and mitigate ignorance and 
prejudice (Dimova-Cookson & Mander, 2006). 
 Liberalism in international relations generally asserts that state preferences rather 
than their capabilities are the primary cause of state behavior. Preferences will change 
from state to state, and different states will have different preferences resulting from the 
unique characteristics that form that state. Liberalism rejects the notion of an anarchic 
international system. Instead, the system provides many opportunities for interaction 
outside the “high politics” of security and military power. The system allows cooperation, 
and gains via interdependence can sustain peace. 
Friction in this situation would arise if an exogenous variable affected the ability 
of actors to perceive the value of relative gains. The situation worsens if the variable 
results in volatile outcomes that make the value of cooperation unpredictable. System 
variables that affect variance in economic outcomes thus would be relevant to liberal 
models. Finally, variables that affect preferences, or perception of preferences, would be 
relevant to liberal theory. Local magnetic field variables that affect individual decision 
makers and internal state dynamics could have an impact on state behavior in the 
international system. Incremental influences in the various sub-structures – economic, 
social, diplomatic, etc. – could influence the behavior of states, cooperation, and 
perception. 
The term Neo-Liberalism came about in the 1930 and 1940s as the concepts of 
classical liberalism reemerged in the political and economic literature and thought. Neo-
liberalism argues that states need only, and should only, be concerned with absolute gains 
made through cooperation and interdependence. It argues that relative gains are not 
important and uses game theory as a tool to illustrate how states in the system could 
choose mutually beneficial outcomes, or win-win situations. Neo-liberals portray an 
international system set up not to enable or facilitate win-win situations, but to provide a 
suitable space for the creation of institutions that do. 
 Neo-liberalism is a reaction to the Neo-realist’s assertion that the primary concern 
of states is security. It is a response to how relative gains in a zero-sum anarchic 
international system in which no institution could realistically be expected to enforce 
agreements or protect sovereignty security influences state views of security. Neo-
liberalism accepts an anarchic system as well as the fact that state interest drives 
interaction in the international system. However, it rejects that these concepts are as 
important as realists assert, or that they inevitably result in conflict. Robert Keohane’s 
After Hegemony (Keohane, 2005) is a classic presentation of Neo-liberalism and, with 
Stephen Krasner and Charles Kindleberger, represents the Neo-liberal school of thought. 
 One of the concrete responses to Neo-realism is Robert Keohane’s and Joseph S. 
Nye’s theory of “Complex Interdependence” (Keohane & Nye, 1977). They explain this 
concept in terms of Neo-realist assumptions: States are coherent and the dominant actors; 
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force is an effective tool of policy; a hierarchy exists in the international system 
(Keohane & Nye, 1977). Their arguments countering the claim of coherency are that 
different and numerous channels of interaction exist outside the state system, that trans-
governmental relations result from states not being coherent units, and that transnational 
relations result from states not acting coherently. This results in a blurring of the line 
between foreign and domestic political agendas, which prevents emergence of a clearly 
delineated hierarchy in international relations.  
Magnetic fields potentially contribute to the international system described by 
Neo-liberalism as well. Military capability and the ability, or willingness, to use force 
exists within political and military interaction and alliances, all of which would be 
susceptible to the exogenous influence of a variable that generates volatility in these 
outcomes. Indirectly, they could mold a Neo-liberal international system by influencing 
sources of both soft and hard power, which in turn would shape relations within and 
among groups of countries. If magnetic fields affect cooperation, or consensus building, 
then they also would have an effect on the working of the institutions that mitigate or 
prevent war, just as they would affect decisions to use the military as an instrument of 
foreign policy. 
 The current economic and political system rewards domestic and economic 
processes identified with democracy and free-markets. This correlation, in conjunction 
with the effects of complex interdependence, results in the idea of a “democratic peace” – 
the idea that democracies should not go to war with each other (Doyle M. W., 1997). 
Therefore, system variables that influence the variance in outcomes of economic 
cooperation would be relevant to Neo-liberal models. Variables that influence states’ 
ability to conduct the cost-benefit calculus of conflict also would be relevant to Neo-
liberal theory. Finally, variables that influence the amount of signal noise that exists in 
the system should be of great importance to Neo-liberals, since the whole purpose of 
institutions is to reduce this noise. In all these ways, magnetic fields would be relevant 
for constructing models. 
4.3 Militarized Disputes 
Military threats, both direct and indirect, are inherent in the nature of international 
systems. Systemic or potential threats manifest by the fact that a polity has a military 
capability. How much and in what way military capability informs conflicts among states 
differs depending on the view of the nature of the international system. When the threat 
of military force is indirect, the conflict has not yet risen to one of violence and the use of 
force is not yet overtly the method of choice to bring about a decision. Indirect threats are 
always present, although not always of equal importance in resolving conflict among 
states (Karsten, Howell, & Allen, 1984). 
 Direct threats exist during moments in time when stable relations among or 
between members of the international system become unstable. This can be because of 
the introduction of some new variable, the re-interpretation, or new perception of an 
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existing variable, or some other change in either party’s views of the cost and benefits of 
the use of force. 
 In between the indirect and direct threats of the use of force exists a series of steps 
that “show force capability” but may not explicitly threaten. Actors use “showing of force 
capability” to communicate a capability in stark terms in order to influence the perception 
or calculus of the other parties in a conflict or dispute.  
 The waging of war and the playing out of disputes depend on the identity of the 
actor, the rules of the system, and the level of analysis: system, state, individual, or 
group. In this section, I review several theories that distinguish conflict along these lines. 
Again, the purpose is to set up how geomagnetic fields could integrate into predictive 
models within international relations, this time focusing specifically on modelling 
conflict. 
4.3.1 System Theories 
 System Theories of war generally focus on transitions. System Theories argue that 
states are the primary international actors, but they operate within constraints and 
limitations set upon them by the broader world system. The key characteristic of these 
theories, therefore, is that the system drives state actions. The system allows, or does not 
allow, certain decisions, actions, or relationships (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981). In these 
theories, the system acts as an “invisible hand” shaping behavior. For instance, different 
systems gave rise to Tribalism, Empires, Feudalism, Nation-States, and perhaps in the 
future could promote the rise of non-state international actors (Porter, 1994). Multiple 
systems might exist simultaneously around the world, such as those found based around 
specific continents (e.g., South America) or around identifiable regions (e.g., Sub-
Saharan Africa, East Asia). Measures of magnetic field activity can operate at the system 
level, are exogenous to the system, and offer clear prior temporal relationships. 
4.3.2 State Theories 
 State theories recognize that an international system exists, but it is more 
anarchical; states may do whatever their capabilities allow them to do. The limits on state 
action are defined by their, and others, capability either to deter or to compel (Evera, 
1999; Morganthou, 1965; Waltz, 1959; Brown, Lynn-Jones, & Miller, 1995). States in 
anarchy will leverage differences in technological capabilities to gain position in the 
international system. If the capabilities are viewed as transitory or short-lived, states may 
be more inclined to leverage the technology in a manner that damages stability and leads 
to war. 
 States go to war when the costs and risks of doing so are low and the benefits 
higher (Mearsheimer J. , 1990). This calculus generally rests on two factors: the 
distribution of power among states and the destructiveness of available weapons (which 
depends on whether they favor the defense or offense). These states may be susceptible to 
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ideologies that are more inclined to engage in armed conflict. Ideologies of “otherness” 
or parallels of “manifest destiny” or “cultural supremacy”, etc., tend to drive states in 
anarchy to seek decision on the battlefield. This could happen in one of two ways. The 
first are actions on the part of the state to “actualize” or “operationalize” its ideology, 
leading it to attempt “domination” of other states or peoples. The second are actions on 
the part of the state to “actualize” or “operationalize” its ideology in a fashion that creates 
insecurity in others. In the second situation, other states seek to reduce insecurity through 
force of arms against the threat state. Geomagnetic fields can distort these processes of 
value formation and these perceptions of threat. 
4.3.3 Actor Theories 
 Actor theories rest upon the assumption that states and systems do not make 
decisions, that they are not distinct actors. Ultimately, individual people exercise choice. 
Actor theories implicitly argue that no international system or state capability structure 
results in actions or conflict. Instead, they form incentives and disincentives within which 
individuals or groups of people make choices. In these theories it is generally argued that, 
regardless of relative power or capabilities or how well or poorly allied states are doing in 
a conflict, only the leaders or the people of a state can decide to wage war or produce a 
threat or escalate a dispute or make peace, etc. (Brodie, 1973), and (Jervis, Stern, & Tilly, 
1989). 
States possess institutions, laws, rules, and norms that limit citizen actions. Within 
a system of anarchy, these institutions must be powerful enough to mobilize or control 
the population sufficiently to maintain security. These states generally find that their 
systems and institutions allow for small groups of leaders to dominate decision-making, 
which allows leaders to pull, push, or lead their states to seek decision through battle. 
 States in systems of anarchy permit special interests to rise and gain influence and 
power through their contributions to security. In such a situation, the actor pursues its 
interests and may succeed backed by the power of the state. At the same time, other states 
in the anarchic system view the activities and goals of these special interests as 
indistinguishable from those of their parent state. In the historical literature, these special 
interests constitute powerful intra-state political alliances that can lead their state to war 
at the expense of the public. Some examples include England’s “stock” companies in the 
1600 and 1700s, the Southern U.S. cotton industry in the 1850s, the American Sugar 
industry in the 1880s, the United States fruit industry in the 1920s, the German steel and 
ship building industry in the 1920s, the oil industry in the 1950-2010, etc. 
 In all of these theories, common themes are found. Decisions and outcomes are 
highly dependent on how those making the decisions see the world. Risk acceptance, 
decision calculus, and perception and interpretation all influence how polities or actors 
(regardless of the level of analysis) act in a situation. This then directly influences 
initiations, escalations, and outcomes within the international system. 
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 An “international system” has been defined by Holsti as  
…any collection of independent political entities - tribes, city-states, 
nations, or empires - that interacts with considerable frequency and 
according to regularized processes. The analyst is concerned with 
describing the typical characteristic behavior of these political units 
toward one another and explaining major changes in these patterns of 
interaction. (Holsti K. , 1995, p. 23) 
 Whichever variety of “international system” one might have in mind, it operates 
within a space whose features will shape the system itself. These characteristics of the 
system’s superstructure, usually absent from International Relations research, are 
depicted in the outer circle that encompasses the international system portrayed in Figure 
4. These characteristics have been viewed as either so random as to defy systematic study 
or fixed and therefore largely irrelevant as a variable of study. Yet these fixed 
characteristics often feature prominently in the study of international relations. Many 
form the foundations of state power. Terrain, resources, access to threats, economic 
power, and culture are all tied to the characteristics of the space in which international 
systems operate. 
The last three chapters have laid the foundation for the theory that earth’s 
magnetic fields constitute an important influence on many of the activities of humans. 
The fields, exogenous to the international system, have been in existence as long as the 
space in which international systems operate. Science has reached a point where these 
fields are easily measured, and to some extent predictable. This has allowed for system-
wide measurements as well as local measurements made and recorded. These field 
influences pierce through all the levels of analysis of international relations. They exist 
outside of the international system, penetrate through all the dynamics of the system, 
impact all institutions, affect the actions and perceptions of actors, and permeate the daily 
lives of each individual. 
The question of the importance and relevance of these influences remains 
unanswered. Chapter Three’s litany of possible relationships only lays the foundation for 
addressing this question. In the current chapter, events and conditions of the international 
system and international relations are evaluated using the magnetic field as the primary 
variable of interest. 
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Figure 4 Superstructures in which actors behave 
 
4.4 War and the Magnetic Field 
The literature on interstate war generally suffers from an inability to conduct a day-
by-day analysis as well as to include characteristics of the space within which the 
international system operates. Much of the available analysis uses variables measured 
annually or only available daily at an extreme cost that has been prohibitive and seen to 
be largely irrelevant and unnecessary. However, the use of daily measures of the 
magnetic field provides an opportunity to analyze any possible relationships between the 
field and ongoing conflicts. After all, parties decide every day whether to continue or end 
a conflict. 
The model beginning this analysis looks at each day of the international system 
over a period of 80 years. Each day is coded for the presence of a war, and modeled using 
Probit. To predict the existence of conflict, I use the average Ap Index value for the 30 
days prior to the day captured by the dependent variable. This model shows that Ap is 
significant. We can only claim the effect of Ap on the probability of war is not zero. 
However, using modeling software a graphical depiction of the 95% confidence interval 
of expected values of probability of war given specified values for the Ap index. The 
graphical depiction is a continuous evaluation of the covariance between the independent 
and dependent variable. 
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Accepting that magnetic fields may have an impact on outcomes allows for a 
deeper look at how the space within which international systems operate influences those 
systems (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, Making the Most of Statistical Analysis: Improving 
Interpretation and Presentation, 2000). Figure 5 shows the predicted probabilities of war 
on a given day. At a zero value of Ap, it would be expected that there would be less than 
a 10% chance of war ongoing on the day. At an Ap value of 24, the probability of a war 
ongoing somewhere on earth is around 15%. At an Ap value of 60 the model estimates 
that there is between a 35% and 60% (95% confidence interval) chance that an ongoing 
war would be present on that day. 
The implication of these findings, if true, could have significant repercussions in 
the validity of various views of the international system and relations. Both realism and 
liberalism view relations among actors in terms of the level of cooperation and conflict 
among them. In fact, at their roots, the fundamental principle that separates them is 
ability of actors to mitigate the characteristic of anarchy. Realism argues that there is 
little an actor can do and liberalism argues there is much that can be done. The analysis of 
the potential relationship between the earth’s magnetic fields and conflict suggests, 
rather, that the amount of anarchy in a system is not fixed or static. It instead could 
depend on the magnetic influence of a period. A modeling of the sample and statistical 
findings shows a possible world where a war is six times more likely to be underway at 
high magnetic values than at low magnetic values. In periods of low magnetic field 
values, on the other hand, many interstate disputes do not escalate to war. This analysis 
can make no definitive claims on the size of the influence. It is relatively confident the 
influence is not zero. One can infer that it is likely a positive influence. 
Table 11 Probit model of state of war for over 80 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Observations 30,592  Prob Chi2 0  
Variables Coefficient and 
Standard Error 
Significance Level Lower 95% 
Confidence 
Upper 95% 
Confidence 
Previous 
30 Day 
Ap Index 
Average  
0.0243 0.0000 *** 0.0167 0.0318 
(0.0038)      
Constant 
-1.5072 0.0000 *** -1.6333 -1.3811 
(0.0643)         
* 0.1 ** 0.05  *** 0.01 
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Figure 5 Simulated probability of war in a day and previous 30 days’ average Ap index 
 
 One of the characteristics of the international system to which theorists look in 
order to determine the international system is whether war or disputes are ongoing. The 
previous models looked at the presence of war, rather than war initiative, which might 
cause concern with readers that the probabilities are overly sensitive to long-running 
wars. That is, they may reject the idea that each day represents an independent decision 
whether to continue a war, and instead wish to focus on war initiative because it is more 
likely to be independent of other observations with similar magnetic levels. 
 The analysis moves from looking at ongoing wars to focus instead on the start of 
conflict. The estimated and simulated probability for there to be an initiated dispute on 
any given day begins at low levels when the Ap index is low, but extrapolates out to an 
extreme of approximately 50% at severely high levels. Using the previous 30 days’ 
average of Ap values instead of the Ap Index value on the day analyzed provided a 
significantly “tighter” range of estimates.  
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Table 12 Probit model the likelihood of war starting in a given day 
PROBIT Model for War Starting in a day given its Ap Index Value 
  Observations 3592 Prob Chi2 0.0178 
Variables Coefficient 
and Standard 
Error 
Significance 
Level 
Lower 
95% 
Confidence 
Upper 95% 
Confidence 
Ap Index on 
Day War Starts 
0.0039 0.0150 ** 0.0008 0.0070 
(0.0016)      
Constant -1.2013 0.0000 *** -1.2713 -1.1313 
  (0.0357)         
*0.1 ** 0.05 ***0.01    
 
Figure 6 Simulated estimated probability of a declared war on a day given day 
 
 
4.4.1 Number of States Involved in Militarized Interstate Disputes 
We move now to an analysis of the number of states involved in a militarized 
dispute on any given day, controlling for if the system is embroiled in a state of war. 
High values on the magnetic field variable, as a potential barrier to cooperation, 
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presumably would cut in two different directions for this model. On the one hand, the 
ability to negotiate cooperative militarized behavior – to create a bandwagon effect, to 
entice cooperation in balancing activities against an enemy power – should decline under 
those conditions. The magnetic field measure, hypothesized to affect cooperation among 
individuals, should exhibit a negative relationship with the number of states involved in a 
militarized dispute on a given day. Those same high values would tend to increase the 
risk of war, pulling more countries into a militarized dispute, but of -course, we can 
control for that contradictory influence by distinguishing periods with an ongoing war. 
Table 13 presents an analysis covering more than 3,500 days of possible conflict, during 
which time the Ap Index ranged from 0 to 279 points. 
Table 13 Poisson model number of states in a dispute 
  Observations 3592 Prob Chi2 401.51 
Variables Coefficient 
and Standard 
Error 
Significance 
Level 
Lower 
95% 
Confidence 
Upper 95% 
Confidence 
Day’s Ap 
Index -0.0012 0.0000 *** -0.0014 -0.0009 
  (0.0001)      
War In 
Effect 0.0959 0.0000 *** 0.0855 0.1064 
  (0.0053)      
Constant 4.4304 0.0000 *** 4.4254 4.4354 
  (0.0026)         
*** P<.01  
 In this model, the War variable is significant as a control variable. More states 
find themselves in MID’s during wartime. The Ap Index is still a significant variable 
even after allowing the multicollinearity with War. The accompaning graph, Figure 7, 
shows how the simulated expected number of state participants changes with the Ap 
value when war is ongoing in the international system and when war is not ongoing in the 
international system. The graphic depicts one possible world based on the sample used 
and repeated modeling of expected values. 
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Figure 7 Simulated number of states involved in a dispute 
 
In this sample, the international system is filled with disputes short of war at the 
lower magnetic values. That result merely describes the state of the sample world, 
however. It was not a fully specified model and therefore not intended to explain why 
geomagnetic waves would correlate with dispute involvement. The next set of models 
takes the next step and attempts to model action using the system variable of earth 
magnetic field as the primary explanatory variable. 
4.4.2 States Initiating or Joining Militarized Interstate Disputes 
The next model, predicting when states initiate a new dispute, does not assume 
that the effect of magnetic fields will be monotonic. The theoretical work on magnetic 
fields suggests that extreme values, whether high or low, could interfere with standard 
decision-making. Thus, it uses the earth’s magnetic field in two variables, a base term 
and a squared term. It also contains a control variable for the number of states already 
involved in disputes, due to likely contagion effects. This variable will help us infer 
whether states seek to engage in disputes under “cover” of conflict within the system. 
As seen in Table 14, the previous 30 days’ Ap average is significant in the model, 
in a negative direction, as is the quadratic term, but in a positive direction. Thus, the 
relationship between geomagnetics and dispute initiative has a clear bend. Also, as the 
number of states involved in disputes increase, states are more willing to initiate 
additional disputes within the system. 
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Table 14 Probability of a new dispute being initiated on any given day. 
 Model Type: Probit  
 
Observations = 
30,595 
Pseudo 
R2 = 
.0330  
 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
Average of the Previous 30 
Days' Ap Values 
   
-0.0102 0.048 ** 
(0.0052)   
Average of the Previous 30 
Days' Ap Values Squared 
   
0.0002 0.052 * 
(0.0001)   
Number of States involved 
in Conflict in the 
International System 
   
0.0059 0.000 *** 
(0.0002)   
Constant -1.530 0.000 *** 
 (0.049)   
 
  
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
 
As the measure of the magnetic field changes from low- to mid-range values, the 
general trend is toward lower probabilities of war initiation. As the values increase from 
mid-range to higher, the probability increases. In this sample, disputes become 
significantly more likely when geomagnetic fields approach extreme values, whether 
especially low or especially high. The graph also shows that when fewer states are 
involved in disputes, the effect of the earth’s magnetic field moving from lower to mid-
level values is estimated to be much shallower than the condition of higher numbers of 
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states involved in disputes. At the lower number of states the reduction in probability 
looks to be around 3%. At the higher number of states involved in disputes the reduction 
in probability looks to be around 7%, or more than twice conditions of few states 
involved in disputes. Progressing from the mid-level values to the upper values, the 
outcome resulting from the number of states involved in conflict and the earth magnetic 
field value demonstrates a greater probability of a state initiating a new dispute. This 
change is a rapid transition and rises well beyond the decline from the lower value to the 
mid-values. However, the chart lacks references for the 95% confidence intervals for 
each estimate. Therefore possible outcomes and estimates may make the clear distinction 
among the graphed estimates much murkier. However, in this sample, expected estimates 
show distinct separation. 
Another relationship in this sample for analysts to note is when lower numbers of 
states are involved in disputes, the effect of higher values of the earth’s magnetic field is 
much less than the effect when more states are involved in disputes. If, in fact, the earth’s 
magnetic field is working as the model suggests, then it uncovers that states pursue 
militarized solutions to disputes under conditions of high conflict in the international 
system. Under conditions of low conflict in the international system, as defined by the 
number of states involved in disputes, states shy away from using military force to 
resolve disputes. However, as the magnetic field value increases it can overcome the 
general trend and increase the probability of initiating a new dispute. For instance, when 
there are no states involved in a dispute the magnetic field can double the probability that 
a state will initiate a dispute. The effect of the magnetic field at its highest sample value 
is the same as if 75 states are involved in militarized disputes but the magnetic field is at 
its lowest. Essentially, the effect of transitioning the international system from no 
militarized disputes to seventy-five disputes on the likelihood of an additional militarized 
dispute being initiated on any given day is the same as moving the magnetic activity of 
the earth from its lowest to highest values of the sample. This description of the graphic 
estimates of the relationship between magnetic field, the number of states participating in 
militarized disputes, and the likelihood that a new dispute is initiated is not generalizable. 
It reflects the covariance discovered in the sample, the temporal relationship among the 
variables, and the application of the theory of magnetic field influence on behavior. It is 
very likely that the a priori theoretical model influenced the post-simulation analysis. 
As the system becomes less stable, as defined by the number of states involved in 
disputes, the probability of an actor starting a new dispute increases. Magnetic fields 
seem to magnify this trend. Theories of international relations that are based on measures 
of system stability, amount of conflict, or amount of conflict resolution should take into 
consideration the influence of magnetic fields. The findings of this model demonstrate 
that fields influence the chance of system instability as reflected in the probability of new 
disputes within the sample. 
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Figure 8 Simulated probability of Initiating a Militarized Interstate Dispute 
  
 
A similar analysis, not shown, broke apart the probability that states would join a 
MID on behalf of the initiator versus the probability they would join on behalf of the 
target. In both cases, the raw variable for magnetic field had a positive coefficient, 
whereas the quadratic term had a negative coefficient – so, more or less, the probability 
of jumping into a militarized dispute climbed as magnetic fields approached high or low 
extremes. As before, the effect of very high geomagnetic levels overpowered the effect of 
very low levels within the sample. About the only remarkable distinction between the 
initiator coding and the target coding is that the U-shaped relationship was much more 
pronounced with regard to the decision whether to join a dispute on behalf of a targeted 
state. Low magnetic levels did not correspond to particularly high probabilities that states 
would unite with an initiator.  
 These findings highlight a problem with International Relations theory’s view on 
the processes of band-wagoning and balancing. When these findings are applied to what 
we would expect to see under different views of the international system, it is apparent 
within this sample that magnetic field effects result in confusing the relationship between 
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actor decisions related to joining attacker or targets and whether the international system 
facilitates cooperation or conflict.  
A new model, therefore, looks at the 684 (target side)/984 (initiator side) cases in 
which a state joined a dispute on either the target or initiator’s side. A new dependent 
variable codes actors that join initiators as 1 and actors that join targets as 0, thus 
predicting when a new belligerent will join up with the attacked rather than the defender. 
The model includes the presence or absence of declared war, the maximum level of 
Hostility reached by the dispute, and a new variable: the cumulative duration of the 
dispute, in days, at the point when the state joined the conflict. Finally, the model 
contains the Ap Index value (and its square) on the day the join occurred. The modeled 
and simulated sample indicates that when states join disputes, the chance they will join 
the attacker climbs to the highest levels when Ap values approach their peak. As the 
disputes go on in time, states are less likely to join initiators and more likely to join 
targets. States are also more likely to come to the aid of targets when the dispute slips 
into war. Finally, at higher hostility levels, the chances of joining the initiator increases. 
In fact, a one-unit increase in hostility can offset war’s effect on which side states will 
join in disputes. 
Again, in the sample analyzed and using simulation software to estimate 
dependent variable values, the magnetic field seems to be influencing the trend toward 
band-wagoning and balancing in both conditions of war and peace. It also seems to be 
affecting the probability of cooperation, conflict, and how cooperation plays out. For 
instance, it seems that balancing when war is ongoing seems to be the more-likely 
decision of joiners. When war is ongoing, actors are two to three times as likely to 
balance versus bandwagon when the magnetic field is a low value. As the magnetic field 
increases in value, the chance that an actor will band wagon increases in relation to 
balancing up to a probability that actors will band wagon of nearly 100% within the 
sample. 
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Table 15 Probability of joining the initiator rather than target when joining a dispute 
 Model Type: Probit  
 Observations = 984 
Pseudo R2 = 
.0598  
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
War 
-0.3190 0.051 * 
(0.1637)   
High Hostility Level By 
Initiator 
0.3727 0.000 *** 
(0.0733)   
   
Ap Index at start of the 
dispute 
-0.0434 0.000 *** 
(0.0107)   
Ap Index Squared at the start 
of a dispute 
0.0006 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Cumulative Duration -0.0002 0.010 ** 
  (0.0001)   
Constant 
-1.045 0.000 *** 
(0.256)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01
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4.4.3 Concluding a dispute through initiator victory 
 Geomagnetic levels may influence behavior in the international system by 
destabilizing decision-making and producing what appears to be irrational outcomes. 
Perhaps the best example of a mistake, in conflict studies, would be when a state initiates 
war in error and ultimately cannot achieve victory. The next model shows the sample 
probability that initiators win a dispute. 
 Differences in available power and alliance structures are two obvious influences 
on whether initiators prove victorious in a conflict. Other possible explanations of dispute 
outcome could be the observed fatality level (because it signals commitment on both 
sides), whether a dispute is reciprocal (because lack of reciprocity means one state may 
not consider the dispute as a national interest), or difference in escalation among initiator 
or target (because faster escalation may indicate greater concern on one participant’s 
part). The results of such a model, including Ap and its quadratic term as measures of the 
earth’s magnetic field, confirm previous findings on interstate disputes, and aligns with 
hypotheses from both realist and liberal literatures.  
As shown, reciprocal disputes are significantly more likely to result in the target 
winning a dispute within the sample. It seems that for most of the dataset, the power of 
the defense over the offense was generally accepted. The fatality level of the conflict also 
influences the probability that the initiator will win the dispute. As the fatality level 
increases in the sample, so do does the probability that the initiator wins. However, if 
initiators escalate disputes disproportionately compared to their target(s), the probability 
of initiators winning falls in the sample. Initiators who race escalation higher covary with 
other states to seek balance by joining disputes on the side of targets, increasing the 
likelihood that the target wins. 
The point of the model is to see how geomagnetic fields perform when included 
in a multiple regression modeling conflict and what we see here is consistent with just 
about every model introduced in this chapter: The probabilities associated with this 
dependent variable do indeed vary with the magnetic field measurements within the 
sample. Specifically, initiators are more likely to prove victorious at extreme 
geomagnetic levels, the conditions under which cooperation is least likely and outside 
parties least likely to enter a conflict on behalf of the targeted state within the sample. At 
middling geomagnetic levels, on the other hand, the initiator is much less likely to win 
after attacking.  
Those targets win when the magnetic field is in middling values, and especially 
on the lower end in the sample, should not be a surprise. It is at these levels that 
balancing tends to occur and actors join disputes on the side of the target in the sample. 
The dynamic nature of the magnetic fields provides evidence for each of the many 
evolutions of both realism and liberalism.  
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Table 16 Probability that initiators win disputes 
  Model Type: Probit   
  Observations = 3,300 Pseudo R2 = .1091 
Variables 
Coefficient and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Previous 30 Days' Average 
Ap 
-0.0430 0.042 ** 
(0.0011)    
Previous 30 Days' Average 
Ap Squared 
0.0011 0.028 ** 
(0.0005)    
Dispute is Reciprocal 
-0.8730 0.000 *** 
(0.1114)    
Fatality Level of Dispute 
0.1950 0.000 *** 
(0.0220)    
Difference in Escalation in a 
Dispute Attacker-Target 
-0.0436 0.000 *** 
(0.0065)    
Constant 
-0.859 0.000 *** 
(0.205)     
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
 Running several different simulations through the model in yields several 
interesting graph-plots of the relationship between the magnetic field variable and the 
probability of the initiator winning a dispute. The simulations show the probability of the 
initiator winning when the dispute is reciprocal and when it’s not. Initiators generally are 
less likely to win in a reciprocal conflict (except when extrapolated out to very high 
geomagnetic levels), even if the target escalates significantly more than the initiator in the 
sample. 
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 Using the same model and re-running the simulations with differing levels of 
fatalities results in Figure 12. This chart demonstrates that when simulating based on the 
sample that increasing levels of fatalities increase the probability that the initiator wins a 
dispute within the sample. The effect of increased fatalities and increased Ap values 
results in greater-than-additive increases in the chance that the initiator wins the dispute 
when not taking escalation into account in the sample analyzed. 
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Figure 12 Simulated probability that initiator wins 
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 The dynamics illustrated by the above model and simulations encourage several 
conclusions about the international system and the relations among nations. Absent any 
other information, and taking the patterns in these models at face value, the behavior of 
the international system seems to accord with a complex tangle of competing world 
views in International Relations Theory. If the sample reflects the population of 
militarized interstate disputes and their covariation with the Earth’s magnetic field 
several observations are possible. First, it seems that at lower levels of Ap, the 
international system reacts to disputes by siding with targets more than initiators, and 
creating conditions by which targets can repel invaders. However, at higher levels of Ap, 
stitching together these defensive coalitions appears to be less likely; if anything, 
members of the international system pile on with the initiators of disputes, all the more so 
when targets show disproportionate aggressiveness. 
In reference to the international system theories discussed earlier, this evidence 
supports arguments of both realism and liberalism. The analysis indicates that targets are 
better off counterstrikeing after attacked, meeting escalation with proportional self-
defense. Not responding sufficiently to militarized threats results in targets having 
increased chances of their losing the dispute. Realists argue this is because targets have 
demonstrated a definitive lack of power, and in a self-help system this results in 
bandwagon on behalf of the attacker. Liberalism would not be able to explain these 
outcomes. International institutions, alliance frameworks, and international norms should 
have brought other actors into the dispute on the side of the target in order to deny hostile 
states rewards for violating international norms. Liberalism would argue that the actors in 
the system would view initiators with hostility and create structures to punish them and 
deny them victory. 
However, once targets escalate beyond that of initiators, they risk a backlash on 
the part of the international system. This takes the form of states joining initiators and 
attempting to end the dispute on terms unfavorable to the target. This outcome makes 
little sense from a realist perspective. Realists would argue that the best thing for a target 
to do would be to escalate disputes, demonstrate power, and resolve to defeat an initiator. 
Other actors in the system would recognize the strength of the target and work with the 
target to defeat initiators and return the international system to the status quo. Realists 
would also be surprised that balancing did not occur when initiators initiated disputes and 
escalated threats well beyond what targets reciprocate. The system reacts more as liberal 
theories would anticipate. 
When targets respond to initiators with overwhelming escalation, liberalism 
would argue that the international system would work to de-escalate and manage the 
“crisis.” Institutions and norms would kick-in; actors would begin to seek leverage 
against both initiator and targets to maintain control of an escalating situation, and 
impose peace even if it means attackers will get away with the provocation and/or keep 
some of their gains. That being said, this outcome cuts against some of the values-based 
perspective seen in liberalism, which would be unable to explain why hostile initiators 
would be allowed to win militarized disputes they started. It is possible that liberals could 
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argue that institutions punish targets because their escalations violate some set of norms 
associated with proportional response. 
Incongruities among outcomes in the sample and international relations theory are 
accounted for by the inclusion of magnetic variables. The inclusion of the magnetic 
variable when analyzing the sample provided information to understand deviations 
among established theories and sample outcomes. 
4.5 The United States at War 
The next step in the analysis is to determine if the model provide information on 
an individual state’s behavior. For this analysis, the United States is the focus of 
determining if the earth’s magnetic field may affect individual state behavior. Looking at 
a specific country allows the movement away from the system variables used up to this 
point and permits the use of local geomagnetic fields. The first model looks at the United 
States’ overseas troop deployments. The dependent variable is troops deployed, less those 
aboard ship and stationed in Europe, and it is measured annually. 
The model includes one important control variable: annual defense spending. Not 
surprisingly, this spending is significant and goes up with the greater deployment of 
troops. Beyond this basic relationship, though, the magnetic fields measurements 
correlate significantly with observed troop deployments. The field measurements are 
significant, demonstrating that the influence is not zero. As the system measure of the 
magnetic field increases, the number of U.S. troops deployed overseas increases. Within 
the sample, higher values correlate with higher probability of war. This inexplicable 
pattern of military action correlating with the system-level geomagnetic predictors, as 
well as with individual field components is compelling. The magnetic field coefficients 
of influences are significant, so unlikely to be zero.  
Much has been made of the influence of the military-industrial complex (Pursell, 
1972) (Eisenhower, 1960) and defense spending related to threat perceptions (Page & 
Shapiro, 1992) (Mogg, Matthews, Bird, & Macgregor-Morris, 1990) (Gordon & Arian, 
2001) and even defense spending as driven by psychological and institutional variables 
(Brader, 2002) (Beer, Healy, Sinclair, & Bourne, 1987). Thus, it is not surprising that a 
similar model predicting defense spending produced comparable results: On balance, 
spending was higher with high geomagnetic levels than at lower levels. However, the 
small number of cases, which results in a deceptively high R2, and a confusing pattern of 
coefficients similar to that seen in the last table, makes the table less interesting than 
most. 
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Table 17 Number of U.S. Soldiers deployed less Europe and aboard ship 
 Model Type: Regression  
 Observations = 31 Pseudo R2 = .5 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
Annual Average Ap 
.1763 0.000 *** 
(0.0032)    
V Component 
-.0138 0.000 *** 
(0.0003)   
N Component .0116 0.000 *** 
 (0.0005)   
I Component .0503 0.000 *** 
 (0.0009)   
D Component .0721 0.000 *** 
 (0.0008)   
E Component -.1167 0.000 *** 
 (0.0013)   
Annual Defense Spending 
(Billions of $) 
.0033 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Constant .130 0.000 *** 
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 (0.013)     
Copyright © Jackie R. East 2014    
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Chapter 5  Intra-State Conflict 
Realism lacks a well-developed framework for discussing intra-state conflict. 
Liberalism does provide some space to think about internal dynamics. Most of the 
discussions in liberalism deal with how internal dynamics generate economic systems. 
However, the internal stability within a country will influence how the state generates 
power and how that power is exercised in the international system. The magnetic 
influence on internal dynamics therefore could affect how states interact in the 
international system. 
The study of intra-state conflict covers a lot of ground. It includes domestic 
political instability all the way to a general break-down of civil society resulting in civil 
war. The following analysis will evaluate how using the earth’s magnetic field could be 
beneficial in models of intra-state conflict. Specifically, outbreak of civil war, severity of 
civil war, and coup occurrence is  reviewed. Some will build upon existing models to 
determine how the inclusion of a system variable representing the earth’s magnetic field 
affects the explanatory power of the model and the significance of other variables of 
interest. Other models will attempt to motivate a new approach to analysis. 
5.1 Recurrence of Civil Wars 
Barbara F. Walter’s “Does Conflict Beget Conflict?” provides a perfect 
opportunity to see how including a magnetic field variable in a fully analyzed and 
rigorous model may affect its power and relevancy (Walter, 2004). The model presented 
by Walter falls squarely into the Neo-liberal school of international relations. Walter’s 
model shows that conditions of low quality of life and high barriers to political, 
economic, and social participation are valuable predictors of which states will experience 
continued civil conflict and which will not.  
The phenomenon that has come to be termed the “Arab Spring” represents a 
spectrum of civil wars. These conflicts also represent a spectrum of possible paths, 
means, and outcomes of civil war. It will be interesting to see if the occurrence of civil 
war will follow the trends of historical civil wars from 1945 to 1996. During this time, 
36% of civil wars followed closely behind a civil war. However, this only represents 22 
of 58 cases of civil war (Walter, 2004). The occurrence and recurrence of civil war led 
Collier and Sambanis to coin the term “conflict trap” (Collier & Sambanis, 2002). 
 Before Walter, the literature on civil war recurrence focused primarily on the 
characteristics of the previous war to explain why some break out again and others do not 
(Licklider, 1995) and (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). This earlier analysis argued that 
recurrence of civil war was a result of characteristics of the previous civil conflict and 
attributes of how the conflict ended. Walter argues that none of the previous explanatory 
factors is sufficient without the presence of strong economic and political incentives for 
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the average citizen to fight (Walter, 2004). Walter’s analysis of every country 
experiencing civil war from 1945 to 1996 suggests that the primary variable in prediction 
of recurrence of the civil war are basic living conditions and ability to participate in the 
political processes of the state. She also found that conflict duration and the willingness 
of a government to partition territory had significant effect on recurrence, but only in 
certain types of renewed war. 
 Explanations of why civil wars recur begin with why they start. Conflicts started 
based on ethnic and identity group conflict (Gurr, 2000) have unique intensity and 
scarring that tend to drive these civil wars to flare up again over time (Rothchild & Groth, 
1995). Explanations of recurring civil wars also include descriptions of how parties 
fought the civil war. Civil wars that have high costs on those involved could drive desires 
of personal vengeance and result in recurring conflicts. This dynamic is probably 
restricted to the “minority” group and not the state. Wars costly to the state would 
suppress the tendency for civil war recurrence, as it would lack the will and resources to 
execute such a conflict if the previous one was particularly devastating (Rosen, 1972). 
Duration of the civil conflict also could influence the probability of a recurrence. Long 
wars are packed with information that leaves little doubt as to the “balance of power” 
among participants. Short wars may leave one or both sides wondering what the real 
balance may be and with uncertainty could enable another outbreak to occur (Walter, 
2004). Finally, how the war ended may have an impact on recurrence. The majority of 
research and support goes to showing that the victorious party, experiencing a decisive 
victory, consolidates power and increases the costs of renewed fighting (Wagner R. H., 
1993) and (Wagner R. H., 1994). 
 Walter argues that what drive the ability of groups to restart or initiate new civil 
wars following the ending of old ones are the conditions that motivate a re-mobilization 
of citizens. She believes that two conditions drive mobilization. First, the status quo 
needs to be perceived as worse than death. Second, there can be no non-violent means of 
changing this status quo (Walter, 2004). She presents a compelling argument concerning 
the quality of life that potential soldiers fighting a civil war have versus their willingness 
to re-enlist in an army to fight another civil war. She also acknowledges that other issues 
complicate the calculus, such as collective action problems; availability of resources, 
supplies, etc. Risk acceptance among the population also should matter. Her intent, 
though, is to show that citizen participation is an understudied dynamic in the recurrence 
of civil conflict. 
 Her focus on individual incentive and evaluating the outcome because of 
aggregate individual decision-making makes her theory a perfect candidate to test the 
relevance and impact of the earth’s magnetic field within an established as well 
articulated model. She looked at every state in the international system that had 
experienced civil war between 1945 and 1996 based on the Correlates of War project 
coding. She used annual observations of each state as the unit of analysis. It resulted in 
1,151 country-year observations representing 58 conflicts (states). 
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 She created three dependent variables with the correlates of war data available. 
First, was a coding for Subsequent War, 1 if a subsequent war occurred in a given year, 
and 0 if it did not. To distinguish between cases where old factors caused the subsequent 
civil war and when new factors did, Walter created two other dependent variables, Repeat 
War and New War. A conflict was coded 1 for repeat war if it was fought by the same 
parties over the same issues as the initial civil war. A conflict was coded 1 for new war if 
it involved new combatants. There were 14 repeat and 8 new wars out of the 58 cases of 
civil war covering more than 1,100 country years. 
 Walter measured several groups of independent variables. The first group dealt 
with the characteristic of the civil war and was a determination if the civil war was an 
Ethnic Civil War. This group also included a classification variable of the demands of the 
rebels as either being in total control of the government or something less: Total Goals 
vs. Non-Total Goals. 
The second group of independent variables used is War-Related Deaths, Duration 
of War in months, and the number of Displaced People. These three variables were log 
transformed. Walter claims that identical analysis with these variables not log 
transformed were the same. These variables were to measure the costs associated with 
renewed war. The third group of independent variables captures the factors associated 
with the resolution of the previous civil war. Grievances Settled, whether a side 
experienced a Decisive Victory, or if a Partition occurred could each point to a different 
likelihood of renewed conflict. Each, if true should reduce the likelihood of renewed civil 
war. 
The final group of independent variables she evaluated measures of economic and 
political conditions of the population. They included Infant Mortality Rate (deaths per 
1,000 births), Life Expectancy at Birth, Adult Illiteracy, and Real GDP Per Capita. These 
variables were highly correlated and not included in the model at the same time. In this 
group Walter included a measure of political openness to measure the non-violent tools 
available to a population unhappy with its plights. She used the Democracy/Autocracy 
scale from the Polity III dataset. 
Finally, Walter included a group of control variables. First, included was a 
measure of ethic heterogeneity. This was to control for differences in racial, religious, 
and linguistic divisions. Second, the addition of the year under observation addressed 
evidence that the number of civil wars per year was increasing over time. Finally, a set of 
variables to measure the number of years between original and recurrence of civil war, 
identified as Peace Years, and a set of natural cubic spline variables of Peace Years to 
determine how war recurrence relates to duration of peace after the end of a civil war. 
She found that in modeling subsequent war using logit regression that both 
partition in the previous civil war and the number of years of peace were significant at 
the .05 level. Partition increased the probability of recurrence, while increases in peace 
years decreased the likelihood of recurrence. The variable of interest, Infant Mortality 
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(lagged one year), and the duration of the previous war were significant at the .01 level. 
None of the other variables measuring the characteristics of the previous civil war was 
significant (Walter, 2004). However, it is worth noting that both total goals are 
significant at the .1 level. This somewhat reduces the strength of her findings and creates 
a more balanced argument that both quality of life and the characteristics of the previous 
conflict are important. In fact at the .1 level a conflict focused on the total replacement of 
the government would be equal to roughly 76.66 infant deaths per 1,000 births. 
As a start, evaluating the effect of Ap or C9 alone on the probability of a civil war 
recurring indicates that Ap is not very useful in prediction or explanation  While the 
preponderance of the 95% confidence interval is positive and the expected effect is a 
meaningful value of .07 (with an Ap range of between 1 and 23), such results could 
appear by chance even if the true relationship was zero. C9, however, is significant at the 
.1 level. C9 could have a mitigating effect on recurrence and that mitigation effect would 
increase as C9 increases. 
However, the inclusion of Ap and C9 in a fully developed model results in 
findings that are more compelling. The inclusion of magnetic field variables Ap and C9 
in Walter’s model don’t drastically change the overall outcome of the model. Inclusion of 
Ap only subtly changed the effect of partition, increasing its coefficient by about 6%. 
Both Ap and C9 are significant in the model; Ap at the .1 and C9 at the .05 level. Within 
the estimated values of the model for Walter’s sample a one standard deviation for the Ap 
index is 4 units, while one standard deviation for infant mortality is 48 units. It takes a 
6.33 unit increase in the rate of infant deaths per 1,000 births to equal a 1 unit increase in 
the Ap Index. If the Ap index is at its max value, infant mortality would have to be as 
high as 145.5 per 1,000 to have equal influence on the recurrent of civil war based on the 
sample and model analysis. The impact of maxing out the Ap value has the same absolute 
impact that a 5-year increase in duration of a previous civil. The Ap increases the 
likelihood and duration decreases the likelihood. So, 5 years of civil war will reduce the 
likelihood and offset the effect of a max Ap value. 
The measure of magnetic influence results in a more drastic impact on the base 
model. Total Goal collapses from a significance level of .071 to .150. The sample 
estimates show the influence of C9 in the model is 8 times as great as the influence of 
Ap. While the model finds the influence of infant mortality to be slightly greater it now 
takes an increase of 39 units in infant mortality to equal a 1 unit increase in C9. Indeed, 
the 2% of instances in which the C9 index is as high or higher than 4 units, infant 
mortality would have to be as high as 158-per-1,000 to be as influential in the recurrence 
of civil war as the C9 index. However, it would only take 1.5 years of civil war to cancel 
out the effects of either a C9 index score of 4 or an infant mortality rate of 158 per 1,000. 
It would only take three years of civil war to cancel out the effects of both. 
Walter re-runs her analysis, substituting other measures of individual well-being 
for infant mortality. These variables are life expectancy and illiteracy. These models with 
Ap and C9 included end in roughly the same results as the base model using infant 
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mortality. In the case of modeling with life expectancy, Ap is significant at the .1 level 
and C9 is significant at the .05 level. Their expected effect on the probability of recurring 
civil war are roughly the same as well. Modeling with illiteracy as a variable of interest 
results in a model of duration significant at the .01 level. Illiteracy is significant at the .1 
level. Adding AP (P = .014) to the model results in illiteracy being significant at the .05 
level, strengthening the results, but much of the rest of the model remains largely 
unchanged. Using C9 (P = .011) has much the same effects as AP in the model. In none 
of these models did partition rise to the .1 or better significance level. 
The magnetic field measurements were solidly significant in the models. Of 
course, this is but a small subset of the population of intrastate and inter-state conflicts. 
Indeed, this analysis is based on only 58 civil war outbreaks, of which 22 suffered some 
type of recurrence. The 58 civil wars represent 5% of the evaluated country-years. The 22 
recurrences are only 2% of the evaluated country-years. One must be cautious about 
asserting that the findings of either significance or impact on the base model (sample 
estimates) can be generalized to the larger set of international conflicts (population). But, 
it is another instance validating the inclusion of magnetic field information in models of 
international relations outcomes. There is no indication of temporal autocorrelation after 
conducting a preliminary set of diagnostic tests. 
5.2 Severity of Civil Wars 
Civil wars may represent microcosms of the international system and offer a 
warning to adherents of liberalism regarding the limits of institutions in maintaining 
orderly relations among people. The magnetic field’s influence on the relations among 
groups within a state may offer insights into relations among states within the 
international system. 
Bethany Lacina points out that all but three of the wars that occurred from 1990 to 
2002 were civil wars, and that civil wars accounted for 90% of the civilian and combatant 
deaths experienced during that period (Lacina, 2006). While Walter’s data set ends in 
1996 and seemed to indicate that civil wars and their recurrence were few in number, 
Lacina points out that even when they occur rarely, such wars may have disproportionate 
impact on civilians and combatants. She also cites work on poverty (Bayer & Rupert, 
2001), (Collier, Elliot, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, & Sambanis, 2003) and 
(Murdoch & Sandler, 2002), poor public health (Ghobarah, Huth, & Russett, 2003) and 
(Krug, Dahlberg, Mercy, Zwi, & Lozano, 2002), and child mortality rates (Black, Morris, 
& Bryce, 2003) to provide strong evidence that civil wars were responsible for these 
social ailments. The depth and breadth of these social ills are most likely determined by 
the severity of any civil war that had occurred in the state. 
Lacina proposes a set of hypotheses and regression analysis that identifies factors 
to explain variation in civil war battle deaths. Her findings are contrary to the analysis of 
civil war onset and duration that asserts that measures of state strength were the 
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significant explanatory variables for these models. Lucina found in her models that 
political variables outperform the measures of state strength.  
 Lacina makes a satisfactory case for using the battle deaths suffered during a civil 
war as a measure of the war’s severity. She acknowledges that the measure of battle 
deaths is not the same as measuring the total humanitarian cost associated with a civil 
war, but it does provide a satisfactory measure of the scale of combat associated with a 
civil war. The determinants of that scale fall into one of two camps: opportunity or 
motivation. The determinants of outbreak are likely to be so ubiquitous that they are 
unlikely to provide much explanatory power as to the variance in severity of civil wars. 
 Lacina develops a series of hypotheses grounded within three different categories 
of variables. The first are measures of state strength and include gross domestic product, 
outside assistance in the civil war, geography of the state and its population density. The 
second involve measures of regime type. The third category is that of ethnicity and 
religion (Lacina, 2006). 
 Lacina conducts analysis on each of these three categories using severity of battle 
violence as the dependent variable. She measures severity of battle violence as the natural 
log of the total count of battle deaths. She controls for both duration and population 
within the regression analysis. For state strength, Lacina uses the measure of military 
quality, which is defined as military expenditures divided by the number of military 
personnel, lagged one year and logged (Bennett & Stam, 1996), the per capita GDP that 
is adjusted for purchasing power parity and inflation (logged), a dummy variable for 
possible external support that is coded 1 if the war occurred during the cold war, and the 
percent of the country experiencing civil war that is “rough” (logged). The measure of 
regime characteristic is a dummy variable that codes a state with a composite score of 6 
or higher on a combined Polity scale of regime type as a democracy (1) (Marshall & 
Jaggers, 2003).  
The analytical findings were that duration, intervention, regime type, and ethnic 
polarization were significant in modeling battle deaths from civil wars. Lacina’s base 
model explained 40% (R2 of .40) of variance in battle deaths. The less restrictive model, 
using only the variables that are significant in the base model, explains 3% more of the 
variance (R2 of .43) but is more parsimonious with little change in the coefficients of 
each variable. 
 Looking at the possible value of the magnetic field alone in modeling battle 
deaths results in neither Ap nor C9 as being significant. In fact, the model indicates there 
is a good chance that in the least restrictive model of battle deaths with magnetic fields as 
the only explanatory variable that the likely effect of the variable is 0, or so very near to 0 
as to be the same. This makes the findings of the value of the magnetic variables in the 
more restrictive model used by Lacina more intriguing and surprising. 
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Merging Lacina’s dataset with the Ap and C9 dataset used to model the influence 
of the earth’s magnetic field results in fewer cases, as some of Lacina’s data points were 
outside of the available Ap and C9 data. Rerunning her model with only the 88 cases that 
match the available magnetic variable data resulted in the same significant variables. 
Shrinking the base model’s cases to match the number of observations in the C9 and Ap 
models did no harm to Lacina’s conclusions. 
Including C9 or Ap in the model find both significant with the former at the .1 
level and the later at .05 level. A trend to note is the movement of the significance of 
ethnic and religious polarity. With either Ap or C9 in the model, neither of the polarity 
variables is significant. The possible significance level of ethnic polarity increases, or 
moves away from an acceptable significance level, while that of religious polarity 
decreases, or moves toward an acceptable significance level. 
If the hypothesis of the earth’s magnetic field influencing human behavioral and 
aggregate behavioral outcomes is true, then this model of Lucina’s sample indicates that 
the magnetic variable has an importance of at least that of some “traditional” explanatory 
variables used in the discipline, such as intervention and regime type. Under certain 
circumstances (low duration and/or high magnetic value) the magnetic field variables 
may be an important explanatory variable in determining civil war severity and duration. 
While one cannot make confident generalizations about the population effect of Ap and 
C9, one can be confident that if the sample is representative that the influence of the 
magnetic has a very small likelihood of being zero..  
Figure 13 Simulated expected Severity of Civil Wars 
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5.3 Coups 
 Much like civil war, discussion space in this thesis for coups, insurgency, and 
terrorism is limited. In Realism, these dynamics are ancillary issues as long as they only 
threaten governments but not the existence of states. Liberalism provides increased space 
to discuss these dynamics. However, this space is full of discussions about how regime 
type and institutions can overcome power relationships, risk, and security concerns. The 
analysis here shows that the system variables could be as important as human institutions.  
Some of the most serious intra-state armed conflicts include coups, terrorism, and 
ethnic wars. For coups, the model below estimates the probability of a coup in a given 
country, explained as a function of the time between and since the last coup in that 
country as well as the time since a coup was last attempted within the region. The Ap 
index score is my addition to the package of explanatory variables. The regions in which 
a coup could occur is a set of dummy variables. Dummy variables for whether the United 
States of America is involved in a “hot war”, a “cold war”, or at peace is included as 
well. 
The Ap index is significant at the .1 level. Generally, as the Ap score increases in 
value the probability of a coup occurring in a county increases. As the time between 
coups in a country increases, the probability of a coup occurring in the same country 
increases. However, as the time between coups in a region increases, the probability of a 
coup occurring generally decreases. Compared to European countries, the baseline 
region, and the region least likely to experience a coup is the Pacific, followed by South 
America. As the Ap Index increases, the probability of a coup occurring in a region 
increases. 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 show expected value of the dependent variable, 
probability of coup, when simulating from the sample and the U.S. is not in a “hot war,” 
and holding the time since the last coup in the country and region at their sample means, 
controlling for no other influences on coups. When the Ap Index is near “0” given the 
other variables in the model, their sample mean is 3%. The expected probability of coups 
in a country of a region in a given day doubles to 6% when the Ap Index ranges between 
130 and 160 units. The expected probability of coups increase to a range of 11% to 12% 
when the Ap Index is 280 units or greater. The absence of involvement by the United 
States in a war results in a shift of expected probabilities of coups by an average of 1%
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Table 18 Likelihood of a coup on any given day 
 
   Probability of A Coup On a Given Day 
  Model Type: Probit  
  Observations = 15,395 Pseudo R2 = .0181 
Variables 
Coefficient and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Ap Score 
.0021 0.092 * 
(0.0012)    
      
Days Since Last Country 
Coup Attempt 
.0100 0.000 *** 
(0.0016)   
    
Days Since Last Coup 
Attempt in the Region 
-.0031 0.027 ** 
(0.0014)   
    
Central Asia and Caucasus 
Region 
.2344 0.062 * 
(0.1255)   
    
Sub-Saharan Region 
.2628 0.009 *** 
(0.1011)   
 
 
  
 
 
97 
 
  
  
South America 
.2189 .045 ** 
(0.1092)   
    
Middle East 
.2308 .040 ** 
(0.1126)   
    
Asia 
.2797 .046 ** 
(0.1190)   
    
Pacific 
-.7037 .016 ** 
(0.2912)   
    
United States in “Hot War” 
-.0950 .022 ** 
(0.0414)   
    
Cold War Period 
.0351 .426 - 
(0.0440)   
    
Constant 
-2.266 0.000 *** 
(0.1111)     
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
Table 18 Continued 
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 The Pacific region probability of coup is sufficiently different from the other 
regions to require its own chart. The expected probabilities of the Pacific region range 
from near “0” to around 2% as the Ap Index values range from “0” to more than 280 
units.  
 The change in expected probability of coup for a country in a given day is small. 
However, when we average expected probabilities for the regions (less the Pacific) and 
we graph the percentage change from U.S. involved in a “hot” war to the U.S. being at 
peace, the impact of the condition change on the probability becomes noticeable. Figure 
16 shows that in simulations of the sample and for non-pacific regions, when the Ap 
Index is near “0” in the sample the simulation shows  a nearly 25% change in expected 
probability of coups occurring when the system changes from one in which the United 
States is in a “hot” war to one where it is at peace. When the Ap Index is at its sample 
high, the percent change in expected probability of coups under the previous condition 
change is only roughly 17%. For the Pacific region, the changes are nearly 35% (Ap near 
0) and 27% (Ap near 280).
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Figure 14 Sim
ulated likelihood of a coup 
Figure 15 Sim
ulated likelihood of a coup 
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  Figure 16 Sim
ulated percentage change in the probability of a coup occurring 
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5.4 Insurgencies 
Next is analysis of the model of insurgency in Iraq. The dependent variable in this 
analysis is the number of occupiers killed in insurgent attacks in Iraq from 2003 to 2010. 
The model controls for past casualties, past terrorism, and the duration of the occupation. 
Table 19 Expected number of occupier troops killed in insurgent/terrorist attacks 
 Number of Occupiers Killed in Attacks 
 Model Type: Poisson  
 Observations = 51 Pseudo R2 = .1839 
Variables 
Coefficient and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Cp Score 
.4939 0.000 *** 
(0.1300)    
Duration of Occupation .0132 
     
0.003 *** 
(0.0044)   
Deaths Inflicted Last 
Month 
-.0019 0.049 * 
(0.0010)   
Wounded Inflicted Last 
Month 
.0007 .000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Terrorist Attacks Last 
Month 
.0001 0.943 - 
(0.0012)   
Constant 3.323 0.000 *** 
 (0.136)     
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
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For this sample, geomagnetic fields correlate with the outcome of interest. 
Specifically, as levels increase, other things equal, the number of occupier deaths that we 
can expect will rise. The other variables also help predict deaths: They increase with 
longer occupations and in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. Whereas wounds might 
encourage additional insurgent activities, deaths of insurgents suppress insurgent activity 
in the following month – but these two variables matter less as individual explanations 
and more as a package of predictors, given that they correlate with each other. 
5.5 Terrorism 
The previous analysis for intra-state conflict has looked at some characteristics of 
insurgency and ethnic conflict at the local or state level. Incidents of terrorism occur all 
over the world, as a system process. The primary data used to conduct analysis of 
terrorist attacks comes from the Global Terrorism Database, retrieved from the Center of 
Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, based at the University of 
Maryland. The database is in two portions, the first from 1970 to 1997, and the second 
from 1997 to 2007. The data provides information on incidents that are intentional, entail 
some level of violence, executed by a subnational perpetrator, and meet two of three, 
pertinent criteria. (1) Whether the act intended to attain a political, economic, religious, 
or social goal. (2) Whether evidence of an intention to coerce exists.(3) Whether the 
action took place outside the context of legitimate warfare (Security, 2007). First, let us 
look at how much additional information the AP score provides when attempting to 
predict the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring in a given day somewhere in the 
world. 
Table 20 Probability of a Terrorist Attack in a Given Day 
Probability of a Terrorist Attack in a Day 
Model Type: Logit 
Observations = 48,249 Pseudo R2 = .0014 
Variables Coefficient & Std Dev Significance 
Ap Score 
.0053 0.000 *** 
(0.0006) 
Constant -.077 0.000 *** 
(0.012) 
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P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01
The geomagnetic measurements covary with probability of a terrorist attack in a 
given day. The coefficient is significant at the .01 level and is unlikely to be zero. Figure 
17 shows the sample based simulation that produce probabilities of an attack occurring 
over the range of magnetic field values. It shows that the probability is generally small 
regardless of the geomagnetic level, always falling below one percent; the estimated 
increase in probability does show in the figure. 
Figure 17 Simulated probability of a terrorist attack in any given day 
When the predicted values for the probability for a terrorist attack occurring 
somewhere in the world on a given day is plotted against the Ap scores in the data 
sample, the probability of an event hovers between .45 percent and .50 percent when the 
Ap score is low, and then increases to .8 when the Ap score is 280 units. This sample 
includes all terrorist events, ranging from mobilizing a mass demonstration to detonating 
a powerful bomb. A full change from a low Ap score to a high score in the sample almost 
doubles the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring somewhere in the world on any 
given day. 
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5.5.1 Probability of High Terrorism on any Given Day 
Figure 18 Simulated probability of a terrorist attack 
This chart shows that when using the sample and simulation that as the Ap score 
goes from 0 to 280 units the probability of a “high effect” terrorist event such as a 
bombing or facility attack on any given day goes from .35% to .70%. The probabilities 
more than double over the range from 0 to 280 for bombing and facility attack events to 
occur in a given day. For assassins the expected probabilities increase around 50% over 
the range of Ap values in the sample. 
105 
5.5.2 Probability of Terrorist Attacks 
The Ap Index covaries with the count of daily terrorist attacks as well as the 
number of successful and failed attacks in any given day. Figure 20 shows that as the 
magnetic field increases, the expected number of expected daily terrorist attacks does as 
well within the sample. 
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Figure 19 Simulated relationship between daily attacks and the Ap score 
Within the sample and using simulations, the model results indicate that as the Ap 
Index increases from 0 to 280 units the expected number of daily terrorist attacks 
increases from about .75 to a little over 2 per day somewhere in the world. The expected 
95% confidence interval of the model and simulation is between 1.5 and 2.5 counts per 
day. Increasing Ap Index values is correlated with increased terrorist attacks. 
5.5.3 Successful Terrorist Attacks 
When terrorist attacks do occur somewhere in the world in the sample, the Ap 
index correlates with the number that are successful. Table 21 shows that the magnetic 
field measurement is significant in modeling the number of successful terrorist attacks if 
not controlling for any other variables. 
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Figure 20 Simulated expected number of daily terrorist attacks 
  
Table 21 Expected number of successful terrorist attacks in a given day 
 Number of Successful Terrorist Attacks 
 Model Type: Poisson  
 Observations = 27,606 Pseudo R2 = .0013 
Variables 
Coefficient and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Ap Score 
.0045 0.000 *** 
(0.0003)    
      
Constant -.292 0.000 *** 
 (0.009)     
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
Figure 21 Simulated expected number of successful daily terrorist attacks  
 
Ap Index 
When Terrorist Attacks are Conducted, The Affect of the Ap 
Score on the Number of Successful Daily Terrorist Attacks 
Globally Controlling for No Other Variables. 
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There are likely to be fewer successful attacks in the sample on a day with lower 
Ap values than on days with higher Ap values. In fact the expected number of terrorist 
attacks in the sample in a day increases from around .75 on average at a 0 Ap value to an 
expected average of over 2.5 average attacks per day, or a 300% increase in expected 
daily terrorist attacks. 
Let’s look at the percentage of attacks in a given day that are successful. This 
time, the analysis will use a linear regression model versus a poison count model. The Ap 
Score is significant at .1 so is unlikely to be zero. However, the variable explains almost 
no variance in the number of successful terrorist attacks in any given day. 
Table 22 Expected percent of terrorist attacks that are successful 
 
Percent of Terrorist Attacks Successful in a 
Day 
 Model Type: Regress  
 Observations = 3516 Pseudo R2 = .0007 
Variables 
Coefficient and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Ap Score 
.0304 0.066 * 
(00166)    
      
Constant 90.839 0.000 *** 
 (0.361)     
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
 
However, the confidence interval and simulating the possible outcome of this 
model indicates that it is possible that the Ap score has little to no effect. Let us look at 
the possible range of impacts that the Ap index has without controlling for other 
variables. Note that we have moved away from a direct count of successful attacks to an 
analysis of the percentage of attacks that are successful. 
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Figure 22 Simulated expected percentage of attacks successful 
 
 
The sample has a high proportion of successful attacks. The Ap index in 
simulations based on the sample covaries with the percent of successful terrorist attacks 
each day. Looking at Figure 22 simulation based on the sample, it can be inferred, there 
are examples when no attempted terrorist attacks are successful; there are 35 of them. 
Yet, the sheer number of days in which all (not just some) attempted terrorist attacks 
were successful, 2,118 or over 60%, indicates that most attacks are successful and that 
the model, without controlling for other variables, cannot explain the failures very well. 
In fact, of all the days that had terrorist attacks occur only 3.75% of them had 50% or 
more failures. Likewise, based on ARIMA analysis there is a low confidence that 
temporal autocorrelation occurs in these models. 
5.6 Conclusions and Caveats 
Although realism and liberalism have shied away from defining characteristics of 
the space in which the international system operates, there may be justification for 
integrating at least one characteristic into their analysis. When looking at internal 
dynamics of actors in the international system, magnetic fields consistently correlate with 
state behavior as well as indications of state strength and stability. Furthermore, the ways 
that the expression of magnetic fields in the international system has a direct effect on 
When Terrorist Attacks are conducted, the Percentage of Attacks in a 
Given Day That Are Successful Globally, Controlling for No Other 
Variables 
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how the international system operates. Any international relations theory that asserts its 
ability to explain why states behave the way they do should consider taking into account 
the influence of magnetic fields. 
 The study and analysis of interstate conflict encompasses quite a few 
subcategories, and generally, each possesses its own preferred control variables. For the 
occurrence of war there are many. Distance between states (Quakenbush 2006), regime 
types of states in a dyad (Schultz 2001) is a control variable when evaluating risks of war 
within the international system (Bennett and Stam 2000). Some other standard controls 
are historical interactions, wealth and power relations, per capita income, military 
spending, technological metrics, domestic regime characteristics, strategies of the parties 
involved, the state of the offense-defense relationships, terrain, among many others. 
Regime type, distance, power relationships, and previous disputes have recently been a 
common package in dispute analysis (Werner 2004). Analysts model military strategy as 
both an explanatory and a control variable in various models (Reiter 1999) 
Theorists use explanations of why wars occur as controls when attempting to 
isolate important contributing factors to war occurrence, initiation, and termination. A 
few include system polarity (Levy 1985), the distribution of power in the international 
system (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972), the percentage of power concentrated in the 
two largest powers (Wayman 1984) and the presence of transitions from bipolar to multi-
polar system (Midlarksy 1988). Along with these, a valid control variable for this work 
would be a measure of the relative strength of satisfied and unsatisfied powers in the 
international system (Stoll and Chapion 1985) or the presence of an arms race (Mayer 
1986). If rivalries are enduring or transitory (Goertz and Diehl 1995) 
Other research has focused on the occurrence of war relating to other variables of 
interest. Jeremy Black’s Why Wars Happen (Black 2005) summarized the revival of 
cultural war explanations. Black evaluates the literature of cultural war and highlights 
aggressiveness in societies, diplomatic breakdowns, and the internal character of states as 
explanatory variables to explain war occurrence. Therefore, a reasonable control variable 
could be diplomatic breakdowns or a metric of the internal character of the states 
involved in disputes. 
Another set of appropriate controls would be information on alliances and alliance 
structure. Similarity of foreign policy positions among states (Signorino 1999) (Signorino 
and Ritter 1999) is a control as well as an explanatory variable.  Theorists use regime 
type and the resulting presence or absence of electoral uncertainty as both an explanatory 
variable and a control variable (Garnkel 2010). Likewise, the characteristics of 
international institutions has been used as a control variable in the expectation that 
international institutions can make dispute outbreak and resolution easier or more 
difficult (Boehmke 2004) 
 Methodologists recommend use of a control variable when time series data suffers 
from time dependence. A spline used in some international relations quantitative analysis 
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helps account for and control for dependence within dyads and time dependence (Beck, 
Johnathan and Tucker, Beyond Ordinary Logit 198). 
 For statistical analysis of states joining existing disputes the control variables 
include alliance structure (A. Smith 1995), alliance reliability, and regime type (Kegley 
and Raymond 1982), how loose or tight alliance commitments are (Kim 1991), 
characteristics of alliance agreements (Leeds 2003). Conflict expansion research rests on 
alliance structure, regime type, distance, interests, and institution controls (Wayman and 
Diehl n.d.) 
 Aside from formal alliance structures, the structures and institutions of trade are 
control variables when modeling the outbreak, occurrence, and termination of disputes 
(Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000). The normal controls for modeling war duration include 
strategy, terrain, capabilities, and regime type (Bennett and Stam 1996). Many of the 
previous variables are also widely used in models of war initiation and war outcome 
(Reiter and Stam, Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory 1998). 
The standard control variables for military spending are previous year’s spending 
(Baek 1991), the threat perceptions (Ostrom and Marra 1986), domestic political 
considerations (Higgs and Kilduff 1993), regime type, alliance structure, international 
institutions, technology, ability to finance costs (Schneider 1988), and the balance or 
distribution of power in the international system (Eloranta 2010). Public opinion 
(Kriesberg and Klein 1980) of defense spending has also been a useful control in models 
of defense spending that focus on institutional explanations (Hartley and Russett 1992). 
 Developing fully specified models incorporating these many control variables 
falls beyond this scope of this research. It would not be possible with such a large battery 
of dependent variables. However, the exclusion need not rely entirely on practical 
considerations. Omitted variable bias is the methodological boogeyman in such a 
decision, and we can have a high level of confidence that such bias is not present except 
rarely and by chance. Why? The nature of the explanatory variable makes it difficult to 
argue that any other control variables would be causally prior, necessitating the capture of 
omitted variables. 
In the spirit of the 2005 Special Issue of Conflict management and Peace Science 
(Kadera and Mitchell 2005), this analysis focuses on a single category of explanatory 
variable supported by a strong theoretical framework as to why it is causally prior and is 
not influenced by other possible independent variables. This negates the concern for 
omitted variable bias that likely drives up the number of control variables in dispute 
models. Further, as demonstrated in the analysis presented in the appendices to Chapter 
Three, it is likely that the geomagnetic variable has an influence on the other control 
variables as well in any model. It is possible that the presence of other control variables 
masks the influence of geomagnetic variables  
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Likewise, growing criticism of the inconsistent and weak explanatory power of 
the traditional explanatory variables has pointed out the poor return for the investment in 
large datasets with multiple controls and explanatory variables (Beck, King and Zeng, 
Improving Quantitative Studies of International Conflict: A Conjecture 2000). One of the 
strongest criticisms is theory assumptions that explanatory variable effects are the same 
in all cases. The geomagnetic field variable may not be able to avoid this problem, but 
leaving out all the controls should increase confidence that even small relationships are 
real correlations and set the conditions for further, deeper analysis. Avoiding over fitting 
models is a byproduct of the decision to leave out many of the second-order control 
variables. The intent is to demonstrate consistently that the explanatory variable of 
interest has near-universal applicability and over fitting would put this goal at risk. 
The exceptions to this are the sections on recurrence of civil wars and the severity 
of civil wars. The intent of these two sections is to demonstrate the benefits of inclusion 
of the geomagnetic data into a fully specified model. The absence of the system variable 
may cause omitted variable bias as discussed in previous chapters. However, far from 
demonstrating any such dynamic, these sections provide evidence that there can be 
benefits from including the variable in models. For instance, Barbara Walter’s “Does 
Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War,” (Walter 2004) demonstrates 
that adding the variable has little impact on the model outputs. In most cases, the 
coefficient of effect for magnetic fields is unlikely zero.  
Bethany Lacina’s (Lacina 2006) work “Explaining Severity of Civil Wars.” is the 
basis for the section on severity of civil wars. Like the results of the recurrence of civil 
war analysis, using the geomagnetic field by itself to explain civil war severity proved of 
little value. Magnetic fields’ coefficient of effect had a reasonable chance of being zero 
and therefore has no effect on the dependent variable in the sample. However, adding it 
to the specified model resulted in some quantifiable benefits. First, Lacina’s model 
explains 50% of the variance in severity with the geomagnetic variable versus 40% 
without. Thus, geomagnetic fields show a consistent relevance that speaks to their value 
in International Relations research. 
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Chapter 6  Crime 
 In this chapter, we move from conflict between one state and another, or perhaps 
one intrastate group and another, to the individual level and look at criminal behavior. 
Dependent variables in International Relations have the benefit of being interesting to 
political scientists. However, they the models often contain idiosyncratic system-level 
and national-level variables. This chapter therefore turns to low-level behavior that may 
be influenced by geomagnetic fields but that are subject to a completely different body of 
theory and to unrelated predictive models. The hope is that by using such diverse data, 
the research triangulates in on a series of consistent findings that cannot be explained 
away because of a specific model specification. 
6.1 Theories of Crime 
This chapter will attempt to link the search for a structured model of crime with an 
understanding of the effects of geomagnetic activity on humans. Research and cultural 
stories indicate a relationship among seemingly irrational behavior and solar and 
geographical magnetic fields.  An attempt is made to explain the count of crimes in 
an econometric model. The intent is to tie the magnetic field impact to the opportunity 
and motivation to commit violent crimes. Unemployment, poverty, or per capita income, 
and the interactions among the magnetic fields, are independent variables in count 
models that explain the number of crime events. Specifically, magnetic fields that may 
affect decisions to carry out a desire to commit a criminal act are evaluated.  
 The criminological research program dates back to formative pieces in 1916 by 
Bonger (Bonger, 1916) and continues to the formative criminological research arguments 
spurred by Cantor and Land’s seminal 1985 piece (Cantor & Land, 1985). This research 
can be divided into three categories of explanation: the Strain Theories (Cloward & 
Ohlin, 1960) (Cohen A. , Delinquent Boys, 1955) (Cohen A. , 1965) and (Merton R. K., 
1938), Utilitarian or Rational Choice Theory (Becker, 1968) (Block & Heineke, 1975), 
and the Conflict or Marxist Theory (Bonger, 1916) (Hughes & Carter, 1981).  
The Strain Theories define crime as structurally induced frustrations resulting 
from a disjuncture between what an individual expects, or aspires to attain, and what the 
structures of society will allow. Utilitarian Theory posits explanations of crime as a cost-
benefit analysis conducted by individuals who determine that the benefits of crime far 
outweigh the costs of a crime. Conflict Theory puts forth explanations on the 
discrepancies between what a society produces and what a society, through labor and 
wage conditions, allows classes of its citizens to consume. 
 The criminological debate revolves around an implicit unification of each of these 
theories into what I will call the Unemployment-Crime Motivation and Opportunity 
Theory. The need for such a theory came about from the untidy tendency of the primary 
explanatory variable of interest being unstable in sign, significance, and size of effect 
from theory to theory as well as among models within theories. Postulated by Cantor and 
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Land in 1985 (Cantor & Land, 1985), the Motivation and Opportunity model resulted in 
the dedication of an entire issue of the Journal of Quantitative Criminology (2001) to its 
defenders and detractors. This article proved to be a seminal building block for the 
quantitative analysis of crime as a consequence of individuals’ (as represented by an 
aggregate crime rate) motivation, which is a unification of conflict and utilitarian theory, 
and opportunity, which is a unification of conflict and strain theory. Changes in 
motivation and opportunity come about from the business cycle, the systematic 
expansions, and contractions of the economy as represented by unemployment. This 
theory rests upon a fundamental rational-actor hypothesis, and while the model holds for 
property crimes, it collapses under the strain of explaining violent crimes (Cantor & 
Land, 1985) (Cook & Zarkin, 1985). 
 The debate in the Journal of Quantitative Criminology (December 2001) agreed 
on little about the relationship between crime and unemployment as a proxy for the 
business cycle, but did come to a general consensus that criminological study had reached 
a pinnacle that could only be surpassed by looking beyond the national systemic level of 
analysis and digging into lower levels of analysis (Levitt & Miles, 2007) (Paternoster & 
Bushway, 2001). While not explicit, a general criticism of linear regression also evolved 
out of the debate (Levit, 2001). The primary explanatory of interest has been limited, due 
to data availability, to employment or the lack thereof and its effect on crime rates 
(Phillips, Votey, & Maxwell, 1972) (Linsky, Bachman, & Straus, 1995) (Lester & Yang, 
1994) (Lester & Yang, 1997). 
 Studies of violent crime generally refrain from using this variable. Its inability to 
explain murder, rape, and assault has largely gone ignored in this debate. A status of 
employment is a proxy for opportunity; people working have less opportunity to commit 
crimes. For motivation, either poverty rate or the per capita income is an appropriate 
measure. The greater the need represented by high poverty or low per capita income, the 
greater the motivation to commit crime. 
Rape is the only category of violent crime that has attracted a distinct research 
project and an audience. This is probably because of the increasing influence of females 
in the discipline, the cultural view of rape in our society, and the low count of crimes 
such as murder. This research program has looked to specific individual variables to 
explain the occurrence of the crime of rape. Male dominance behavior, female 
precipitation, societal pressure, male sexuality, and pathology are explanatory variables. 
The strongest explanations are psychological and tied to a man’s desire for power and 
domination (White & Humphrey, 1997). 
An alternate theory behind crime could unite an adjusted opportunity and 
motivation model with the magnetic research project as an explanation. The geomagnetic 
research program has much to offer a model for explaining crime. One possible 
explanation for the failure of the opportunity-motivation model and other theories to 
explain violent crime is that these models rest on rationality. Violent crime is inherently 
irrational. Society will expend only a few of its limited resources to solve or prosecute 
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property crimes, hence the power of rational and economic models to explain these types 
of crimes. However, society will redirect resources to solve and prosecute perpetrators of 
violent crime. The “rational” explanation and related models are further discredited 
because people the victims know and can identify (Justice, 2008) perpetrate a great deal 
of violent crime. 
Research in the field shows some sort of relationship between the magnetic fields 
and events that result from a breakdown in behavior and decision-making. Studies show 
that traffic accidents in two Indian cities correlate with periods of magnetic field 
disturbances, with 83% of magnetically quiet days having no traffic accidents while 81% 
of the magnetically disturbed days had traffic accidents (Dubrov A. , 1978). Additionally, 
studies indicate a relationship between magnetic fields and the number of accidents in the 
workplace (Dubrov A. , 1978). Each of these examples supports a possible relationship 
between magnetic fields and an ability of an individual to make decisions. If magnetic 
fields can affect the “simple” process of cost-benefit analysis for how fast to drive, what 
machinery to use, when to accelerate or decelerate at a lighted intersection, or where to 
put one’s limb in relation to a piece of machinery, imagine the effect it could have on the 
“complex” cost-benefit analysis that would be conducted to decide to commit a crime. 
The magnetic field could be affecting the perception of opportunity and would have an 
important influence on the outcome of models. 
A.P. Dubrov continued his study of magnetic field effects on individuals by 
looking at the number of schizophrenia cases reported in Moscow in the 1970s (Dubrov 
A. , The Geomagnetic Field and Life. Geomagnetobiology, 1978). His research showed a 
correlation between .7 and .9 connecting the increase in reported schizophrenia to 
magnetic field measurements (Dubrov A. , 1978). Thirty years later, M.A. Persinger 
found a strong negative relationship between an individual’s sense of pleasantness and 
the earth’s magnetic field (Persinger M. , 2004). Within this study, he hypothesized and 
supported that magnetic fields influenced neuropsychological processes to generate 
hedonistic effects/emotions/mental processes that correlate with multiple types of 
“negative behavior.” Persinger explained that the period of reduced pleasantness and 
increased hedonistic “desires” result in an increased irritability, diminished vigilance, and 
attenuated inhibition. To complicate these effects, Dmitrieva et al. found in subject 
experiments that field-human interactions also resulted in a physiological response 
similar to a “normal” human stress response (Dmitrieva, Obridko, Ragoulskaia, & 
Reznikov, 2000). Magnetic fields induced “stress” that differed significantly from 
“normal stress” in that it resulted in a “hyper-function” that lasted several hours, followed 
by an extended (several day) period of depression . The period of “hyper function” results 
in feelings of strength, actual physical strength, agility, and constitution, and a false sense 
of increased cognitive capability. The period of “extended depression” results in a 
feelings of decreasing value, hope, and “normality.” “Normal stress” de-escalates 
relatively quickly and has no extended mood impacts. 
 Criminology and demography have shared several characteristics that allowed the 
stressing of a linkage between population dynamics and deviant behavior (Short, 1971). 
116 
 
  
Generally, the two fields have emphasized spatial variations, used aggregate trends, 
embraced biological and physiological explanations, and based their research on the life-
course perspective. Further, both fields generally favor quantitative over qualitative 
approaches (South & Messner, 2000). 
 Age, sex, and race are among the most powerful and robust individual-level 
factors for deviancy and victimization. Young people, males, and disadvantages racial 
groups are consistently at the greatest risk of deviancy, both as perpetrators and victims 
(Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997). In fact, most theorizing concerning crime in sociology and 
criminology is concerned with explaining these relationships (Braithwaite, 1989, pp. 44-
53). One of the debates exploring these relationships concerns age as related to deviance 
and victimization. Hirschi & Gottfredson argues that the social factors cannot account for 
crime because the age-crime relationship is invariant. They argue that the reason crime 
falls off with age occurs because of the aging process (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1983) 
(Gottredson & T., 1990). The lack of variation between age and crime implies that 
longitudinal research studies are unnecessary, that a mere panel model should capture all 
the variation if the age-crime relationship is constant. 
 Some vigorous challenges to the assertion that age-crime relationships are 
constant have arisen. However, most of these challenges rest on increasing the 
complexity of models or in reducing the applicability of crime models to limited sub-sets 
of the population under specific, environmental conditions. For instance, one response is 
that age and crime are actually not invariant, but only manifest differently for different 
offenses and that the relationships change over time (D., Allen, Harer, & Streifel, 1989) 
(Greenberg, 1985). Another challenge of the invariance between age and crime is that the 
aggregate does not adequately capture the relationship between these two factors and the 
entire population. For instance, a series of studies indicate that researchers can distinguish 
among different groups or categories of offenders based on their distinctive offending 
“trajectories” (D'under, Land, McCall, & Nagin, 1998) (Laub & Nagin, 1998) (Nagin & 
Land, 1993). 
 Further debate revolves around the persistence of deviant behavior over the 
lifespan of the individual. An established finding in the literature is that deviancy in 
childhood is a powerful predictor of adult criminality (Krohn, Thornberry, & Rivera, 
1999) (Sampson & Laub, 1993). Two explanations of this relationship are the latent-trait 
perspective and the life-course perspective (Moffitt, 1997) (Simons, Johnson, Conger, & 
Elder, 1998). The latent-trait perspective asserts that the propensity to commit deviant 
acts develops at a young age and remains stable throughout life. If this is true, deviant 
behavior reflects stable differences in propensities across individuals. The life-course 
perspective, on the other hand, rests on developmental processes. Young-age deviancy 
leads to feedback, events, and learning that tend to generate behavioral stability. Under 
this model, the correlation between early and later behavior is imperfect. Life events and 
transitions can result in redirected and altered behavioral trajectories. Research is 
developing that supports both perspectives (Simons, Johnson, Conger, & Elder, 1998) 
(Paternoster & Brame, 1998) (Bartusch, Lynam, Moffitt, & Silva, Criminology). 
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 Like age, sex has a generally identifiable pattern. Males are disproportionally 
involved in crime as both victims and offenders. This is especially true for serious and 
violent crimes. Again, an ongoing debate concerns the stability or change in the “gender 
gap.” The continuing stability of rates of gender incarceration in the face of increasing 
gender equality in economic, education, and other sociological characteristics has been a 
mystery. However, in practice the effect of gender equality on relative levels of male and 
female deviancy remains an open question in the literature. The primary theory that 
addresses these relationships is the “power-control theory of delinquency” (Hagan, Gillis, 
& Simpson, 1987) (Hagan, Gillis, & Simpson, 1990). This theory holds that greater 
equality of genders in authority relations result in more egalitarian familial relations. This 
in turn would lead to similar socialization of boys and girls, leading to similar risk 
profiles and reduced differences in delinquency between the genders. 
 The power-control theory has had to deal with several critiques (Akers, 1997) but 
others have provided support for the approach (Grasmick, Blackwell, & Bursik, 1993) 
(Grasmick, Hagan, Blackwell, & Ameklev, 1996). However, one of the most compelling 
arguments against the theoretical model of power-control theory is one that uses basic 
assumptions concerning crime against the theory. Gender inequality should lead the 
disadvantaged group to participate in crime because of that disadvantage, as asserted by 
conventional theories on the causes of crime (D. & Allan, 1996). 
 Gender and victimization is another point of contention in the literature. 
Theoretically, gender equality should equate to legal equality in quality of representation 
for women leading to increased cost to commit violence against them. The increased cost 
should result in a decline in violence against women as gender equality increases (Bailey 
& Peterson, 1995). The research is clear that at an aggregate level, and looking only at 
victimization and gender, such a relationship does not exist (Bailey & Peterson, 1995). 
However, after controlling for “standards of structural determinants” the relationship is 
small but exists (Brewer & Smith, 1995). Generally, though, research has determined that 
for minor deviancy the variables important in predicting and explaining crime, while 
different in the how women and men are involved in deviancy and how they perpetrate 
crimes, are not different for males and females (Steffensmeier & Allan, 1996) 
(Mazerolle, 1998) (Triplett & Myers, 1995) (Miller, 1998) (Alarid, Marquart, Burton, 
Cullen, & Cuvelier, 1996). 
 The issue of race is one that stirs much controversy. Minorities, specifically 
African Americans, are over-represented in the criminal system as offenders. Some have 
argued that this is the result of the structure of the justice system. However, there is 
general agreement that behavioral differences exist among races that influence offender 
and victim propensities (Sampson & Lauritsen, 1994) (Sampson & Lauritsen, 1996). 
Explanations of the race and crime relationship have traditionally come down to a 
combination of cultural and structural models (Wolfgang, 1967) (Curtis, 1975) (Blau & 
Blau, 1982) (Blau P. S., 1984) (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1999) (Parker, McCall, & Land, 
1999). However, no set of research definitively settles the question, and several 
conflicting findings are quite compelling, if not convincing (Messner & Sampson, 1991). 
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One such set of intriguing studies asserts that the black and white populations are actually 
two different populations, that the structural context in which each lives are so different, 
on average, that “the worst urban context of white communities are better off than the 
average black communities” (Sampson R. J., 1997). If this is true then controls for race in 
these models actually do reflect the structural context of the samples. One such study 
demonstrates that, when we control for structural conditions, we find no significant 
difference between deviancies among black and white boys (Peeples & Loeber, 1994). Of 
course, other work depicts a complex relationship between race in crime, made more 
complicated by the fact that crime rates within racial groups vary considerably across 
places and in comparison with other groups (Hawkins, 1999). 
 One of the implications of these dynamics and concerns in the literature is that of 
“compositional effects.” If people with different characteristics show more or less 
probability of being a deviant or victim, then some variation in crime taken together must 
occur due to the group quantities that compose the aggregate, such as differences in 
relative size or density of the group relative to others.  A popular way to control for this is 
to use information on how groups get involved in criminal activity to create rates that 
reflect what would be expected if all groups that made up the collective had the same 
propensity to commit crimes as the whole (Deane, 1987) (Phillips J. , 1997). 
 The standard method for controlling for the structure of the aggregate population 
and its effect on the crime dynamic is to include these types of control variables in 
statistical models (LaFree, 1999) (Neopolitan, 1997). The relationships are of a manner 
that allows generalization across the population and generally tends to seem more 
complex than the standard prediction that low age predicts crime and high age predicts 
victim, or that “medium age male” and “low age female” predict crime, and so forth. The 
inclusion of these control variables is further problematical as, especially in the case of 
race controls, multicollinearity is generally present (Messner & Sampson, 1991) (Land, 
McCall, & Cohen, 1990).  
6.1.1 Linking Crime to the Aggregate Level 
 A few of the theories that link crime to the population structure are (1) social 
disorganization theory, (2) sub-culture of violence theory, and (3) relative cohort resource 
availability theory. Generally, these theories attempt to explain crime in terms of the 
impact of socialization. The general theme in these studies is that people who exist in a 
social environment that lacks the mechanism for “vaccinating” individuals against the 
mind-set of committing crime, or in an environment that does not build a social norm for 
protecting “classes” of people, will have a higher tendency either to commit crime or be 
victimized by it. 
Social disorganization theory is based on change in local communities, such as 
population turnover and migration, along with group heterogeneity and measures of 
demographic change at the higher levels of analysis. This theory uses these measures to 
determine the ability of communities to impose informal community norms on residents. 
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A community’s ability to inculcate norms results in a high (or low) propensity of crime; 
the greater the ability, the lower the crime rate (Bursik, 1988) (Crutchfield, Geerken, & 
Grove, 1982) (LaFree, 1999) (Neopolitan, 1997) (Parker, McCall, & Land, 1999). 
The sub-culture of violence theories argue that communities, as characterized by 
contextual variables affecting crime, create dynamics that propagate a culture of crime 
and violence. Research indicates that the density, segregation, social isolation, and 
poverty of populations all represent important variables in the theories of sub-culture of 
violence. Members of groups influenced by these contextual variables socialize into or 
out of the culture of crime and violence (Shihadeh & Flynn, 1996) (Sampson R. , 1987) 
(Sampson R. , 1985) (Peterson & Krivo, 1993) (Phillips J. , 1997). 
 Relative cohort resource availability theories generally argue that a lack of 
resources for social control and social normalizing, as well as a community’s ability to 
accept risk in a sub-group, is what leads to crime. This follows the logic of “strain” and 
“control” theories. First, larger cohorts trend towards fewer resources per individual, such 
as larger student-teacher ratios or lower rates of law enforcement per person in a 
community, providing less social control. Second, large cohorts lead to reduced 
economic, social, and security opportunities. Large cohorts have to compete for a finite 
set of economic opportunities. Economic growth and dynamism might absorb more of a 
cohort, but those that are significantly larger than previous cohorts will face problems. 
Third, cohort characteristics may point to different differences in resource availability 
and propensity to crime. Cohorts high in members from single-family homes or from 
families that have parents who are absent from the home for long periods will lack the 
“positive” socializing influences that exposure to adults brings. The tendency of these 
cohorts to spend more time with their peers, who are themselves lacking in positive 
socializing influences, results in the cultivation of deviant behavior. Finally, certain sub-
group demographics may lack community resources because of their economic, social, or 
other characteristics relative to other sub-groups. The less available these resources, the 
more protection that the society affords these resources, thereby protecting them from 
crime or creating conditions that negate that groups need for committing crime (O'Brian, 
Stockard, & Isaacson, 1999) (Pampel & Gartner, 1995) (Steggensmeier, Streifel, & 
Shihadeh, 1992).  
 A large area of the literature dealing with crime suggests that criminal behavior is 
a result of perpetrators’ broadly (relative) rational choices and decisions (Clarke & 
Cornish, 1985). This area moves away from the determinism that dominated the literature 
prior to the 1990s. Scholars see socio-economic status, stress, or the community as 
proving a compelling impetus moving individuals in a criminal direction. Culture need 
not cut against this force: The relativity of deviant behavior, versus acceptable behavior, 
as well as the effects of social control and political and economic resources within 
communities, could frame individual choices, predisposing an individual to accept 
deviancy. People make choices within framed spaces. Rationalizing choices through 
techniques of neutralization, (“Everyone else I know is doing it”) and reconciling 
morality and justifications (“they have it better than me; I deserve it” or “That rule is for 
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other people; it is not wrong for me to do it”) take place within the defined sociological 
context.  The communal nature of crime is complementary and grows within families and 
communities (Kockars, 1974) (Prus & Irini, 1980) (Maguire, 1982). 
 The explanations for crime have assisted in educating policy makers and allowed 
them to make decisions; yet, often times the delay and distance between the theory and 
the policy result in problematic outcomes. These outcomes lead to a sense in 
communities that “nothing works” (Glaser D. , 1979). In turn, this despair leads to a 
sense that the only thing to do is to incarcerate and punish in order to reduce recidivism. 
While this punitive approach may work to a degree, it grossly overtaxes the ability of 
society to deal with the consequences of such policies. 
 Criminological research attempts to recommend policy that will influence the 
circumstances around an offense, and it necessarily involve itself with the rewards, 
opportunities, and normalization of crime. Some research indicates that as criminals’ age, 
they tend towards less deviant criminal behavior (Petersilia, 1980) (Donald, 1982) 
(Petersilia, 1980). Further research along these lines indicates that criminals make 
rational choices concerning risk, suitability of targets, opportunity for escape, or the 
resources required to travel to the target (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1975) (Downes, 
1966). Additional research focused on “opportunity structure” for crime shows that the 
supply of available opportunity drives crime. Note that geomagnetic disruptions in the 
reasoning process could affect any of these processes.  
 Psychologists also contribute to the criminological literature, starting with the 
“social learning” research agenda in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Social learning 
theories argue that learning mechanisms influence an individual analysis to the point of 
determining whether someone commits crime. This theory asserts that an individual’s 
cognitive abilities predicts tendency towards deviant behavior (Mischel, 1973) (Mischel, 
1979). This leads to process tracing, or studying decision making as it naturally occurs, 
by interviewing people – and later studies that looked at rules of thumb and decision 
making or choice heuristics leading to the concept of “bounded rationality” (Gigerenzer 
& Selten, 2002). Again, geomagnetic fields could intervene. 
6.1.2 Theoretical Model 
 Taken as a whole, criminological studies show a strong need to include a variable 
that affects motivation. Magnetic fields may influence motivation. From an increase in 
the hedonistic desires of individuals to the tendency to have “vivid” or “paranormal” 
memories, may encourage motivation to commit a violent crime. Magnetic research 
indicates that the fields not only affect the perpetration of violence indirectly through the 
motivation and opportunity mediums but it may have a direct effect on violence itself. St. 
Pierre, et al. found that certain magnetic fields directly influence the rate of aggressive 
biting in rats during experiments (St-Pierre, Persinger, & Koren, 1998). Magnetic fields 
represent a variable of interest that affects opportunity and motivation. 
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6.1.3 Methodology of Analysis 
Analysis of crime counts will use the Poisson distribution as a model of event 
counts. I will use poverty and per capita income as proxies for the motivation component 
and unemployment as a proxy for the opportunity portion of Cantor and Land’s model. 
Models will control for the population of the unit of analysis in consideration. These 
models assume that observations are independent, and not affected by events in any 
previous observation period. Counts of crime cannot be negative but lack a theoretical 
upper bound. The Poisson also implicitly assumes that the probability of more than one 
event occurring at exactly the same instant is zero. 
6.1.4 The Data 
I will analyze crime at the state, county and city level. Previous literature focused 
on national and state annual crime since the end of the WWII. One may argue that 
analysis of crime at the state level is generally a highly localized phenomenon and is of 
limited utility; this analysis goes two steps further and analyzes violent crime at the 
county and city level. In this chapter, the analysis will start at the lowest level and work 
the analysis higher. The discussion will start with an evaluation of magnetic field effects 
on crime in cities in Kentucky in 1978. It will transition to a short discussion of the 
aggregate city data applied to the entire county during the same period. An analysis of the 
entire state transitions the discussion to a nation-wide analysis of crime counts. At each 
level, I use measures of the magnetic field affecting the level and the times. 
The dependent variables used in each of the modeled datasets represent violent 
crime counts and come from the Kentucky State Police annual publication, Crime in 
Kentucky (Police, 1978). The crime variables are annual counts, with periods bounded by 
the first and last day of the year, and as monthly counts, with periods bounded by the first 
and last day of the month. The models use annual counts for the City 1978, County 1978-
1980, and Annual Kentucky crime models. The Monthly Kentucky 1973-2000 crime 
model use monthly counts of crime. The different crimes modeled include murder, rape, 
assault, robbery, and a count of total violent crimes for the period. 
 Murder is a dependent variable in each of the geographic and temporal models.  
Rape and Assault is also a dependent variable in each of the geographic and temporal 
models. However, these two variables are more suspect as they may suffer from reporting 
bias from two dimensions. First, people may not choose to report such events. Second, 
communities may have an interest in underreporting events for one of two reasons; 
cultural or economic. Each of the geographic and temporal models except for the City 
1978 model use total counts of violent crimes. 
 The variable of interest is the measurement of the geomagnetic field. Three 
different data “groups” Capture the measure of magnetic fields. The first is a set of three 
values that represent the three dimensions of the full field. These dimensions are the 
Horizontal Field, the Declination Angle, and the Vertical Field. These measures are daily 
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values. In order to match the period of the dependent variables they were each averaged 
for a given month and then for the year. This produced a monthly and yearly (from 1960 
to 2008) average horizontal, declination angle, and vertical field. The dataset analyzing 
annual violent crime counts in Kentucky from 1970 to 2008 and monthly violent crime 
counts in Kentucky from 1973 to 2008 use this data set.1 
 The second data group is a measure of the total intensity of the geomagnetic field 
that I depict as the total effect of the three components. This measurement came from an 
aeromagnetic map of the state of Kentucky built in 1978. The map represents a graphical 
depiction of the total field intensity at 1000 feet above ground level for the entire state. It 
transforms continuous data into ordinal data. The measures are “smoothed” and 
represented by colored bands that represent a range of 20 gammas of field intensity.2 I 
will use this Gamma measurement in two different data sets. The first is a city data set 
that looks geographically at the minimum and maximum field strength overlaying each 
city represented on the map. The second set uses a county minimum and maximum 
magnetic field measurement. The second set of models averages the minimum magnetic 
field and maximum magnetic field associated with each city residing within the county 
borders. 
 The lack of available gamma-magnetic measurements make it necessary to use 
the Space Physics Interactive Resource site component measurements for all datasets 
looking for relationships outside the 1978 temporal domain.3 Therefore, we require two 
different groups of models: one with Gamma magnetic field measurements and another 
with the component measurements. Both groups represent the earth’s geomagnetic 
influence on violent crime counts, just using different available data. While the measure 
1 We define the horizontal field as the measure of electromagnetic field intensity relative to true north. The 
vertical field is the measure of the electromagnetic field intensity from the northern pole of the earth’s field 
to the equator. The vertical field produces a 0-degree angle in a dip needle at the equator and a 90 degree 
dip angle at the magnetic north and south poles. Both the horizontal and vertical fields are measured in 
nano-tesla, which represents 100,000 gauss. Generally, the horizontal and vertical fields are referred to as 
the horizontal and vertical component of the total field and are not defined as separate and distinct concepts 
or entities. This analysis breaks with that tradition and will look at the effect of each and the interaction 
between them . The declination is a measurement of the angle between magnetic north and true north. Since 
the magnetic north of the Earth is in constant motion, this angle changes . This measure is in units of 
degrees. 
2 One gamma equals one nano-tesla. Maximum error due to contour smoothing in production of the map is 
10 gammas. Further, establishment of recognizable ground points for each collection of data is accurate to 
within +/- 50 feet. The measures of intensity range from -300 to 2500 gamma (nano-tesla). 
3 The 1978 Aeromagnetic Map was produced as an aid to estimating the states’ coal and oil reserves. 
Aeromagnetic measurements assist in identifying resource deposits. Since resource deposits, once mapped, 
do not move and extraction is closely monitored, these types of measurements are done rarely. 
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of the effect may be different, the presence or absence of an effect should remain 
constant. 
 The third variable group representing magnetic fields is the C9 index. This index 
is a somewhat complicated transformation and summation of the isolated effects of the 
sun on the earth’s magnetic field.4 This variable is measured daily and must be averaged 
the same as the horizontal, declination, and vertical fields. The result is an average daily 
C9 index for each month from 1970 to 2008 and each year from 1960 to 2008. Another 
variable that used is the Ap index. The Ap index is a measure of magnetic activity. The 
higher the Ap Index the greater the magnetic activity. 
6.2 Kentucky City Crime in 1978 
 Kentucky city crime data set uses the 1979 aeromagnetic map produced to assist 
in locating coal and natural gas deposits in the state. The aeromagnetic map produces a 
generalized measure of the geomagnetic field every 10 km in a grid pattern across the 
state. An algorithm developed from modeling correlations between the aeromagnetic 
measurements taken 1,000 Above Ground Level versus surface measurements smoothed 
the measurements, creating a “Contour-like” effect. The field strength in which the cities 
were located is the field measurement (in gauss units) for that city. 
 I found the crime counts using the Kentucky State Police annual publication, 
Crime in Kentucky (Police, 1978).  I use the census population counts from 1980 as a 
proxy for the actual population of the cities in 1978. While some cultural and economic 
dynamics may have resulted in large shifts of population between 1978 and 1980 I found 
no obvious ones or ones that could cause such a social upheaval that the population 
change would invalidate inferences from models using the 1980s numbers. The crime 
rates for the counties are also available from the Crime in Kentucky publication for that 
year. Finally, poverty values are available from the Kentucky state government for the 
counties as well as from the 1980 census. I use the 1980 poverty numbers. The magnetic 
field value for the county is the average of the magnetic field Contour measurements 
crossing through the county. I attempted to weight the average based on percentage of the 
county covered by each magnetic field value. In addition, I used the average of the 
magnetic field strength within each county to determine the average magnetic field for 
urban areas versus the average for the county. Ultimately, I found no significant 
difference among the three geomagnetic averages. Further, in Kentucky in 1978, more 
4 These measurements are taken at three-hour intervals at 13 different observatories all over the world. 
These measurements are summed across a 24 hour period at each observatory and the arithmetic mean is 
computed for the thirteen stations. Finally the measurements are transformed into an ordinal scale from 0 to 
9. The final outcome is a scale of solar effect on the magnetic field ranging from 0 to 9. This conversion 
and transformation process is done and reported on the Space Physics Interactive Data Resource for almost 
every day from 1932 to 2004. 
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people living in a county were rural than were urban. Therefore, the final average I used 
was a straight average of all magnetic field values existing within a county. 
6.2.1 Murders 
 Using magnetic fields to model violent crime allows modeling at each level of 
analysis, from city to nation. Looking at 30 cities in the state of Kentucky in 1978 
demonstrates the ability of magnetic field to offer modeling power. The number of 
murders in the 1978 Kentucky city dataset ranges from 0 to 66 with the average number 
of murders being 4. The mode is 1 murder per city (12 out of 30 cities) representing 40% 
of all cases. Cities with no murders account for another 23% of cases. There were 125 
murders in 1978 in Kentucky. 
 Rather than present the statistical output, Figure 23 shows simulation based on 
the sample generating the expected number of murders in an average size Kentucky city 
in 1978 given a magnetic field measurement. For an average-sized city, the increase in 
the count of murders from the lowest to the highest magnetic field measurement ranges 
from an increase in murders from 1 murder to 2 (100%) at the lower range of the 
confidence interval, or from less than 4 up to 8 murders using the upper bound (200%).
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While we have greater information on communities experiencing lower field 
values and less for communities at higher field values, we are still confident that the 
affect of the geomagnetic field is not zero. There is little probability of getting these 
coefficients if there was actually no relationship between the crime counts and the 
magnetic field. Knowing the magnetic field that a city resides in may provide a great deal 
of information on how to divide limited resources.  
The general methods of analyzing charts are to: 
1. Compare the mean line among the magnetic field Fields to determine how changes in
magnetic field affect the best prediction of the crime count.
2. Compare the Max and the Min lines. The Max line represents the upper bound of the
95% confidence interval. The Min line represents the lower bound of the 95%
confidence interval.
Whether one is concerned about absolute count or percent increases and 
decreases, the models provide warnings and information that can frame decisions made 
relative to resource allocations, making those decisions more efficient. For instance two 
cities (all other things being equal) with the same population but with one experiencing 
magnetic field values towards the higher end of the measurements while the other is at 
the lower end, the one in the higher end has greater risk of experiencing more murders if 
the analyzed sample reflects the population. If additional resources are available and a 
political decision concerning the allocation of those resources made based on risk, then 
the city in the higher magnetic field measurement values should receive the resources. 
Figure 26 depicts this. In this example, City “B” should receive the additional resources 
(all other things being equal) if available because their magnetic fields field will result in 
more murders than City “A.” 
6.2.2 Rapes 
The model of murder counts in Kentucky cities in 1978 found that the magnetic 
field was not significant, although the best guess of the model is that the likelihood of this 
rare event increased along with geomagnetic levels. In the case of rape counts in 
Kentucky cities in 1978, the magnetic field measurement is statistically significant in the 
model. The Table 23 model includes a control variable for city population. 
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Table 23 Expected rape counts in Kentucky cities in 1978 
 
 
Rape Counts in Kentucky Cities in 1978 
Poisson Model  
 Observations = 30 Pseudo R2 = .8619  
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
City Population (1980) 
in 1,000s 
0.0154 0.000 *** 
(0.0005)   
Average 1978 Magnetic 
Field Measure 
-.0009 0.001 *** 
(0.0003)   
   
Constant 
1.529 0.000 *** 
(0.1836)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
 
Looking at a sample simulated city with an “average” population (35,218 people) 
and affected by an “average” magnetic field (722 Gauss), all things equal, one would 
predict an average of 4 rapes. It is unlikely that the sample produces the expected values 
if there was no relationship.  
Table 24 Simulated expected number of rapes 
 
 
 
 An initial review may lead to the question of why higher magnetic field 
measurements would lead to more murders but fewer rapes. This pattern matches what 
Estimated Rape 
Count 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% Population 
Magnetic 
Field 
4.068 3.377 4.893 MEAN MEAN 
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we saw in the last chapter with regard to war being more likely, while militarized 
disputes if anything were less likely, at the highest geomagnetic levels. Therefore, it 
could be a dynamic of escalating violence. If the populations susceptible to committing 
rape and murder overlap, then higher magnetic fields may be escalating cases from the 
class of rape to the class of murders; reducing the numbers of rapes and moving them into 
the “murder” category. If that were true, we would expect the same pattern with Assault: 
A decline as the geomagnetic level increases. This does leave the question of where 
missing assaults and rapes went, given the number of rapes is small compared to assaults 
and murder counts are small compared to rapes. 
6.2.3 Assault 
 Table 25 shows the general count model for assaults in Kentucky cities in 1978 
controlling for their populations. When controlling for population, using the coefficient 
for the magnetic field of a city would yield valid predictions of assault counts in the 
model and would be the best measure of effect to use a significant proportion of the time. 
Table 25 Expected assault counts in Kentucky cities in 1978 
 
Assault Counts in Kentucky Cities in 1978 
Poisson Model  
 Observations = 30 Pseudo R2 = .6138  
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
City Population (1980) in 
1,000s 
0.01 0.000 *** 
(0.0002)   
Average 1978 Magnetic Field 
Measure 
-.0005 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
   
Constant 
4.423 0.000 *** 
(0.045)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
 If one considers that murder, rape, and assault are all forms of violent crime, it 
may be useful to model the impact of magnetic fields on overall violent crime counts in 
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Kentucky cities in 1978. Combining all three crimes into one model may eliminate the 
problem of escalation that may occur under magnetic influence. Magnetic fields could 
drive what may have been at first only a simple assault, or rape, into the next level of 
violence. 
Table 26 shows that at least in cities in Kentucky in 1978, as the magnetic field 
value increase, the count of violent crimes decline. Further, the estimated value of the 
decline is the best estimate to use a significant amount of the time. Figure 27 depicts 
graphically a simulation based on the sample generating the impact of the different range 
of magnetic field values on a small city in Kentucky. 
Table 26 Expected count of violent crimes in Kentucky cities in 1978 
 
Violent Crime Counts in Kentucky Cities in 
1978 
Poisson Model 
 Observations = 30 
Pseudo R2 = 
.5346 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
City Population (1980) in 
1,000s 
0.009 0.000 *** 
0.0001   
Average 1978 Magnetic Field 
Measure 
-.0003 0.000 *** 
0.0001   
   
Constant 4.631 0.000 *** 
 0.005   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
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Figure 27 Simulated expected violent crime counts in small Kentucky cities in 1978 
 
 
The pattern with Assault therefore matches that with Rape. Before accepting the 
escalation hypothesis, though, we should see if geomagnetics continue to perform in the 
same way with other data 
6.2.4 Crime Counts in Kentucky Counties in 1978 
 One possible reason for the anomalous negative pattern with Rape and Assault is 
that I only used city data in the last analysis. Changing the level of analysis to the county 
should alleviate problems with how counties reported crime. County-level data also will 
allow the inclusion of new explanatory variables whose data was unavailable for the 
cities, moving us toward a more fully specified model. Because a third problem with the 
city analysis was that we were unable to include the other motivation and opportunity 
variables that Cantor and Land assert are important. We also can include some of the 
structural variables that the literature has identified as influencing motivation and 
opportunity. These variables include spending on police, education, welfare, and the 
number of people living below the poverty line. 
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Table 27 Expected murder counts in Kentucky cities in 1978 
 
Murder Counts in Kentucky Counties in 1978 
Poisson Model 
 Observations = 119 Pseudo R2 = .6064 
Variables Coef & Std Dev Significance 
County Population (1980) in 
1,000s 
0.0042 0.000 *** 
(0.0003)   
Average 1978 Magnetic Field 
Measure 
.0004 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Percent Population Living 
Below Poverty 1978 
-.0997 0.000 *** 
(0.1519)   
Per Capita Spending on Police 
.0004 0.822 - 
(0.0019)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Education 
-.0014 0.311 - 
(0.0014)   
Per Capita Welfare Spending 
.0013 0.940 - 
(0.0169)   
County Unemployment Rate in 
1978 
.0988 0.003 *** 
(0.0331)   
County Per Capita Personal 
Income 
.0004 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Constant 
-1.854 0.002 *** 
(0.597)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
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 Table 27 shows the opportunity and motivation model for murder counts with the 
magnetic field included. The predictive model performs well. The socioeconomic and 
spending variables are a bit unruly, relative to how one might have expected them to 
behave as controls, but now the geomagnetic variable has a positive and significant value, 
as expected. 
For rapes, both attempted and successful, the structural opportunity and 
motivation variables do much better than in the case of murder as far as the significance 
of their coefficients are concerned. The percent of the population living below the 
poverty line, the amount of money per capita spent on police, the per capita expenditure 
on education, unemployment rate, and per capita income are significant. However, the 
geomagnetic variable again fails to predict a significant increase in this behavior. Table 
28 shows the statistical model for rape counts.  
Table 28 Expected annual rape counts in Kentucky counties in 1978 
 
 
Rape Counts in Kentucky Counties in 1978 
Poisson Model 
 Observations = 119 Pseudo R2 = .7963 
Variables 
Coefficient and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
County Population (1980) in 
1,000s 
0.0034 0.000 *** 
(0.0003)   
Average 1978 Magnetic Field 
Measure 
.0001 0.005 *** 
(0.0002)   
Percent Population Living 
Below Poverty 1978 
-1.9203 0.000 *** 
(0.3282)   
Per Capita Spending on Police 
.0180 0.000 *** 
(0.0025)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Education 
-.0074 0.000 *** 
(0.0014)   
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Per Capita Welfare Spending 
.0062 0.680 - 
(0.0151)   
County Unemployment Rate 
in 1978 
.1581 0.000 *** 
(0.0330)   
County Per Capita Personal 
Income 
.0004 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Constant 
-.1758 0.762 - 
(0.5805)   
 
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
 
 All motivation and opportunity variables help explain Assault counts. In this case, 
all of them have expected impacts on assault counts that cannot be ignored, and the 
coefficients are unlikely greater than zero by chance. One again, however, the estimated 
effect of geomagnetic field is not statistically significant in the hypothesized direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 28 Continued 
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Table 29 Expects annual counts of assaults in Kentucky counties 1978 
 
Assault Counts in Kentucky Counties in 1978 
Poisson Model 
 Observations = 119 Pseudo R2 = .7496 
Variables Coef & Std Dev Significance 
County Population (1980) in 
1,000s 
0.0010 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Average 1978 Magnetic Field 
Measure 
.0001 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)  
Percent Population Living 
Below Poverty 1978 
-2.1511 0.000 *** 
(0.0774)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Police 
.0186 0.000 *** 
(0.0005)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Education 
-.0039 0.000 *** 
(0.0034)   
Per Capita Welfare Spending 
.0284 0.000 *** 
(0.0030)   
County Unemployment Rate 
in 1978 
.1562 0.000 *** 
(0.0079)   
County Per Capita Personal 
Income 
.0004 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Constant 
1.529 0.000 *** 
(0.139)   
 * P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
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6.3 Magnetic Fields and Murder 
Despite the limited size of the coefficients on geomagnetic waves, however, they 
results are still substantively meaningful given the potential variation in those variables. 
The following charts, Figures 27 through 29, show the outcome of simulations based on 
statistical analysis of the sample. The effects on Murder of the geomagnetic field at 
varying strengths in small, average, and large counties on a range of crimes. I generate 
the figures by charting the results of first running the data in a Poisson count model and 
then simulating the expected outcomes for differing measures of the magnetic field using 
Clarify (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000) (Tomz, Wittenberg, & King, 2001). In each 
case, we keep all other explanatory variables at their average value for the dataset, 
although we are extrapolating out to high geomagnetic levels. The MEAN value on the 
chart, the “blue” line, provides the average predicted count of crimes given the magnetic 
field. The other lines represent the minimum and maximum bounds of the 95% 
confidence interval.  
This model shows that, given information about the magnetic field environment of 
different size counties, policy makers could use it in resource-allocation decisions that 
might make responding to murders more efficient and maybe even more effective. 
Magnetic fields have an important relationship with violent crime counts in Kentucky 
counties in 1978, astonishing given the small amount of data. While the sample is 
relatively small, one year and only 119 counties in only one state, the models show that 
geomagnetic fields have significant explanatory and even predictive power. 
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Figure 28 Sim
ulated expected m
urder counts; K
entucky 
counties 
 
Figure 29 Sim
ulated expected m
urder counts; K
entucky 
counties  
 
Figure 30 Sim
ulated expected m
urder counts; K
entucky 
counties  
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6.4 Crime Counts in Kentucky from 1970 to 2005 
 The key points to be made with this analysis is that magnetic field influences 
decisions of individuals and groups, that magnetic field as a variable in models has strong 
explanatory and predictive power while being efficient in cost to collect, so it can be a 
critical tool in assisting in resource decisions at all levels of politics and government. 
Now to see if the analysis extends to the state level and if it remains powerful in 
explaining and predicting or modeling other types of crimes. 
The first dependent variable is the Kentucky Criminal Index, which is a 
summation of all crime type counts and represents the “amount” of crime that the state 
experiences, and has data available for 36 years. This model, as well as the ones that 
follow it, include the state population and the opportunity and motivation variables of 
unemployment rate and per capita income. Because direct magnetic field ground 
measures become so complicated at the state level, and because the main source of 
interesting variation now comes across time rather than across space, the Ap Score will 
substitute for the magnetic field measure used at the state and county level. 
 This first model from the modern period supports the hypothesis that geomagnetic 
levels help predict crime. The Ap Score (magnetic field measurement) is significant and 
the directions of the opportunity and motivation variables are as predicted by the Cantor 
and Land hypotheses. 
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Table 30 Expected total crime counts in Kentucky 
 
Magnetic Field Effect on the Kentucky 
Total Crime Counts 1970-2005 (Poisson 
Model) 
 Observations = 36 Pseudo R2 = .5967 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
Kentucky Population 
in 1,000s 
0.0004 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Average Magnetic 
Field Measure 
.0009 0.000 *** 
(0.0002)  
State Per Capita 
Income (1,000s) 
-.0019 0.000 *** 
(0.0004)   
State Unemployment 
Rate 
.0292 0.000 *** 
(0.0005)   
Constant 
9.9220 0.000 *** 
(0.0397)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
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Figure 31 Simulated expected total recorded crimes in Kentucky 
 
 Figure 31 shows the relatively strong relationship between Ap scores and the 
estimated crime index in the simulation of that statistical analysis of the sample. In this 
model, on average, a one-unit increase in the Ap score yields about a 100-unit increase in 
the Crime Index.  
6.4.1 Violent Crime 
 If we look at only violent crime in the index, and use as the dependent variable 
the count of violent crime in the state, the model and the graph of the effect of Ap Score 
looks like Table 31 and Figure 32.  
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Table 31 Expected violent crime counts in Kentucky 
 
Magnetic Field Effect on the Kentucky 
Violent Crime Count 1970-2005 
(Poisson) 
 Observations = 36 
Pseudo R2 = 
0.5523 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
Kentucky Population in 
1,000s 
0.0028 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Average Magnetic Field 
Measure 
.0032 0.000 *** 
(0.0005)  
State Per Capita Income 
(1,000s) 
.0001 0.000 *** 
(0.0001) 
State Unemployment 
Rate 
.1227 0.000 *** 
 (0.0015)  
Constant 
17.227 0.000 *** 
(0.124)  
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
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Figure 32 Simulated expected violent crime counts in Kentucky 
 
 In this simulation a one-unit, increase in the Ap Index results in an increase of 
violent crime counts by about 50. The 95% confidence interval has a distance that ranges 
from 50 to 200 violent crime counts. It is unlikely that the statistical analysis would 
generate coefficients or the 95% confidence interval if the actual relationship was zero. I 
also analyzed separate components of this violent-crime rate one at a time: Murder, Rape, 
and Assault (analysis not shown). In all three cases, the rate of violent crime increased as 
the Ap Index climbed. For Rape and Assault, the pattern was statistically significant. 
6.4.2 Property Crime 
 Up to this point the primary emphasis of analysis has been on violent crimes such 
as murder, rape, and assault. Property crime also fits the expectations of my hypothesis 
that high levels of geomagnetic field scores will lead to higher crime rates, because they 
too bring the dangers of arrest and serious penalties. Below, a model of property crime 
using the Ap Score, with controls for the motivation and opportunity models, shows that 
magnetic field is also a useful variable for analyzing property crime risk and counts.  
 For the annual period of analysis for the state of Kentucky, the Ap index is 
significant in property crime models. Table 32 and Figure 33 (Simulated Expectations) 
show that the magnetic field effect on the count of property crimes is such that it should 
enter into decision-making and policy-making processes. The chart of the effect of Ap on 
property crimes, setting all the other model’s variables to their average and depicting the 
95% confidence interval, show the power of the index on indicating the risk of increases 
or the benefit of decreases in the counts of property crime. 
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Table 32 Expected count of property crimes in Kentucky 
 
Magnetic Field Effect on the Kentucky 
Property Crime Counts 1970-2005 (Poisson 
Model) 
 Observations = 36 Pseudo R2 = .5756 
Variables Coef & Std Dev Significance 
Kentucky Population in 
1,000s 
0.0008 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Average Magnetic Field 
Measure 
.0008 0.000 *** 
(0.0002)  
State Per Capita Income 
(1,000s) 
-.0157 0.000 *** 
(0.0005)   
State Unemployment Rate 
.0182 0.000 *** 
(0.0005)   
Constant 
8.716 0.000 *** 
(0.0002)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
Figure 33 Simulated expected property crime counts in Kentucky, 1970 to 2005 
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 The expected change in the number of property crimes when population, per 
capita income, and unemployment are set to their means and the AP Score increases one 
unit is approximately 200 counts. The simulation’s total average impact of the AP Score 
moving from 8 to 24 is 1,300 property crimes. The maximum total predicted impact of 
the AP score moving from 8 to 24 in the simulation is approximately 1,800 counts of 
property crime. 
6.4.3 Burglary 
 Burglary may not be as interesting as other violent crimes, but the sheer number, 
emotional and mental strain on victims, and the amount of resources committed to the 
problem of burglary is such that it is deserving of analysis. The Ap index is significant in 
the model that included unemployment, per capita income, and population. The magnetic 
field is positive and significant at the .01 level, as shown in Table 33. 
Keeping the population, unemployment, and per capita income at their average 
and looking how changes in Ap Score effects burglary counts provides yet more evidence 
that geomagnetic field variables have an important role to play in modeling, predicting, 
and mitigating burglary counts. The amount of change in burglary counts in the 
simulation as one goes from the lowest to the highest Ap scores for the data set is 
between 1,500 and 2,000 burglary counts. This represents about a 7% increase from 
lowest to highest Ap value. 
Policy makers get unprecedented precision information from this model. Someone 
trying to determine where to put resources addressing burglary or when to commit it can 
look at the Ap index projected and make projections as to where will experience more or 
fewer burglaries based on the Ap. In the simulation, two towns with similar population, 
unemployment, and wealth but separated by 6 units on the Ap scale will experience a 
difference of between 850 and 1,150 burglaries. 
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Table 33 Expected burglary counts in Kentucky 
 
Magnetic Field Effect on the Kentucky 
Burglary Counts 1970-2005 (Poisson 
Model) 
 Observations = 36 
Pseudo R2 = 
0.6530 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
Kentucky Population in 1,000s 
0.0013 0.000 *** 
(0.0003)   
Average Magnetic Field Measure 0.0038 0.006 *** 
(0.0009)   
State Per Capita Income (1,000s) 
-0.0466 0.000 *** 
(0.0008)   
State Unemployment Rate 
0.0140 0.000 *** 
(0.0003)   
Constant 
5.909 0.000 *** 
(0.078)   
Figure 34 Simulated expected burglary counts in Kentucky, 1970-2005 
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6.4.4 Larceny 
 The same conditions and outcomes found when looking at the Ap index for 
Burglary holds for analysis of larceny. Ap is significant and the graphs of the effects 
show that the span of the distance between the lower 95% and upper 95% confidence 
interval is relatively small. Table 34 and Figure 35 (simulation) show the relationship 
between larceny counts and the magnetic field. 
Table 34 Expected counts of larceny in Kentucky 
 
 
Magnetic Field Effect on the Kentucky 
Larceny Counts 1970-2005 (Poisson 
Model) 
 Observations = 36 Pseudo R2 = .6500 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
Kentucky Population in 1,000s 
0.0007 0.000 *** 
(0.0002)   
Average Magnetic Field 
Measure 
0.0010 0.000 *** 
(0.0002)   
State Per Capita Income 
(1,000s) 
-0.0057 0.000 *** 
(0.0006)   
State Unemployment Rate 
0.0248 0.000 *** 
(0.0006)   
Constant 
8.357 0.000 *** 
(0.053)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
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Figure 35 Simulated expected larceny counts in Kentucky, 1970 to 2005 
 
6.4.5 Vehicle Theft 
 The magnetic field model of vehicle theft has a high level of confidence in the 
coefficient of effect for the Ap index. It is unlikely that the value of the magnetic field is 
zero. Ap is significant at better than .01 and indicate a negative relationship to the 
dependent variable. Again, the apparent decline in vehicle theft covaries with magnetic 
field influence. It could be that vehicle thefts become much more violent as Ap increases 
thereby falling into progressively higher violence categories of crime. Figure 36 shows 
the simulated expected number of vehicle thefts because of the magnetic field based on 
the sample. 
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Table 35 Expected vehicle theft counts in Kentucky 
 
Magnetic Field Effect on the Kentucky 
Vehicle Theft Counts 1970-2005 (Poisson 
Model) 
 Observations = 36 
Pseudo R2 = 
0.3102 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
Kentucky Population in 1,000s 
0.0005 0.000 *** 
(0.0005)   
Average Magnetic Field 
Measure 
-0.0115 0.000 *** 
(0.0005)   
State Per Capita Income 
(1,000s) 
0.0156 0.000 *** 
(0.002)   
State Unemployment Rate 
-0.0112 0.000 *** 
(0.0017)   
Constant 
10.892 0.000 *** 
(0.140)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
Figure 36 Simulated expected vehicle thefts in Kentucky, 1970 to 2005 
 
148 
 
  
6.5 Ground Magnetic Field and Crime in Kentucky 
 The Kentucky city and county analysis discussed earlier in this chapter 
demonstrated the power of a geomagnetic field variable at near ground level. The 
variable used was the Total-Field effect measured in Gauss. The statewide analysis used 
the measures of Solar Magnetic activity as an estimate for its effect on the ground level 
magnetic field. The next set of analysis breaks the total-geomagnetic measures down into 
some key component parts to determine which component may affect “rational decision 
making,” deviant behavior, and risk taking. 
 A concern is that the component measures for Kentucky are not available as there 
are no detailed component measurement stations in the state. However, the city of 
Fredericksburg, Maryland, does have a detailed measuring station with some data for the 
period analyzed (25 out of 39 years). This is less of an issue for the index count as it uses 
a proxy (magnetic field component measures in Fredericksburg for the magnetic field 
Components in Kentucky) to explain an aggregate containing information on many 
different categories, and even classes, of crime counts. While one would be wise to take 
care when using the models to predict, they do offer tantalizing glimpses into the power 
of magnetic field Components as independent variables, when the data is available. 
The opportunity and motivation model should support the model for general theft. 
However, the sign of the unemployment variable is opposite that expected, according to 
the Cantor and Land et. al. opportunity-motivation models. The expected sign is positive 
while it is actually negative in the model. The expectation is that as unemployment 
increases so, too, does the expected count of thefts in the period of analysis. However, the 
model shows a decline in cases of theft as unemployment increases. This could be 
capturing an interesting dynamic in deviancy. Much crime occurs locally and many 
criminals perpetrate crimes against those of a similar cultural and social group to 
themselves.  
Transportation, risk, comfort, knowledge, focus, and orientation of security forces 
all argue against targeting groups outside one’s “territory” and “cultural reference 
structure.” Increased unemployment in communities decreases the available loot for 
thieves to target. This could lead to a decline in theft simply because there are fewer 
things to steal.  For the graphical look at the impact on theft counts, two different charts 
are required.  
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Figure 37 Simulated expected thefts in Kentucky, 1970 to 2008 
 
Figure 38 Simulated expected thefts in Kentucky, 1970 to 2008 
 
 Using three of the components of magnetic field in modeling different categories 
of crime counts proves that almost all cases are significant at least at the .05 level. In 
many models, the addition of magnetic field components or magnetic field made either or 
both motivation (per capita income) and opportunity (unemployment) insignificant at 
below the .1 level. The effect of magnetic field and/or its component covarys so that 
small changes in magnetic fields correlate with large changes in crime counts. 
6.6 State Crime and Geomagnetic Fields 
 I have demonstrated that magnetic field measures have value in modeling crime at 
the city and county level in one state, Kentucky. They also have value in predicting crime 
in the state of Kentucky. Now we can look across states, and with an expanded time, to 
see if magnetic field remains a valid, and significant, independent variable to model 
150 
 
  
crime counts. The expanded data set allows the use of additional control variables. The 
basic data set includes information for Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, 
Maryland, Mississippi, Texas, and Wisconsin. The data generally covers the period of 
1960 to 2008. While some states may have data that is earlier and later, the majority of 
the data comes from this period. Two different data sets are produced and analyzed, one 
looking at annual data and a second looking at monthly data. 
 Data is available to include information related to the number of sworn full time 
officers available in the year at the federal, state, and local level as well as per capita 
spending on justice, police, judicial system, and corrections. However, a serious 
multicollinearity problem exists among the officers available at the different levels and 
the population of the state.  
Table 36 Correlations among the number of sworn full time officers and populations 
Correlation Among The Number of Sworn Offers 
Variables 
Local 
Sworn 
Officers 
State 
Sworn 
Officers 
Federal 
Sworn 
Officers Population 
Local Sworn 
Officers 1    
State Sworn Officers 0.9037 1   
Federal Sworn 
Officers 0.999 0.9216 1  
Population 0.9936 0.9326 0.9962 1 
 There is no such problem among the different per capita spending on law 
enforcement, legal system, and correctional systems and the population. However, there 
are, as could be expected, correlations among the three; law, legal, corrections that may 
cause problems. There is also a danger of a multicollinearity issue among these three 
measures and the per capita income of the state. 
It is difficult to determine the relationship between the levels of crime, the size of 
a population, and the number of officers and amount of money spent on security. The 
theoretical problem is what comes first, high crime rates or a police force dictated by a 
population? This problem is more acute and troublesome for the counts of officers than 
the amount spent on them as well as the legal and correctional system. A polity may 
spend on a fixed ratio of police to population, especially in the absence of any other 
information to determine proper police force size (count). However, no polity would 
willingly spend resources on maintaining a large legal and correctional system in the 
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absence of a clear requirement to do so. Therefore, it is more reasonable to argue for the 
inclusion of expenditures on these programs than it is to argue for the inclusion of counts 
of law enforcement officers or the money spent on them. 
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 The value of including these variables is problematic, however as they really 
contribute very little to the improvement in model power, precision of estimates, or the 
effect that magnetic field components have on the crime counts being analyzed. 
 
Table 38 Expected annual state murder counts  
Magnetic Field Effect on State Murder Counts 1960-2008 (Poisson Model) 
 Observations = 115 Pseudo R2 = .9681 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
D Component in 1,000s 
-0.0199 0.000 *** 
(0.0047)   
H Component in 1,000s 
0.002 0.003 *** 
(0.0006)   
State Unemployment Rate 
.0001 0.507 - 
(0.0001)   
State Per Capita Income 
(Squared) 
-0.076 0.000 *** 
(0.0029)   
Number of State Sworn Full-
Time Law Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0282 0.000 *** 
(0.0008)   
Number of Local Full-Time 
Sworn Law Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0075 0.000 *** 
(0.0003)   
Per Capita Spending on Police 
0.0010 0.004 *** 
(0.0004)   
Per Capita Spending on Judiciary 
-0.0081 0.000 *** 
(0.0004)   
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Per Capita Spending on 
Corrections 
0.0024 0.000 *** 
(0.0002)   
Population in 1,000s 
0.0003 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Constant 
7.159 0.000 *** 
(0.0548)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
 Graphing the impact on murder counts of the h and d components of the 
geomagnetic fields, while keeping the other independent variables set to their means, 
yields the following chart. The lines represent the average, highest, and lowest estimates 
defined by the 95% confidence interval for annual state murder counts when all but the 
specific magnetic field component is set its average value and the specific magnetic field 
component of interest changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 38 Continued 
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Table 39 Summary statistics of the independent variables in the model of annual state 
murder counts with magnetic field components 
Variable of Interest Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Murder 490 542.2224 804.9552 11 4096 
D Component 373 3406.796 5947.054 -12215 16907.16 
H Component 349 22797.82 5705.324 2564.311 29252.04 
Unemployment 299 249525.6 321428.6 12564 1605757 
Per Capita Income 273 27064.76 7087.538 10947 41580 
Number of State Full 
Time Sworn Officers 240 1403.658 1823.348 0 7924 
Number of Local Full 
Time Sworn Officers 240 13792.22 16105.01 609 59402 
Per Capita Spending on 
Police 220 153.9955 64.56185 41 412 
Per Capita Spending on 
Judiciary 220 82.18636 53.28682 12 290 
Per Capita Spending on 
Corrections 220 125.5955 67.07847 18 299 
Population 490 6636297 8136127 226167 36800000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
156 
 
  
Figure 39 Simulated expected annual state murder counts  
 
The same type of analysis applied to the entire spectrum of crime demonstrates 
how the components affect estimates. 
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Table 40 Magnetic field effect on state rape counts 
 
 
Magnetic Field Effect on State Rape 
Counts 1960-2008 (Poisson Model) 
 Observations = 115 
Pseudo R2 = 
0.9660 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
D Component in 1,000s 
-0.0092 0.000 *** 
0.0024   
H Component in 1,000s 
-0.0028 0.000 *** 
0.0003   
State Unemployment Rate 
-0.0001 0.000 *** 
0.0001   
State Per Capita Income (Squared) 
-0.0006 0.560 - 
0.0010   
Number of State Sworn Full-Time 
Law Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0242 0.000 *** 
0.0042   
Number of Local Full-Time Sworn 
Law Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0043 0.468 - 
0.0002   
Per Capita Spending on Police 
-.0013 0.000 *** 
0.0002   
Per Capita Spending on Judiciary 
-0.0086 0.000 *** 
0.0001   
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Per Capita Spending on Corrections 
0.0025 0.000 *** 
0.0001   
Population in 1,000s 
0.0002 0.000 *** 
0.0001   
Constant 
7.32 0.000 *** 
0.024   
* P<.1 ** P<.05   *** P<.01 
 
Figure 40 Simulated expected annual state count of rapes 
 
 
6.6.1 Assaults 
The previous charts depict the relationship of d and h components of the magnetic 
field on various crime counts. These variables are statistically significant at the .001 level 
in each of the statistical analysis. Further, d shows a consistent non-linear downward 
Table 40 Continued 
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influence on crime counts as its value increases. The h component demonstrates an 
incremental downward linear influence on the value of crime counts as its value 
increases.  
Table 41 Expected annual state counts of assaults 
Magnetic Field Effect on State Assault Counts 1960-2008 (Poisson 
Model) 
 
Observations = 
115 Pseudo R2 = .9684 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
D Component in 1,000s 
-0.0415 0.000 *** 
(0.0009)   
H Component in 1,000s 
-0.0010 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Unemployment Rate 
-0.0001 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Per Capita Income 
(Squared) 
-0.0457 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Number of State Sworn Full-
Time Law Enforcement 
(100s) 
-0.0107 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Number of Local Full-Time 
Sworn Law Enforcement 
(100s) 
-0.0042 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Police 
0.0009 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Judiciary 
-0.0097 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
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Per Capita Spending on 
Corrections 
0.0061 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Population in 1,000s 
0.0002 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Constant 
9.964 0.000 *** 
(0.0084)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
Figure 41 Simulated expected annual state counts of assaults 
 
6.6.2 Victims by age 
 If these components can prove statistically significant as well as useful in 
modeling crime counts perhaps they have use modeling the demographic characteristics 
of the victims of the most violent of crimes; murder. Whereas the previous analysis 
looked at the impact of magnetic field components on the perpetrator of a crime this 
d impact on assault counts 
h impact on assault counts 
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analysis looks at the impact of magnetic field on either the choice of a victim or of the 
tendency of members of a group to be victims. The age models and estimates presented in 
this section provide a sample of the significant relations that exist among the magnetic 
field, its components, and the age of victims. The findings indicate that the D component 
of the magnetic field and the number of homicide victims who are under 14 may have a 
direct relationship. In the model, the number of victims almost doubles over the range of 
sample D component values. For age groups from 15 to 17, the D component indirectly 
relates to the dependent variable.. Magnetic fields are significant in modeling the count of 
homicides in most age categories reported by the FBI. 
Table 42 Expected count of state homicide victims under the age of 14 
Magnetic Field Effect on Count of State Homicide Victims Under the Age of 14 
(Poisson Model) 
 Observations = 115 Pseudo R2 = .9571 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
D Component in 1,000s 
0.0142 0.000 *** 
(0.0022)   
H Component in 1,000s 
0.0018 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Unemployment Rate 
-0.0001 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Per Capita Income 
(Squared) 
-0.0001 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Number of State Sworn Full-
Time Law Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0225 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Number of Local Full-Time 
Sworn Law Enforcement 
(100s) 
-0.0055 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on Police 
0.0052 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
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Per Capita Spending on 
Judiciary 
-0.0118 0.000 *** 
(0.0002)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Corrections 
0.0019 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Population in 1,000s 
0.0002 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Constant 
7.522 0.000 *** 
(0.0238)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
 
Figure 42 Simulated expected count of homicide victims under 14 
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 Likewise the model can be used for estimating the number of homicide victims in 
the age range of 15 to 17. 
Table 43 Estimated annual state counts of homicide victims age 15 to 17 
Magnetic Field Effect on Count of State Homicide Victims Aged 15 to 17 (Poisson 
Model) 
 Observations = 115 Pseudo R2 = .9532 
 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
D Component in 1,000s 
-0.0884 0.000 *** 
(0.0027)   
H Component in 1,000s 
0.0089 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Unemployment in 1,000s 
-0.0004 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Per Capita Income 
(Squared) 
-0.0001 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Number of State Sworn Full-
Time Law Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0147 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Number of Local Full-Time 
Sworn Law Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0028 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on Police 
0.0013 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on Judiciary 
-0.0050 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Corrections 
0.0073 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
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Population in 1,000s 
0.0002 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Constant 
8.742 0.000 *** 
(0.0244)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
Figure 43 Simulated expected count of homicide victims 15 to 17  
 
 
6.6.3 Victims by gender 
 The magnetic field components of interest have been particularly efficient and 
valuable in modeling victim counts below and above certain ages and within age ranges; 
especially the d component. Perhaps the components will be able to provide information 
Table 43 Continued 
165 
 
  
to help estimate the counts of victims by gender, race, and gender-race combinations. The 
figures show various predicted relationships among gender and race and the magnetic 
field components D and H. In both male and female models, the D component is 
inversely proportional to the number of expected homicide victims by gender. The H 
component shows a direct relationship. Proportionally, the effect of the D component is 
much larger than the effect of the H component. Figure 44, Figure 45, and Table 44 
depict the estimated effects of magnetic field component values on the count of victims 
by gender based on a series of simulations generated using the statistical analysis of the 
sample. 
Figure 44 Simulated expected number of male homicide victims annualy 
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Figure 45 Simulated expected annual number of female homicide victims 
 
Table 44 Expected state counts of male and female homicide victim 
 
 
Magnetic Field Effect on Count of 
Male Homicide Victims (Poisson 
Model) 
Magnetic Field Effect on Count of 
Female Homicide Victims (Poisson 
Model) 
 
Observations = 
115 
Pseudo R2 = 
.9729 
Observations = 
115 
Pseudo R2 = 
0.9680 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
D Component in 
1,000s 
-0.0179 0.000 *** -0.0253 0.000 *** 
(0.0005)   (0.0009)   
H Component in 
1,000s 
0.0018 0.000 *** 0.0007 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   (0.0001)   
State Unemployment 
(1,000s) 
0.0001 0.000 *** -0.0001 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   (0.0001)   
167 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
State Per Capita 
Income (Squared) 
-0.0001 0.000 *** -0.0001 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   (0.0001)   
Number of State 
Sworn Full-Time 
Law Enforcement 
(100s) 
-0.0292 0.000 *** -0.0242 0.000 *** 
(0.0001) 
  
(0.0002) 
  
Number of Local 
Full-Time Sworn 
Law Enforcement 
(100s) 
-0.0079 0.000 *** -0.0062 0.000 *** 
(0.0001) 
  
(0.0007) 
  
Per Capita Spending 
on Police 
0.0010 0.000 *** 0.0006 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   (0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending 
on Judiciary 
-0.0076 0.000 *** -0.0094 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   (0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending 
on Corrections 
0.0027 0.000 *** 0.0015 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   (0.0001)   
Population in 1,000s 
0.0003 0.000 *** 0.0003 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   (0.0001)   
Constant 
11.690 0.000 *** 9.773 0.000 *** 
(0.006)   (0.0109)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05   *** P<.01 
 
6.6.4 Homicide victims by race 
The models of black and white homicide victims indicate that the D component of 
the magnetic field has a significant effect on the count of homicide victims by race. The 
simulations indicate that the D component is indirectly related to the count of black 
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homicide victims but indirectly related to the count of white homicide victims. The H 
component relates directly to the count of both black and white homicide victim counts. 
Figure 46 Simulated expected annual number of black homicide victims 
 
 
 The h component may not look very valuable at this scale. If separated out into its 
own estimate graph the impact of the component is much more clear and compelling. 
Figure 47 Simualted expected annual count of black homicide victims 
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Table 45 Expected annual state count of black homicide victims 
 
Magnetic Field Effect on Count of Black 
Homicide Victims (Poisson Model) 
 Observations = 115 
Pseudo R2 = 
.9380 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
D Component in 1,000s 
-0.1518 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
H Component in 1,000s 
0.0020 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Unemployment 
(1,000s) 
-0.0003 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Per Capita Income 
(Squared) 
-0.0002 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Number of State Sworn 
Full-Time Law 
Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0211 0.000 *** 
(0.0002)   
Number of Local Full-Time 
Sworn Law Enforcement 
(100s) 
-0.0066 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Police 
0.0001 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Judiciary 
-0.0095 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Corrections 
0.0047 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
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Population in 1,000s 
0.0003 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Constant 
12.870 0.000 *** 
(0.011)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
 
Table 46 Expected annual state count of homicide victims; white 
 
Magnetic Field Effect on Count of 
White Homicide Victims (Poisson 
Model) 
 
Observations = 
115 
Pseudo R2 = 
0.9468 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
D Component in 
1,000s 
0.0242 0.000 *** 
(0.0006)   
H Component in 
1,000s 
0.0019 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Unemployment 
(1,000s) 
-0.0001 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Per Capita 
Income (Squared) 
-0.0001 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Number of State 
Sworn Full-Time 
Law Enforcement 
(100s) 
-0.0034 0.000 *** 
(0.0002) 
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Number of Local 
Full-Time Sworn 
Law Enforcement 
(100s) 
-0.0089 0.000 *** 
(0.0004) 
  
Per Capita Spending 
on Police 
0.0038 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending 
on Judiciary 
-0.0116 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending 
on Corrections 
0.0018 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Population in 1,000s 
0.0003 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Constant 
10.532 0.000 *** 
(0.007)   
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Figure 48 Simulated expected annual count of white homicide victims 
 
 
Figure 49 Simulated expected annual count of white homicide victims 
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Table 47 Expected simulated annual state counts of black homicide victims 
 
Magnetic Field Effect on Count of 
Black Male Homicide Victims 
(Poisson Model) 
 
Observations = 
115 
Pseudo R2 = 
.9370 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
D Component in 1,000s 
-0.1488 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
H Component in 1,000s 
0.0020 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Unemployment in 1,000s 
-0.0003 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Per Capita Income 
(Squared) 
-0.0002 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Number of State Sworn Full-
Time Law Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0207 0.000 *** 
(0.0002)   
Number of Local Full-Time 
Sworn Law Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0065 0.000 *** 
(0.0007)   
Per Capita Spending on Police 
0.0007 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Judiciary 
-0.0083 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Corrections 
0.0049 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
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Population in 1,000s 
0.0003 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Constant 
12.774 0.000 *** 
(0.012)   
 
Table 48 Expected annual state counts of black homicide victims 
 
Magnetic Field Effect on Count of 
Black Female Homicide Victims 
(Poisson Model) 
 
Observations = 
115 
Pseudo R2 = 
0.9293 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
D Component in 1,000s 
-0.1636 0.000 *** 
(0.0023)   
H Component in 1,000s 
0.0038 0.000 *** 
(0.0002)   
State Unemployment in 
1,000s 
-0.0004 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Per Capita Income 
(Squared) 
-0.0001 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Number of State Sworn 
Full-Time Law 
Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0022 0.000 *** 
(0.0003)   
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Number of Local Full-
Time Sworn Law 
Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0070 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Police 
0.0025 0.000 *** 
(0.0002)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Judiciary 
-0.0146 0.000 *** 
(0.0002)   
Per Capita Spending on 
Corrections 
0.0039 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Population in 1,000s 
0.0003 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Constant 
10.758 0.000 *** 
(0.023)   
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Figure 50 Simulated expected annual count of black male homicide victims 
 
 
 
Figure 51 The expected simulated annual state count of black female homicide victims 
  
The same models are useful for white homicide victims by gender. 
d impact on the number of annual 
black female homicide victims 
h impact on the number of annual 
black female homicide victims 
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Table 49 Expected state annual counts of white homicide victims 
 
Magnetic Field Effect on Count of 
White Male Homicide Victims 
(Poisson Model) 
 
Observations = 
115 
Pseudo R2 = 
.9468 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
D Component in 1,000s 
0.029 0.000 *** 
(0.0006)   
H Component in 1,000s 
0.0023 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Unemployment (1,000s) 
-0.0001 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Per Capita Income (Squared) 
-0.0001 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Number of State Sworn Full-Time 
Law Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0356 0.000 *** 
(0.0012)   
Number of Local Full-Time Sworn 
Law Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0094 0.000 *** 
(0.0005)   
Per Capita Spending on Police 
0.0037 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on Judiciary 
-0.0108 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on Corrections 
0.0021 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
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Population in 1,000s 
0.0004 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Constant 
10.399 0.000 *** 
(0.012)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
 
 
Table 50 Expected state annual counts of white homicide victims 
 
Magnetic Field Effect on Count of 
White Female Homicide Victims 
(Poisson Model) 
 
Observations = 
115 
Pseudo R2 = 
0.9369 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
D Component in 1,000s 
0.0086 0.000 *** 
(0.0012)   
H Component in 1,000s 
0.0001 0.567 - 
(0.0002)   
State Unemployment (1,000s) 
-0.0009 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
State Per Capita Income (Squared) 
-0.0001 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
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Number of State Sworn Full-Time 
Law Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0281 0.000 *** 
(0.0002)   
Number of Local Full-Time Sworn 
Law Enforcement (100s) 
-0.0071 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on Police 
0.0039 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on Judiciary 
-0.0141 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Per Capita Spending on Corrections 
0.0009 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Population in 1,000s 
0.0003 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
Constant 
8.757 0.000 *** 
(0.0133)   
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Figure 52 Simulated expected annual counts of white female homicide victims 
 
Figure 53 Simulated expected annual count of white male homicide victims 
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Figure 54 Simulated expected annual count of white male homicide victims 
 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 In most cases, the magnetic field variable was a significant explanatory variable. 
The magnetic field variable covaries with dependent variables in ways that indicate an 
effect on motivation and behavior in humans. The magnetic field variables seem useful 
are an important variable in explaining, predicting, and analyzing many types of crime. 
The variable may even help in the modeling of the distribution of crime among different 
genders and races. 
The question remains, “What use is this geomagnetic variable?” Imagine a world 
that issues magnetic field and SMF warnings; akin to a smog alert. People warned that 
magnetic field and SMF activity will affect their judgment, that they should drive more 
slowly, recognize their aggressiveness, and act with patience.  
Scientists model magnetic fields predictably, which allows the planning security 
and police efforts. What if police departments could use magnetic field to assign person-
power to specific geographical areas through simple, portable magnetic field measuring 
devices? What if police departments could “save” overtime hours for projected periods of 
magnetic field activity that will increase violent crime? What if state and national police 
forces could be flexible enough to react to statewide or national magnetic field effects 
that result in an increase/decrease in violent crime counts? Currently “spot” presence and 
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a “fireman” network of distributed bases allow law enforcement to maintain “presence 
patrols” and react to events, but not to do much to deter these acts. 
A significant effect by magnetic field would offer a highly specific and cheap 
method to assist in resource planning and distributions. More scientific than “We send 
police there because crime happens there,” or “We save up overtime for holidays because 
that’s when people commit crime.” By providing a geographical non-personal profile of 
where and when crime is more likely to happen, we can curtail racial and social profiling. 
Gathering information on the magnetic field variable is cheap. More importantly, 
it is possible to collect it in real-time with few added costs. A series of automated 
measuring stations could constantly feed information into a computer and use it to predict 
the probability of violent crime occurring on a specific street, or even a specific property. 
More generally, if magnetic field is significant in explaining violent crime counts 
and it is truly because of an interaction that results in irrational behavior, it could mean a 
total shift in social-urban feng-shui. What if it were found that court was held in a 
geographic area dominated by magnetic field that affects rationality negatively? What if 
court could be held and jury deliberations completed in an area where magnetic field 
contributed to rationality? Perhaps road intersections are in poor locations. Maybe 
counties should build schools in areas that maximize magnetic field effect on rationality 
and creativity. In the realm of economic development, geographical areas that contribute 
to rationality (reduced injuries on the job) and creativity would be a premium for research 
centers, customer relations centers, factories, or company headquarters. 
The standard control variables for population, crime models income, education, race, 
gender, law enforcement spending, employment, etc., are used in some models of crime 
in this chapter, if the data were available for the time increments and level being 
analyzed. When traditional control variable data were not available, or to demonstrate the 
parsimonious and unmasked effect of the magnetic field on crime counts, these variables 
were removed to make the model less restrictive. There is confidence that, as 
demonstrated in the Chapter 3 appendices, the geomagnetic field is causally prior to 
possible social, political, and economic control variables – so fear of omitted variable 
bias is unwarranted. XT models and ARIMA models indicate that temporal 
autocorrelation diagnostics reduce the significance of magnetic variables in models of 
crime to 0.1 from between .001 and .05. Only models of rape demonstrate high risk of 
temporal autocorrelation with magnetic variables falling in significance when adjusted 
for autocorrelation. The presence of temporal autocorrelation in almost all these models, 
although categorized as low risk, compels analysts to seek a deeper understanding of how 
temporal autocorrelation impacts crime analysis using magnetic fields. However, it is 
important to note that almost most other variables of interest used in the criminology 
literature suffers more from temporal autocorrelation. 
The model being used is based on the seminal work of Cantor and Land (Cantor 
& Land, 1985), and whenever possible remains true to its theoretical foundation. Given 
that this chapter mainly explores the relationship between the geomagnetic field and the 
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opportunity or motivation to commit crime as theorized by Cantor and Land’s 
opportunity-motivation model, the goal was to focus as narrowly as proper model 
specification would permit on their conceptual framework. Combining the analysis 
without the controls with models applying control variables at each level of analysis 
(from the city to the national level) allows a comprehensive view of the benefits and 
concerns of the geomagnetic field as an explanatory or control variable. 
The result of merging the geomagnetic field into a data set built around Cantor 
and Land’s methodology demonstrates the statistical effect of the field on crime counts 
relative to the traditional control variables. The results consistently illustrate the main 
point that is the burden of this thesis: Adding magnetic field measures tightens up the 
95% confidence intervals returned by these statistical models, and therefore allows them 
to be more precise in their predictive ability than models that left out this natural 
phenomenon. 
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Chapter 7  Stock Market Volatility, Risk, and Chance  
Rationality, in word or concept, goes back to the initial works of Max Weber in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries. It could be argued that the roots of the rationality story 
goes back even further, to the classical scientific method of Aristotle(Aristotle, 1938) and 
the efforts of Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen, 1974), or to François’ Quesnay’s Tableau 
Economique (Quesnay, 1759) and its foundational economic theories that informed much 
of Adam Smith’s work in the Wealth of Nations (Smith A. , 1776). Let us start with a 
very different concept, that of probability, epitomized in the early 1500s with a 
brainteaser. 
A and B are playing a fair game of balla. They agree to continue until one 
has won six rounds. The game actually stops when A has won 5 and B has 
won 3. How should the stakes be divided? (Hogben, 1968). 
This was a first and formative moment in the development of the concept of risk 
and probability that has in many ways waylaid the whole idea of rationalism in social 
science. The importance of risk goes back to the origin stories of the Greeks, who explain 
the “big bang” as a game of chance among the Gods in which Zeus won the heavens and 
the other Gods were assigned to their areas according to chance. It was the characteristics 
of the Greek civilization (a rich system of mathematics, a lack of a domineering 
priesthood, etc.) that set the conditions for significant breakthroughs in risk and 
probability. Unfortunately, their numbering system only allowed for the recording of 
results and little utility for calculating (Florence-Nightingale, 1962, p. 2). 
 The Greeks were able to develop the concept of probability with little problem 
and even made the critical assessment that “like truth” is not the same as “truth” 
(Sambursky) (Kendall & Plackett, 1977, pp. 1 - 14). However, the distinct separation of 
thinking about games of chance and playing games of chance (and all other relevant 
events that are risk/chance/probabilities based) remained firmly in place for more than 
1,000 years. Shmuel Sambursky, an historian and philosopher, argued this was the case 
because the Greeks found order only in the heavens and could not accept any ordering of 
the messiness of life. Literature, art, and culture were interwoven with drama and 
tragedies that tell of the helplessness of humans in the grasp of impersonal fates. Even 
Gods were victims of the unpredictable and messy existence. 
 It was not until the view of the future radically changed that civilization was able 
to develop a sophisticated theory and application of probabilities and risk. Until the 
Renaissance, people viewed the future as just a matter of luck, a random assortment of 
variations, with instinct as the best guide in a world of randomness. The conditions of life 
were so connected to nature, and the demands of survival so high, people were could not 
conceive they could influence their futures in any way that mattered. Even when 
civilizations advanced, that advancement alone was not sufficient in itself to drive the 
development of risk concepts and risk based methodologies (Eves, 1983). 
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 It was the rise of the Arab empires and their contact with the Indian civilizations 
of the time that spread a numbering system from India westward that would allow for a 
transformation of mathematics and measurements. The Hindu numbering system 
gradually replaced the abacus, and the Roman system of numerals. Yet, the five hundred 
years that passed, the development of more abstract mathematical thinking, and the use of 
written numerology was not enough to spawn a field of probability and risk. It would not 
be until a civilization realized that human beings were not at the mercy of randomness 
and nature, but could influence outcomes through understanding, action, or inaction that 
this would occur (Rabinovitch, 1969). In the 1200’s, Europeans were introduced to 
written works that taught the difference between 10 and 100. This was not enough to 
motivate a development of risk or uncertainty or probability theory, as most people still 
perceived risk because of the unpredictability of nature (Bernstein P. L., 1998). Re-enter 
our earlier brainteaser: 
A and B are playing a fair game of balla. They agree to continue until one 
has won six rounds. The game actually stops when A has won 5 and B has 
won 3. How should the stakes be divided? (Hogben, 1968) 
It was not until 1545, that an author published a work focused on probability and 
chance. The author was an admitted gambler (sometimes every day for a year), a well-
known medical professional, and a prolific writer. Book on Games of Chance (Cardano, 
1526) was the title of the work. It took 50 more years for Galileo to take a break from his 
astronomical musing and mathematical studies to move the understanding of probability 
forward and another 100 years for the terms associated with probability to come into 
common usage (Hacking, 1975). 
 By the start of the 17th century, advances in calculus and the study of chance 
resulted in foundations laid  for disparate subjects ranging from insurance and investment 
to medicine, behavior of matter, war, and weather forecasting (Bernstein P. L., 1998). In 
1654, three French Mathematicians set out to solve the riddle posed in 1500 as to the 
division of the pot of an incomplete game of chance among the players. One of the many 
lines of analysis to solve the problem would lead to the theory of decision making 
(Hacking, 1975). A short time later, in 1662 theorists introduced a critical component in 
the application of probability theory. The critical component was the concept of “gravity” 
or utility. A new idea was published that both the chance of an event happening and the 
gravity/payoff/cost associated with an event should both be used when determining how 
useful taking a chance would be; hence utility (Hacking, 1975). 
 Later in 1693, Sir Edmund Halley would publish a detailed analysis of the 
population of the town of Breslaw for the years 1687 through 1691. He would use the 
town’s detailed birth and death records to estimate the town’s population as well as the 
chance of dying of one of many causes in a given year. He went on to apply the risk of 
death to a most common financial instrument: the annuity (Newman, 1988). Since at least 
1540, the English government had sold annuities that repaid their purchase price in but 
seven years without regard to the age of the buyer. The sale of the annuity, with the intent 
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of filling the kingdom’s treasury, turned into a long-term drain as buyers outlived the 
payback period (Hacking, 1975). 
 It is in 1738 that Bernoulli coined the explicit use of the term utility as well as the 
concept that different people perceive risk differently. He also defines “expected value” 
and “mathematical expectations.” Having established these concepts and supported the 
supposition that different people viewed risk differently, he argued, “The utility resulting 
from any small increase in wealth will be inversely proportional to the quantity of goods 
previously possessed.” These concepts and statements transformed probabilities from a 
process to “procedures for introducing subjective considerations into decisions that have 
uncertain outcomes (Bernstein P. , 1998).” The assertion that different people perceived 
risk differently was the beginning of the divergence from the classical rational man, who 
shared similar rationality with all other classically rational men. 
 Earlier, in 1705, Bernoulli’s father structured and defined the problems with 
application of probability theory. First, for most people and situations, only partial 
information is available. Second, events in the future will follow the same pattern as 
events in the past (independence). Third was the relevance of the quantitative valuation 
(Bernoulli, 1713). It was also around this time (1711) that De Moivre developed the 
normal distribution, a graph that allowed the derivation of the standard deviation, and 
inspired/motivated Thomas Bayes’ efforts that led (well after his death) to the foundation 
of statistical inference and the idea that you could measure uncertainty (Bernoulli, 1713).  
Towards the end of the 1800s, Francis Galton, would make two critical contributions to 
risk theory and analysis. The first was that measures (samples) tended to return to the 
mean of a population and this trend tended to resist efforts at manipulation in real life. 
The study of eugenics demonstrated this. The second was that samples of samples 
maintained the same distribution of the population. He designed a machine that would 
randomly drop balls into a series of bins that would result in the normal distribution. 
Randomly dropped balls from this array would in turn create a normal distribution 
(Forest, 1974). These exciting and novel concepts came together through the 1800s to 
make the normal distribution the core of risk management and lay the foundation for all 
that would happen in the 1900s. In fact, regression to the mean provides many if not all 
decision-making systems’ philosophical foundations (Bernstein P. L., 1998, p. 172). 
 However, Bernstein points out in his discussion of regression to the mean that 
there are three reasons why using regression to the mean is such a problematic guide to 
both understanding and executing decision making (Bernstein P. , 1998, p. 172). First, 
regression to the mean can progress at any rate. At times, the process can progress at such 
a gradual pace that shocks can disrupt it. The pace and impact of such shocks can result 
in a never-ending regression. Second, the rate of movement to the mean, and a lack of 
any natural “door stop” may result in the trend swinging back well beyond the mean. The 
result is “erratic and unstable” swings one each side of the mean that never come to rest 
at the prior mean. The unstable and erratic swings may not even provide enough 
information to estimate a valid mean. Finally, it is possible that the mean itself is 
unstable. Tomorrow’s new normal replaces yesterdays’. While we may have had plenty 
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of information about the mean yesterday, we may not know anything about the mean that 
exists today and not have enough information to project or predict the mean of tomorrow. 
 Once people were able to define, quantify, describe, and recognize risk it was 
inevitable that they would attempt to mitigate, control, and manage it. Risk management 
is maximizing the areas where one has control over the outcome of processes and 
minimizing the areas where one does not. However, it is difficult to define such spaces 
when “real” world processes and interactions are the subject of risk management. Often 
there is no ready explanation for extraordinary events that require strong explanatory 
proofs in order to claim understanding of what drove the extraordinary event (Bernstein 
P. L., 1998, p. 199). 
 Along these lines a profound observation by an, at the time an unremarkable 
French mathematician, describes the basic expectation of such extraordinary events. He 
asserted the expected likelihood of such extraordinary events; such as swings greater than 
20% in stock market value, war, devastating shocks to economic and social systems, etc., 
is zero (Bernstein P. L., 1992). 
 What makes matters worse is that one can never have all the relevant information 
to generate a 100% correct decision. Further, we are never sure of the quality, relevance, 
efficiency, or validity of the information we do have. This information is but a sample of 
the entire population of existing data that affects a prediction, inference, deduction, 
process, or outcome. One never knows how efficient, or representative, the “sample” of 
information they are operating under is when compared to the population of all possible 
information. In situations where we cannot adequately support the inference that the 
sample of information available is representative of the population of possible 
information, one must revert to inductive reasoning to develop an estimate of the 
probability of an event or outcome. John Maynard Keynes discussed this dynamic when 
he asserted that while there may in fact be a relationship among the evidence and an 
outcome there is no guarantee that it is possible to measure it (Keynes, 1921). 
Keynes produced a flurry of criticism that spares none of the previous section’s 
leaders in identifying, quantifying, and managing risk and uncertainty. He even spares 
some time to be critical of the use of the arithmetic mean, which, while easy to use, in no 
way reflects nature’s lack of concern for ease of analysis (Keynes, 1921, pp. 206 - 209). 
This brings us back to the issue of rationality and the first explicit works penned 
by Max Weber. Rationality as a concept has an evolving meaning in the social sciences. 
From Weber (Weber, 1922) to Reed (Reed, 2000) the debate has sought to understand 
and defend the role of rationality in matters of research interest (Swedberg, 1999). A 
corollary coming from this debate is the role of “non-rationality” in research interests 
(Genoc, 1991). The methodological and substantive arguments in favor of rationality as a 
foundational concept and explanation for event processes and outcomes found its home in 
rational choice and exchange theorists such as Morrow (Morrow J. D., 1994), Ordeshook 
(Ordeshook, 1992), Mitchell (Coleman, 1990), Hogarth (Hogarth R. M., 1980), Reder 
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(Hogarth & Reder, 1987), Coleman (Coleman, 1990) and (Coleman, 1986) and others. 
Rational choice theory assumes that “The elementary unit of social life is the individual 
human action. To explain social institutions and social change is to show how they arise 
as the result of the action and interaction of individuals (Elster J. , 1989).”  
Alongside this, are a variety of “thin” and “thick” rational models that have differing 
levels of restriction and adjustments that bring the rational decision making models closer 
to the de facto choices that people make (Yee, 1997). These modifications to the original 
theory mainly deal with adjusting the assumption that rationality equates to maximizing 
value of outcomes. In other words, moving the theory away from assuming that 
individuals desired to get themselves the best outcome they could for themselves. 
Although, in fairness to rational choice, it must be acknowledge that it is not so much a 
theory as it is “a descriptive phrase used to describe any of a number of individual 
theories that use the rationality assumption (Quackenbush, 2003).” 
 In the 1950s, Kenneth Arrow asserted that people generally over-estimate the 
value, amount, and even relevance of the information they possess and use to make 
decisions. Already established was that an infinite number of insignificant yet relevant 
influences cause zero percent-expected events. Arrow then asked why anyone accepts 
risk and “plays the game” under these conditions? His answer applies to two groups; 
those who gamble and those who insure. Gamblers are willing to accept the small 
probability of a big payoff in exchange for a large probability of a small loss.  Those who 
use insurance prefer a 100% chance of a small loss (insurance premium) in exchange for 
the small chance of a large gain (insurance payout to cover a catastrophe). It seems 
reasonable to argue what divided people into each group was a psychological process 
likely never captured for political or economic analysis. Researchers and analysts would 
only be able to evaluate the hypothetically available choices, outcomes, and intervening 
benefits and costs and risks. 
In attempts to address the criticisms of rationality the concept of rationality as 
inherent in outcome has devolved to a point of stipulating that all decisions are rational 
and therefore analysts ignore rationality as a variable. This allows the disciplines to 
continue to use rationality as an assumption in models that describe processes and explain 
outcomes while not having to measure or quantify the concept. Other researchers assume 
that preferences are observed and revealed through behaviour. These researchers reject 
the mental or psychological factors involved in determining rationality as being too 
subjective (Yee, 1997). Others have called for an integrated and more elaborate analysis 
of mental event factors such as norms, ideas, and beliefs arguing that unobserved mental 
context prevent the revealing of preferences through behaviour. (Mitchell  1969  
and1993). To overcome difficulties presented by critics of these approaches others’ 
attempts to assign probabilities and values to each outcome to get an expected utility 
value. Preferred outcomes would be those with the highest expected utilities (Morrow J. , 
1994). 
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  Reconnecting with an earlier discussion of risk, the phenomenon of regression to 
the mean, the stock market is one of the strongest examples of its application to risk 
analysis, risk management, and decision-making. The concepts of “Buy low and sell 
high,” “You never get poor taking a profit,” intraday averages (generally 200 day 
averages), “support levels,” and much of “technical analysis” rests on regression to the 
mean. 
 However, most investors tend to follow trends; in a world where uncertainty 
defines tomorrow, the only available dependable data is that which has happened in the 
past. Investors, absent any compelling reason not to, tend to assure that tomorrow will be 
more of yesterday and today. In this way, investors deem stocks that have been raising 
recently better investments than stocks that have been falling recently. In this way, people 
benefit from the concept of momentum. Indeed Wall Street has a whole class of investors 
who trade on momentum. In this class, professionals as well as amateurs tend fall into the 
same tendency (Bernstein S. C., 1994). In fact, a study found that professional investors 
who projected higher-than-average growth for a company consistently overestimated the 
actual performance of the company. On the other hand, those who projected lower-than-
average growth consistently underestimated the actual performance; on average. What 
ends up happening under the pressure of momentum trading and the tendency to 
overestimate or underestimate performance by analysts and investment advisors is that 
stocks with high expectations rise to high values while stocks with low expectations fall 
to low values. This is when regression to the mean asserts its influence. Investors and 
realistic analysis of the valuation of stocks bring people into the market as those who held 
the unreasonable expectations leave the market, or shift to new stocks. As buying and 
selling accelerate, the prices of stocks move to the “actual” valuation, the mean. 
 As Peter Berstein’s Against the Gods the Remarkable Story of Risk (Bernstein P. , 
1998) points out so well, when asking whether the regression to the mean underlay the 
performance of stocks and the market as a whole, what one is really asking is whether 
predictability exists. If the answer is that predictability exists, then the obvious next 
question is under what conditions it exists (DeBondt & Thale, 1986). The answer from 
research looking at losers and winners in the market is that losers tend to outperform 
markets and winners tend to underperform markets around 36 months after analysts 
assign stocks either winner or loser status. Regression to the mean seems to be taking 
place. Later research showed that for the S&P 500, a basket of 500 stocks that represent 
the U.S. economy from 1926 to 1993, variance of returns over specified periods was less 
than expected meaning that long run volatility is significantly less than expected if 
regression to the mean was not at work in the market. Then why are not all investors rich, 
and why do not all investors, because of the success of “regression to the mean investors” 
and the failure of “momentum investors” invest with regression to the mean as a 
fundamental component of their analysis and strategy? The answer is that no one know 
what the mean is, how fast the regression occurs (although research has indicated that in 
the past it took less than 36 months), or when the mean may have changed. 
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 To continue the earlier discussion of risk, uncertainty, and risk mitigation it is 
important to realize that these concepts are largely new, that for almost 200 years in the 
United States and much longer in the markets of Britain, France, and the Netherlands, 
they did not exist. Through the years, risk was accepted, and to prosper one had to beat it. 
Risk, removed from mathematics,  remained a game of instinct, gut, intuition, and 
constitution (Bernstein P. , 1998).  
 In this vein, the seminal work on rationality, risk, uncertainty in building stock 
portfolios, and describing ways to minimize risk came about at a doctoral dissertation of 
a 25-year-old computer programmer. Harry Markowitz’s analysis of market risk and 
return and how to build a minimally risky portfolio while maximizing returns, published 
in 1952 (Markowitz, 1952) could not have come at a better time, if only anyone paid any 
attention. In the 1960’s a group of aggressive investment advisors and managers solely 
focused on performance became demi-gods among those “in-the-know.” The “good 
times” hid the fact that these investors were just riding a wave of valuation growth that 
ended in the 1973 – 1974 market crash that from crest to trough wiped out 50% of the 
market’s value. Taken with the other crises of the day; Watergate, the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods Agreements, and a 50% drop in the value of the dollar, the market crash 
brought into stark relief that “performance” as defined by the “gurus” of the 1960s was a 
fantasy built upon a convenient absence of shocks in the market and steadily increasing 
valuations of markets.  
  The resulting search for ways to protect from suffering the losses experienced in 
the 1973 crash brought Markowitz renown throughout the investing community. His 
position was that portfolio construction should focus on both an expected return and a 
minimal variance in that return. While he never uses the word risk in his analysis, he 
identifies “variance of return” as something one avoids; over the years, risk and variance 
have come to mean the same thing. While Von Neumann and Morgenstern had in the past 
put a value, or number, on utility, Markowitz had put a number on stock market risk. In 
this, way risk rose to take on equal status with return. However, it is only valuable if 
investors are rational. If they invest on instinct, follow the herd, or prefer fad investment 
strategies not grounded in mathematical analysis, rationality, game theory and the like 
such as momentum investing then the application of risk vs. return balancing is 
irrelevant. It is unfortunate that research has pointed to deviations from “rational” are 
systematic among investors and that all the conditions (following fads and such) for 
eroding the value of Markowitz’s analysis, more often than not, grip the investor and only 
lets them go after the “crash”. While “irrational” may be an inappropriate term to apply to 
these behaviors, generally the outcome is no different from when one assumes no 
rationality.  
Capital markets have been volatile throughout history. The level of volatility has 
largely gone unexplained, since capital markets are “bets on the future,” and the future is 
uncertain leading to unexpected outcomes. The willingness of people to cooperate defines 
markets. As a buyer, one is at the mercy of what price the seller is willing to accept. As a 
seller, one is at the mercy of that price others are willing to buy. In an orderly market, 
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buyers and sellers agree on the value of equity and all sellers match all buyers in price 
and number of shares. Disorderly markets occur when buyers and sellers have a distinctly 
and significantly different idea of the value of equity. Volatility occurs on the way to a 
disorderly market. Volatile markets have buyers and sellers entering and leaving the 
market at different times with random and intermittent meetings of buy/sell prices and 
share counts. Volatile markets may result in stock prices moving up and down until all 
“intermediate” buyers and sellers are cleared out. Once that happens, two camps warily 
eye each other across a chasm of buy and sell prices: the spread. This condition persists 
until information is made available that proves one group more correct than the other in 
their valuation of an equity. 
Looking at volatility, the swings, and moves of the market, and presidential tone 
(whether positive or negative) yields the following findings. In the model below, the 
volatility is a count of “points” that the market moves as measured by the distance 
between the low and the high of the day. In this model all information assists in reducing 
volatility, which indicates that the key value added by the President is not “pushing” the 
market in a direction, but providing information that assists in reducing volatility. 
Volatility is an interesting area to analyze because it is a mark of inefficiency in the 
market and creates uncertainty and risk (Black F. , 1986). Little is known about the 
determinants of financial market volatility, largely because we have no proven theory of 
volatility, although we have several measures of volatility (Shiller, 1988). 
Two groups dominate the thinking concerning financial volatility. The first is a 
qualitative explanation called behavioral finance (Shiller, 1981). The second is the 
efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1965). Behavioral finance started with an argument 
that market volatility was a result of the mental state of the investing and trading public 
(Seldon, 1912). Later, the idea of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 
1956) was developed. Cognitive dissonance was an uncomfortable feeling that arose from 
conflicting thoughts and information. To alleviate the problem, investors would ignore 
information that conflicted with expectations (Caplan, 2007). This leads to irrational 
decision-making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and speculative markets (Arrow K. J., 
1983). 
Efficient market hypothesis argues that large numbers of rational, profit 
maximizers, will compete to predict future market values. As information becomes 
available to the public, actors will race to inefficiencies, thereby eliminating them (Fama, 
1965) (Merton R. C., 1973) (Lucas, 1978) (Breeden, 1979) (Malkiel, 1973). Actors act in 
a profit-maximizing manner and the whole market has all information required to be 
efficient in the long run available to it. It is possible for short duration inefficiencies to 
exist, but these rapidly disappear. 
Mounting evidence is available that points to market actors acting in ways that do 
not align with the efficient market hypothesis. Indeed, a range of actions from responding 
to the market instead of news, crisis reactions, and opinion are important drivers of 
market activity in many studies (Shiller, 1988) (Landberg, 2003) (Hilsenrath, 2004). One 
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of the earliest of these theories is feedback theory that asserts that when markets behave a 
certain way and some investors benefit, others attempt to emulate the success and 
expectations are heightened for further market moves (Shiller, 2003) (Andreassen & 
Kraus, 1990) (Smith V. , 1988) (Marimon, 1993) (Daniel, 1998). Other research 
demonstrates that markets are more volatile than efficient market theory would indicate 
(Le Roy & Porter, 1981). Another dynamic that affects market behavior is the aggregate 
aversion or acceptance of risk (Dalton, 1988). 
Martin’s analysis places his conceptual framework within the context of the 
efficient market hypothesis. He sees presidential signals as being available to all actors in 
the market. Since all actors are profit seeking, they add the signals to their information 
and make market decisions. Adding a variable that affects decision making, risk taking, 
or perception and asserting that it’s influence is felt as market volatility and that this 
variable can better define the effect of presidential signaling is taking Martin’s work out 
of the efficient market model and places it squarely in the behavior model. Magnetic 
fields may result in increased anxiety, risk aversion, risk taking, and enhanced or altered 
perceptions. Every day market volatility, performance, and how the market views 
presidential signals all reflect the possible influence of magnetic fields. 
7.1  Daily Trading Range 
The analysis of magnetic field influence on markets and how they may or may not 
assist analysts in understanding how presidential signaling may be perceived starts with a 
simple look at how magnetic fields on their own may be influencing a measure of market 
volatility. One measure of stock market volatility is the distance or space that exists daily 
between the lowest trading value of the market and the highest. “Wild” swings in prices 
are indicative of markets that are in crisis, lack transparency, or are suffering from 
information and perception problems. Analysis shows a possible relationship between the 
high-low ranges of the stock market a day after total field strength is measured. The 
model shows that the magnetic field variable is significant, and, as the total field 
increases in value, the distance between the daily low and the daily high of the stock 
market gets smaller. If the total field is broken down into its component parts three 
components are significant. Analysis shows the three components are significant. It also 
shows as the y and h component increases in value, the distance between the daily low 
and daily high increases. The z component tends to offset the effects of increases in the h 
component. 
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By themselves these models only tell us that there is a possible relationship 
between the magnetic field and stock market volatility, or the daily range between the 
low and the high. When the magnetic variable is included in a developed model the 
results become much more compelling. 
7.2 The Influence of the President and Magnetic fields 
 Research has looked at the President of the United States as an influence on the 
market. Volatility resulting from signals from the President as well as the influence of 
magnetic field can be determined with appropriate models (Martin, 2008). Thomas 
Martin’s research sought to determine if the “President’s rhetorical leadership produces 
tangible outcomes, market responsiveness (Martin, 2008). Market responsiveness is a 
term Martin uses to denote market volatility. Some disagreement exists among scholars 
as to the effectiveness of presidential rhetoric on market outcomes. Many insist that the 
evidence is problematic and that often the relationship is spurious, with the market 
reflecting public opinion that already existed prior to the presidential communication. 
Therefore, presidential rhetoric is largely symbolic (Edwards, 2003) (Cohen J. E., 1997). 
A substantial body of literature on the President’s impact on economic variables also 
exists, even though there is little in the way of analysis on his direct or indirect influence 
on stock market volatility (Beck, 1991) (Light, 1999) (Niskanen, 1988) (Roundtree, 
1995) (Tufte, 1978) (Wood, 2004) (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005). 
 The President rises to a singular level of importance because of a couple of 
factors. First, the President is a singular voice versus the hundreds that are in congress 
(Corwin, 1957). Second, the executive is “always in session, has first mover advantage, 
and acts swiftly” (Martin, 2008). Finally, while the President’s power is limited by the 
constitution and necessity of working with congress and being checked by the courts, the 
perception and expectation that the public have are not limited (Peffley & Williams, 
1985) (MacKuen, Stimson, & Erikson, 1992). 
 Martin’s conceptual framework for presidential influence on markets rests in the 
traditional veins of presidential study and analysis but also on the influence on markets 
through rhetoric (Martin, 2008). He bases his premise on Alter’s (Alter, 2005) assertion 
that “presidential rhetoric is the most underappreciated force in politics.” Authors 
acknowledge that presidential rhetoric could be both positive and negative (Muir, 1992). 
Martin concludes that presidential rhetoric is important because the President is the only 
official who is elected by a national constituency (Martin, 2008, p. 14). As President, the 
chief executive has three types of power available to them: formal, informal, and implied 
(Corwin, 1957) (Neustadt, 1960) (Skowronek, 1997) (Genovese, 1995). It would be 
through the extension of formal executive power, rhetorical leadership TULIS 1987. 
Martin’s study focuses on the power of the presidential “signal.” The signal represents 
information communicated to individuals that allow them to make decisions (Eshbaugh-
Soha, 2006). Marin hypothesizes that what Presidents say formally and informally 
influences financial decisions and through them stock market volatility. 
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 Presidents express their optimism or pessimism about the U.S. economy and 
become the most visible economic commentator in the U.S. system (Wood, 2004) 
(Wood, Owens, & Durham, 2005) (Wood, 2007). The President can communicate their 
rhetoric without delay and unilaterally (Wood, 2004, p. 573). Evidence suggests that 
Presidents can use rhetoric to influence approval ratings (Cohen & Hamman, 2003) and 
media and Congressional attention to economic issues (Druckman & Holmes, 2004) 
(Eshbaugh-Soha & Peake, 2005). Presidential rhetorical power is enhanced because the 
public views the President has an informed opinion given the office’s unsurpassed 
resources (Roundtree, 1995, p. 330). 
 Others assert that the study of the presidency is primarily concerned with the 
“institutional practice, political authority, the exercise of presidential power, and 
influence” (Tulis 1987). Therefore, presidential rhetoric is a legitimate area of study with 
important relationships to explore (Whittington, 1997). There is also a compelling body 
of analysis that demonstrates empirical relationships between presidential rhetoric and 
economic variables, such as inflation and unemployment (Wood, 2004) (Wood, Owens, 
& Durham, 2005) (Wood, 2007). Further, the speed of presidential rhetoric differs 
significantly from the rate of bargaining. Unlike executive bureaucrats who move at their 
leisure, presidential rhetoric moves at the speed of the news cycle (Howell, 2003). 
 Table 52 shows the results of Martin’s analysis on how presidential signaling may 
affect volatility in stock markets. Table 53 shows what Martin’s analysis would have 
shown with magnetic field as an independent variable. Martin codes the first time that a 
President brings positive or negative messages to the market, ignoring repeats or 
recasting of the same message. Martin’s measure of volatility is the percentage change in 
value of the market as defined by the various Dow indexes and the NASDAQ index 
(Martin, 2008). 
Adding in the impact of magnetic field in the form of Ap shows a slight 
improvement in the explanatory power of the model. Given the range of values for Ap, its 
impact in relative terms seems less than that of the President’s tone on the relevant issues. 
As Ap is higher, volatility is lower. However, the weakness in this model lies in the fact 
that it does not distinguish among the many ways in which the distance is generated and 
what the daily outcome of market moves look like. First, the distance could have fallen 
from a high value to a low value. Second, the distance could have risen from a low value 
to a high value. Third, the distance could have resulted from an increase, then a decrease, 
and then another increase resulting in a small, if any, difference in closing and opening 
prices. In the end, this model provides some explanatory power and highlights the 
effectiveness that Presidents have in communicating to the public and reducing volatility 
through providing information. 
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Table 52 Expected market daily volatility without magnetic field 
Daily Market Volatility (Martin’s Measure), Presidential Messaging, and 
Economic Control Variables 
 
Observations = 
4,811 
Pseudo R2 = 
.1952  
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
Positive Deficit 
Message 
0.6691 0.000 *** 
(0.0953)   
     
Negative Deficit 
Message 
0.1243 0.001 *** 
(0.0361)   
   
Positive Economic 
Message 
-0.0091 0.015 ** 
(0.0038) 
  
Negative Economic 
Message 
0.0001 0.001 *** 
(0.0000)   
    
Positive Inflation 
Message 
-.6975 0.000 *** 
(0.0194)   
    
Negative Inflation 
Message 
-.5666 0.000 *** 
(0.0341)   
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Positive Interest Rate 
Message 
-.4703 0.000 *** 
(0.023)   
    
Negative Interest Rate 
Message 
-.7975 0.000 *** 
(0.0305)   
    
National 
Unemployment Rate 
-.7215 0.000 *** 
(0.0009)   
    
National Inflation Rate 
-.0526 0.000 *** 
(0.0005)   
    
Federal Reserve 
Board’s Funds Rate 
-.1921 0.000 *** 
(0.0007)   
Ap Index (Magnetic 
Field) 
   
   
    
Constant 
-10.938 0.000 *** 
(0.0063)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
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Table 53 Expected market daily volatility with magnetic field 
Daily Market Volatility (Martin’s Measure), Presidential Messaging, 
and Economic Control Variables 
  Observations = 4,811 
Pseudo R2 = 
0.1969 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Positive Deficit Message 
0.8951 0.000 *** 
(0.0127)   
     
Negative Deficit Message 
-0.6891 0.060 * 
(0.0265)   
   
Positive Economic Message 
-0.8614 0.100 * 
(0.0082) 
  
Negative Economic Message 
-0.9613 0.087 * 
(0.0092)   
    
Positive Inflation Message 
-.7264 0.000 *** 
(0.0194)   
    
Negative Inflation Message 
-.5222 0.000 *** 
(0.0342)   
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Positive Interest Rate Message 
-.4302 0.000 *** 
(0.0229)   
    
Negative Interest Rate 
Message 
-.8204 0.000 *** 
(0.0305)   
    
National Unemployment Rate 
-.7124 0.000 *** 
(0.0009)   
    
National Inflation Rate 
-.0494 0.000 *** 
(0.0005)   
    
Federal Reserve Board’s Funds 
Rate 
-.1900 0.000 *** 
(0.0007)   
Ap Index (Magnetic Field) 
-.0078 0.000 *** 
(0.0001)   
    
Constant 
-10.967 0.000 *** 
(0.0063)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
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If one looks at the President as a communicator and provider of information 
regardless of tone, positive or negative the model looks like Table 54. This may indicate 
that the net effect of presidential signaling is to increase volatility. Perhaps his signals 
only confuse and increase uncertainty in the market? 
Table 54 Expected daily market volatility  
Daily Market Volatility (Martin’s Measure), Presidential 
Messaging Without Regard to Positive or Negative 
Message 
 
Observations 
=3,863 
Pseudo R2 = 
.7853 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
Presidential 
Messaging 
0.0284 0.000 *** 
(0.0047)   
National 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-.3420 0.000 *** 
(0.0040)   
National 
Inflation Rate 
-.0025 0.000 *** 
(0.0009)   
Federal Reserve 
Board’s Funds 
Rate 
-.0989 0.000 *** 
(0.0022) 
  
Total Magnetic 
Field (1,000s) 
-.8308 0.000 *** 
0(.0111)   
Constant 
-2.592 0.000 *** 
(0.161)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
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 To get a true view of presidential impact, a look at the volatility as a percentage of 
the total composite value is necessary and displayed in Table 55. Repeating the analysis 
and adding magnetic field variable results in Table 56. Such a model using presidential 
tone by subject area does nothing to assist in explaining or predicting volatility, while the 
total field strength does. 
Including a magnetic field variable in models moves some subjects of presidential 
communications towards significance. Collapsing Presidential Signals into only two 
categories, positive and negative, does not produce an appreciably better model or 
additional significant variables. Collapsing Presidential Signals into only one category, 
Presidential Market Signals does not either. 
Table 55 Expected daily market volatility 
Daily Market Volatility (Distance from High to Low), Presidential 
Messaging, and Economic Control Variables 
 
Observations = 
4,781 
Pseudo R2 = 
.0050 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Positive Deficit Message 
0.0742 0.321 - 
(0.0748)   
     
Negative Deficit Message 
-.0357 0.795 - 
(0.1371)   
   
Positive Economic Message 
0.493 0.328 - 
(0.0504)   
Negative Economic Message 
0.0548 0.369 - 
(0.0610)   
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Positive Inflation Message 
-.0023 0.983 - 
(0.1071)   
Negative Inflation Message 
.0299 0.868 - 
(0.1798)   
Positive Interest Rate Message 
-.0456 0.749 - 
(0.1424)   
    
Negative Interest Rate Message 
-.0958 0.573 - 
(0.1699)   
National Unemployment Rate 
-.0513 0.000 *** 
(0.0077)   
National Inflation Rate 
-0119 0.008 *** 
(0.0045)   
Federal Reserve Board’s Funds 
Rate 
.0022 0.601 - 
(0.0042)   
Total Magnetic Field (1,000s) 
   
   
Constant 
1.043 0.000 *** 
(0.0472)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
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Table 56 Expected daily market volatility with and without magnetic field variable as 
control part 2 
Daily Market Volatility (Distance from High to Low), Presidential Messaging, 
and Economic Control Variables 
 
Observations = 
3,866 
Pseudo R2 = 
0.0121 
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
Positive Deficit Message 
0.1132 0.156 - 
(0.0798)   
     
Negative Deficit Message 
-0.0814 0.616 - 
(0.1624)   
   
Positive Economic Message 
.0448 0.433 - 
(0.0571) 
  
Negative Economic Message 
.0582 0.386 - 
(0.0672)   
    
Positive Inflation Message 
-.0188 0.887 - 
(0.1325)   
    
Negative Inflation Message 
-.0844 0.735 - 
(0.2496)   
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Positive Interest Rate Message 
-.0435 0.1594 - 
(0.1594)   
Negative Interest Rate Message 
-.0930 0.639 - 
(0.1982)   
National Unemployment Rate 
-.1584 0.000 *** 
(0.0213)   
National Inflation Rate 
-.0054 0.331 - 
(0.0055)   
Federal Reserve Board’s Funds 
Rate 
-.0377 0.001 *** 
(0.0111)   
Total Magnetic Field (1,000s) 
-.1451 0.017 ** 
(0.0607)   
Constant 
3.554 0.000 *** 
(0.0472) 
 
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
 
Perhaps presidential signaling affects the scale of volatility and not its absolute 
measure or relative percentage volatility. Analysts could use Presidential signals to 
explain or predict whether market volatility as measured as the distance the market 
moves from low to high for the day will rise above its average volatility. Table 57 shows 
the results of a model of a market having volatility higher than average. This model 
categorizes negative economic messages as significant and resulting in an increase in 
volatility, but the magnetic field variable is not significant. 
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Table 57 Probability that daily market volatility will be above average 
 
Probability of Above Average Daily Market 
Volatility (Distance from High to Low)  
 Observations = 3,863 Pseudo R2 = .0923  
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
Positive Deficit Message 
0.1861 0.226 - 
(0.1535)   
Negative Deficit Message -.1281 0.659 - 
(0.2898)   
   
National Unemployment 
Rate 
-.4658 0.000 *** 
(0.0381)   
National Inflation Rate 
-.0437 0.000 *** 
(0.01)   
Federal Reserve Board’s 
Funds Rate 
-.0847 0.000 *** 
(0.0193)   
Total Magnetic Field 
(1,000s) 
.1449 0.186 - 
(0.1095)   
Constant 
5.23 .001 *** 
(1.55)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
 
 Collapsing the categories of presidential messaging into only positive and 
negative presidential signals in general yields the results displayed in Table 58. Neither of 
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the presidential message variables is significant in modeling above average volatility. The 
magnetic field variable is significant though. 
Table 58 Probability that daily market volatility will be twice the average 
Probability of Average Daily Market Volatility Twice the Average 
(Distance from High to Low)  
 
Observations = 
3,863 Pseudo R2 = .0078  
Variables 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
President Positive 
Message 
0.0775 0.328 - 
(0.0793)   
     
President Negative 
Message 
-.0637 0.584 - 
(0.1165)   
   
    
Positive Interest Rate 
Message 
-.1112 0.706 - 
(0.2944)   
    
Negative Interest Rate 
Message 
-.2644 0.449 - 
(0.3493)   
    
National 
Unemployment Rate 
-.1827 0.000 *** 
(0.0423)   
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National Inflation Rate 
-.0194 0.081 * 
(0.0111)   
    
Federal Reserve 
Board’s Funds Rate 
-.0189 0.386 - 
(0.0218)   
Total Magnetic Field 
(1,000s) 
.3637 0.003 *** 
(0.1215)   
    
Constant 
4.552 .008 *** 
(1.725)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
  
 The model for days when the market volatility is twice as large as average market 
move demonstrates that the President’s negative or positive message is not significant in 
explaining this behavior, but the total geomagnetic field’s strength is significant. 
However, positive Presidential signals can result in days where the movement as a 
percentage of the market value is three times the size of average market volatility as 
measured by the distance the market moves as a percentage of value, while the total field 
strength remains significant. This chart displays the results of estimating the marginal 
influences on the dependent variable, volatility, when a one-unit increase in the 
explanatory variables occurs. The marginal influence represents the likelihood that the 
dependent variable will be 1. In this sample, 1 equates to having volatility 3 times greater 
than the average. If the President presents a positive message then it increases the 
likelihood of the next day having 3 times the average volatility around 2.7%. The change 
in likelihood associated with the Federal Reserve rate is -.16% for each 1 unit change in 
the interest rate. A one-unit change in the total magnetic field only changes the 
probability of having a 3 times the average volatility day by .0011%.  
 Evaluating the values in the sample allows us to say that in this sample the net 
effect of the magnetic field is much larger. The explanatory variable positive presidential 
message only has two values, 1 and 0. Likewise, the Federal Funds rate has a limited 
range of values, 1 to 20. Since 1971, the highest Federal Funds rate has been is 20% 
Table 58 Continued 
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(Bank, 2012). The total magnetic field can have a value from 0 to over 11,000 units. This 
means that it is possible that a positive presidential message will only have an expected 
effect of increasing the likelihood of the outcome by 2.7%. The Federal Funds rate could 
have an effect equal to approximately 3% increase in the likelihood of a day having 
volatility 3 times higher than the average. If unemployment is at 10% then the likelihood 
of having a day with volatility 3 times the average is 5.9%. Finally, if the total magnetic 
field moves 50% of its estimated 11,000 units, it would result in an increased probability 
of volatile days equal to at least 3 times the average of around 6.22%. To increase the 
probability equal to that of unemployment would require a change in total magnetic field 
of only 5,300 units. A change of only 2,650 units, or 24%, is necessary to find a 3% 
change in likelihood that a day will be 3 times as volatile as the average day. Only around 
2,380 units, 22% has the same effect as presidential messaging. Remember, one cannot 
claim any knowledge of the population or what the actual values of the variable impacts 
on the dependent variable may be. This model only tells us that it is unlikely that these 
coefficients are actually zero. 
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Table 59 Change in probability that the daily volatility will be three times the average 
Change in Probability that a Day with be Three Times as Volatile as the 
Average Volatility for the Sample  
dprobit model Observations = 3,719 Pseudo R2 = .1008  
Variables 
Change in Probability 
Standard Error Significance 
President Positive 
Message 
0.0027 (2.7%) 0.052 - 
(0.0016)   
National 
Unemployment Rate 
 
-.0059 (5.9%) 0.000 *** 
(0.0016)   
   
National Inflation Rate -.0005 (.05%) 0.885 - 
 
 
(0.0003)   
   
Federal Reserve 
Board’s Funds Rate -.0016 (.16%) 0.042 ** 
 
Total Magnetic Field 
(1,000s) 
(0.0008)   
0.0113 (1.13%) 0.002 *** 
(0.1215)   
 * P<.1 ** P<.05*** P<.01 
7.3 Absolute Change in Market Value 
Another dynamic may be at play and needs to be considered. It could be that 
presidential signals are only good if they conform to existing economic and financial 
data. For instance, a presidential speech replete with positive tones about the economy 
may have a measurable effect only when supported by measures of finance and 
improving economic indicators. In this model the fed rate, unemployment, and inflation 
get better if they are lower than the day before. If they are lower than the day before and 
the President spoke in positive terms about that metric the same day then the market 
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listens, the President is coded giving a valid message. If the President speaks in positive 
terms and the metrics are the same or worse, then his attitude is interpreted as 
cheerleading and discounted. The message is coded as invalid. This may explain why his 
theoretic and tone are not found to be a significant explanatory variable for market moves 
in many previous analysis. Table 60 shows the probability that the market will be up at 
close versus the open if the presidential signals match economic indicators. This model 
shows that if market conditions match presidential positive signals, then the market will 
close up higher than if the President’s positive economic indicators do not support 
message. 
We see in the Table 61 that, in fact, when analysts view the President as having his 
tone on unemployment confirmed by the unemployment rate getting better, the 
probability of the market closing higher increases. The direction of effect that 
unemployment rate getting better is in line with expectations. Lower unemployment rates 
result in smaller decreases in the probability of having an up day. Of note, this model 
does not have a significant magnetic field variable. It represents a weakness in the 
hypothesis that the magnetic field may have more influence than the President’s message. 
A model with the market closing down from its open has no variable of interest 
significant in explaining the outcome. 
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Table 60 Change in probability that the Dow Index will close up versus its open 
 
Change in Probability that the Dow Jones Will Close 
Up Versus its Open 
dprobit Observations = 3,876 Pseudo R2 = .0023  
Variables 
Coefficient and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
President Positive 
Message Valid 
0.3586 (35.86%) 0.043 * 
(0.1771)   
National Unemployment 
Rate Gets Better 
-.1089 (-10.89%) 0.056 * 
(0.0562)   
    
National Inflation Rate 
Gets Better 
.1240 (12.40%) 0.022 ** 
(0.0519)   
    
Federal Reserve Board’s 
Funds Rate Gets Better 
-.0643 0.351 - 
(0.0687)   
Total Magnetic Field 
(1,000s) 
-.0007 0.966 - 
(0.0174)   
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
 
 If one categorizes the President as a catalyst that pushes markets up or down 
beyond the average expected move, then determining if the President’s tone results in 
increases or decreases significantly beyond the average is necessary. The President 
talking positively in general about economic and financial metrics is useful in modeling 
market increases above the lifetime average daily increases. This chart shows that, by 
itself, positive presidential tone can increase the probability that the market will end the 
day up above its lifetime average daily increase. By itself, positive presidential tone about 
the economy and finance are not useful in modeling market increases two and three times 
the lifetime average. 
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When we add magnetic field to the model presidential tone is no longer 
significant, while the magnetic field variable is significant at the 0.1 level. This model is 
different from the previous examination of the magnetic field’s effect on presidential 
messaging. The previous model evaluated a validated presidential message and its 
probability of having the market close up. Table 61 highlights the spurious nature on the 
President’s positive message (regardless of whether they are validated) on the market 
closing up above the average for market increases. When the magnetic field variable is 
included in the model, the President’s positive messages are not significant and the 
probability for closing higher than the average percentage close is much reduced. 
Without the magnetic field variable, the President’s positive message has a very large 
influence in the probability that the market will close a percentage higher than the 
average percentage increase. These two models indicate that presidential messaging may 
be spurious and its effect over-estimated.
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  Table 61 Effect of a m
agnetic field variable on the significance of presidential positive m
essaging. 
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O
bservations = 
19425 
Pseudo R
2 = 
.0614 
O
bservations = 
4,125 
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2 = 
0.0011 
V
ariable 
C
oefficient and 
Standard D
eviation 
Significance 
C
oefficient and 
Standard D
eviation 
Significance 
President Positive 
M
essage 
0.1775 (17.75%
) 
0.058 
* 
0.0173 
0.410 
- 
(0.0170) 
 
 
(0.0210) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total M
agnetic Field 
(1,000s) 
 
 
 
.0193 (1.93%
) 
0.066 
* 
 
 
 
(0.0105) 
 
 
* P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
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 Negative presidential messages, even when controlling for magnetic field values, 
do not help in modeling days when the market is down above the average decline, when 
the market is down twice as much as the average daily decline, or when the market is 
down three times as much as the average daily decline by itself. There were 3,168 days in 
the sample when the market declines more than the average and 16,257 days when the 
sample declined less than the average. There were 963 days when the market declined 
twice the average daily decline. There were 354 days when the market declined three 
times the average daily decline. There are 19,425 total days of market activity in the 
sample. 
7.4 Highs and Low vs. Open and Close Values 
A possible criticism of the previous analysis is that we are trying to model the 
wrong dynamic. It could be that what one really wants to know about presidential tone’s 
impact on volatility is how much it makes the market move between its daily high and 
low in relation to its final distance traveled from open to close. For instance, a day in 
which the market has a high and low that was 100 units apart but the difference between 
the open and the close was only 10 units would have a ratio of 10:1 or 10. Another day 
may see the market high and low that was 200 units apart but the difference between the 
open and the close was actually 100 units. This day would have a ratio of 2:1 or 2. In the 
first example, even though the high and low represented less distance than in the second 
example, it represents greater volatility and increased uncertainty. Since our assumption 
is that presidential tone provides signals that are integrated as information to reduce 
uncertainty, presidential information should reduce this ratio, unless the information 
directly contradicts established economic and financial evidence. 
Table 62 shows, when the ratio measure of volatility is modeled, Martin’s model 
shows presidential signaling as being strongly significant. The magnetic field variable is 
significant as well. Of interest in Table 62 is deficit messaging, both positive and 
negative, which indicates its tendency to increases the ratio measure of volatility. 
However, negative deficit messages almost double the ratio versus the positive defense 
messages. In contrast, economic messaging reduces the ratio measure of volatility, but 
negative messaging has double the effect of positive messaging. Positive messaging 
about inflation results in lowering the ratio measure of volatility while negative 
messaging about inflation increases the ratio. Positive messaging about interest rates 
result in increasing ratio measure of volatility while negative messaging decreased the 
measure.
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Table 62 Expected ratio of the distance from daily low to high versus the daily open 
and close prices of the Dow Index 
 
The Ratio of Daily High-Low Range to the Distance 
from the Open to the Close Value  
 Observations = 3,849 Pseudo R2 = .0256  
Variable 
Coefficient and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
President Positive 
Deficit Message 
0.4219 0.000 *** 
(0.0278)   
     
President 
Negative Deficit 
Message 
.7518 0.000 *** 
(0.0465)   
   
Positive 
Economic 
Message 
-0.7518 0.000 *** 
(0.0257) 
  
Negative 
Economic 
Message 
-0.3197 0.000 *** 
(0.0326)   
    
Positive Inflation 
Message 
-1.1003 0.000 *** 
(0.0917)   
    
Negative Inflation 
Message 
.2168 0.032 *** 
(0.1010)   
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Positive Interest 
Rate Message 
.5926 0.000 *** 
(0.0481)   
    
Negative Interest 
Rate Message 
-0.5270 0.000 *** 
(0.1078)   
    
National 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-.0603 0.000 *** 
(0.0092)   
    
National Inflation 
Rate 
-.0110 0.000 *** 
(0.0024)   
    
Federal Reserve 
Board’s Funds 
Rate 
-.0804 0.000 *** 
(0.0048)   
Total Magnetic 
Field (1,000s) 
.1277 0.000 *** 
(0.0262)   
    
Constant 1.873 .000 *** 
 (0.375)   
 * P<.1 ** P<.05 *** P<.01 
 
 Using both previous models and Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, & King, 2001) 
(King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000) one can run simulations and see based on the sample 
that if the President is able to avoid commenting either negatively or positively on 
Table 62 Continued 
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deficits, the economy, inflation, and interest rates but unemployment, inflation, and the 
federal funds rate are at their historical averages the expected amount of volatility is 
11.36 units. This means that the distance between the daily high and low will be 11.36 
times the distance between the daily open and close. Therefore, a day the index opens at 
8000 and closed at 8005 could see a low-high range of 55 points. This analysis does not 
have anything to say about where on the continuum of market valuation the 55 points fall 
around the open and close space. Given the information available, we would expect on 
average that the market would remain roughly in the range of 7945 and 8060 points in 
this example. 
There is evidence that there is an impact on markets from presidential tone. First, 
positive, and negative tones on the deficit result in increases in volatility. Negative tones 
have a coefficient almost twice that of positive deficit statements. The context of deficit 
positive statements dealt with budget surpluses spurned uncertainty as to what 
government would do with those surpluses. In the context of negative statements, dealing 
with deficits the context is generally that continuing deficits could threaten solvency, 
dollar values, exports, consumer spending, and other critical aspects of the economy. It 
could be that the best way to use discussions of the deficit to reduce uncertainty and have 
less volatility in market indexes is not discuss the deficit. 
 Using Clarify (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000) to run simulations and estimate 
the effect on volatility when the President talks positive about only deficits and 
unemployment, interest rates, and inflation are at their historical average yields the 
following expected outcome on volatility. This is 6 units higher than when the President 
does not comment on deficits. When the President talks of deficits in negative terms, 
volatility increases significantly. The low-high range for the day is on average 17 times 
the distance of the daily open and close distance when the President speaks positively 
about deficits. This grows to 24 times on average when the President talks negatively 
about deficits, or twice the volatility as when the President refrains from messaging.  
Positive talk about the economy generally decreases volatility as measured by the 
ratio of the distance between the daily low and high and the distance between open and 
close. Negative talk about the economy results in lower volatility as well. Simulating the 
expected level of volatility and comparing the impact of presidential positive versus 
negative talk concerning inflation shows that negative talk results in lower volatility. A 
note of interest is that positive discussion of the economy puts volatility near, but still 
below, the historical average volatility for the composite index. Negative talk of the 
economy puts volatility well below the historical average volatility. 
 Analysis in this chapter shows that talk of inflation in positive terms results in a 
decrease in volatility while talk of inflation in negative terms results in an increase in 
volatility. In the sample, the coefficient of positive talk of inflation is almost 5 times as 
large as the coefficient for talking negatively about inflation when controlling for the 
total geomagnetic field strength. Positive presidential talk concerning inflation results in 
volatility that is 1/4th the historical average for the composite index and less than 1/4th the 
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volatility of when the President speaks negatively about inflation, which results in 
volatility that is higher than the historical average. 
  Previous analysis is evidence that positive talk of interest rates result in a counter-
intuitive conundrum for markets. Interest rates that are “good” are low rates. Low interest 
rates are generally indicative of an economy that is attempting to recover from some 
economic or financial misfortune. Also, low interest rates result in constant “guessing” 
and “projecting” that higher rates are imminent while markets react to rumors and 
attempt to interpret all messages related to rates to glean information as to when rates will 
increase and by how much. Increasing rates disrupts the economic and financial 
trajectories and changes the risk-reward calculus of today and the future. Positive talk of 
interest rates results in volatility that is almost twice the historical average volatility in the 
composite index. 
 Negative talk of interest rates generally deals with rates that are too high, rates 
that are choking off economic and financial innovation, growth, and strength. High rates 
are meant to do one of two things. First, they are designed to increase the cost of money 
so that economic growth will fall to sustainable levels, thereby avoiding inflation and 
smoothing out “boom-bust” cycles. Second, high interest rates are the critical tool in 
battling high inflation regardless of the reason for the inflation. Therefore, high rates 
signal to the market that the Federal Reserve is engaged and winning the fight on 
inflation and on track to manage an over-heated economy to a “soft landing.” More 
importantly, high rates rarely go higher. High rates are generally followed by lower rates 
as economic and financial management succeeds in either tames the economy and 
inflation or crashes the economy. Negative talk of interest rates as being too high 
guarantee an eventual decline in rates; which is a good thing from the market’s 
perspective. Therefore, the fact that positive presidential talk of interest rates results in 
increased uncertainty as to when rates will be forced higher by economic growth or 
inflation, while negative presidential talk of interest rates results in decreased uncertainty 
as market players start to look forward to a time of reduced interest rates and the 
accompanying growth. 
Negative talk about where interest rates are results in a decrease in volatility to 
almost ½ the historical average the composite index and 1/3rd of the volatility had the 
President talked positive instead. In this case, negative messaging ensures that the 
direction of the open and close of the market moves in the same direction as the high and 
low market value relationship in given days. Table 63 shows from left to right: 
1. The classification of the presidential messages included in the simulation. 
2. The estimated ratio of the daily low to high range divided by the daily open to 
close range.  
3. The lower 95% confidence interval value of the volatility ratio 
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4. The higher 95% confidence interval value of the volatility ratio. 
5. The set of dummy variables. Marked yes if the variable was valued at 1, 
marked no if the variable was valued at 0, for the simulation. 
6. The list of control variables set their sample mean.
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Table 63 Simulated estimated market volatility ratio determined by explanatory 
variables 
 
As unemployment, interest rates, and federal funds rates increase volatility 
decreases. These relationships are probably due to two facts. First, as these metrics 
deteriorate, the distance between open and close is probably all negative, or decreasing in 
value while the daily low and high represented by volatility stays close to the value of 
decline, meaning less volatility but a straight shot down in value. Second, as these values 
deteriorate, investors will become progressively more assured that action is on its way. 
Traditionally action taken to combat unemployment has been stimulus spending and jobs 
programs. Interest rates fall when economic activity is reduced and so is demand for 
liquidity in the market. To put the impact of the President’s signals in perspective see the 
impacts of changes in unemployment, interest rates, and federal funds rate on expected 
volatility..
 
    Dummy Variables (YES, NO or 1,0) 
    
Message 
Estimated 
Volatility 
Ratio 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Negative 
Deficit 
Message 
Negative 
Inflation 
Message 
Negative 
Economic 
Message 
Negative 
Interest 
Rate 
Message 
Positive 
Interest 
Rate 
Message 
Positive 
Deficit 
Message 
Positive 
Economic 
Message 
Positive 
Inflation 
Message  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEGATIVE 24.043 22.011 26.419 YES NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE 
NEGATIVE 14.132 11.438 16.82 NONE YES NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE 
NEGATIVE 8.257 7.735 8.811 NONE NONE YES NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE 
NEGATIVE 6.773 5.508 8.28 NONE NONE NONE YES NONE NONE NONE NONE 
NONE 11.365 11.255 11.478 NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE 
POSITIVE 20.609 18.624 22.679 NONE NONE NONE NONE YES NONE NONE NONE 
POSITIVE 17.346 16.454 18.355 NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE YES NONE NONE 
POSITIVE 9.776 9.321 10.28 NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE YES NONE 
POSITIVE 3.825 3.149 4.545 NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE YES 
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Figure 55 Simulated expected volatility given the unemployment rate with no presidential signals 
 
Figure 56 Simulated expected volatility given the interest rate with no presidential signals 
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Figure 57 Simulated expected volatility with no presidential signals and inflation 
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7.5 Volatility Scenarios 
 Let us look at the impact of presidential communications and the total magnetic 
field measure on volatility of the Dow Jones Index in different situations with simulations 
using the sample available. What would the measure of volatility be if we had a situation 
in which the President communicated positive information about the deficit, economy, 
inflation, and interest rates while unemployment, magnetic field, the fed funds rate, and 
inflation were all at their historical mean? Unemployment would be 6.5% or well above 
full employment, estimated to be 4%. Inflation would be higher than the Federal Reserve 
target of 3% at 3.6%. The fed funds rate would be at a high of 7.25%, which is much 
higher than recent history. The combination of high unemployment and high interest rates 
would in today’s market signal a President not in touch. However, over the historical 
period of analysis these values are quite possible. In the 1970s and early 1980s, interest 
rates were high to reduce inflation while unemployment was also high. Economists refer 
to periods like this as stagflation.  
 In this situation, the model would predict volatility measures between 7 and 11. 
Even in the worst case, this is below the historical average volatility. This may indicate 
that even in the face of economic data shouting negativity, in the face of total 
geomagnetic field effects, the President’s signals resulted in reduced volatility. If we 
replay the simulation for a day in which the President communicated only negative 
information to the public concerning the economy, inflation, the Federal Reserve rate, 
and unemployment the expected values for volatility show that negative messaging 
results in higher volatility than positive messaging. 
 Therefore, under the exact same circumstances, volatility increases by 33% when 
the President communicates negative messages about deficits, inflation, interest rates, and 
unemployment versus sending no message according to the simulation. Other control 
variables are included in the simulation, but they are set to their mean. In this and 
previous models of presidential messaging, it seems that while controlling for magnetic 
field positive presidential messages tends to result in greater volatility than negative 
presidential messages. This finding calls for future analysis. Presidents seem to design 
their messages to calm the market through reduction of volatility, or the up and down 
gyrations of the market around its open and close values. If this is true, then any 
messaging is ill advised, and positive messaging just makes the situation worse, even 
with the message validated by other economic data. 
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7.6 Presidential signaling and magnetic field 
Since some analysis on the effects of presidential signaling controlling for magnetic 
fields is complete, a graphical depiction of the impact of magnetic fields on volatility 
may be useful. Figure 58 shows the results of simulations based on statistical analysis of 
a sample and depicts the expected volatility ratio when the President communicates all 
positive messages, the other explanatory variables are at their means, but the magnetic 
field changes from its lowest to highest values. Figure 59 does the same for all negative 
presidential messaging. Both graphics depict the volatility ratio discussed previously in 
either an all positive or all negative presidential messaging environment. Additionally, 
interest rates, inflation, and unemployment are at their sample means. Finally, the graphic 
depicts volatility in relation to the value of the Total Geomagnetic Field.  
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 These two simulations show that in the sample when unemployment, inflation, 
and interest rates are at their historical average, and the President is all positive in signals, 
the changing magnetic field from its lowest value in the sample to its largest value in the 
sample is associated with the reduction of volatility. If the President is all-negative, 
changing magnetic field from lowest to highest value is associated with a decrease in 
volatility Allowing the magnetic field variable value to vary demonstrates that the control 
variable results in presidential signaling resulting in the market behavior desired. A 
negative presidential messages result in higher volatility than positive presidential 
messages and the effect is not only significant statistically it is substantial. 
If the President is not signaling, either positive or negative, changing the magnetic 
field from lowest value to highest value in the sample makes volatility look like Figure 
58, a simulation based on the statistical analysis of the data set. 
Figure 60 Simulated expected volatility of U.S. stock market without Presidential signals 
 
 Without the President to provide signals in the sample, the magnetic field moving 
from its lowest value in the sample to its highest value in the sample, decreases volatility. 
However, when magnetic field increases to its highest value in the sample the expected 
level of volatility, keeping unemployment, inflation, and interest rates at their mean and 
without presidential signals, falls. There are indications that presidential messaging does 
have an impact on moderating volatility in the stock market within the sample. 
 The analysis presented on presidential messaging centers around understanding 
the nature of the magnetic field’s effect on market volatility and what, if any, role it could 
pay in clarifying presidential rhetorical power as an influence on market volatility. The 
results have demonstrated a relationship among presidential signaling, magnetic fields, 
and the volatility of markets as measured by the ratio of the daily high and low and the 
final open and close values of the market index. While this measure has the weakness of 
not being able to differentiate among the different types of market moves and whether the 
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market moves up or down, it does provide a useful proxy for market volatility in an 
absolute and relative sense. Further analysis using a more precise measure of market 
movements in relation to their direction and magnitude would have needed to make any 
definitive statements on this topic. However, including the magnetic field in Martin’s 
models resulted in an increase in efficiency, an increase in significance, compelling 
simulations, and estimates of effect for both variables, and a richer context within which 
to understand the dynamics of presidential rhetorical power in relation to market 
behavior. 
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Chapter 8  Conclusion: Rationality, Uncertainty, Fuzziness, Chaos and Risk 
 One of the first works that examined examples of systemic irrationality is the 
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds by Charles Mackay and 
published in 1841.  His book described a number of historical European examples of 
mass hysteria, manias, bubbles, and systemic irrationality. He examines one of the 
earliest examples of economic bubbles, the Mississippi Company of 1684-1720. The 
bubble began in 1719 when the Company was given monopoly over the French territory 
of Louisiana and earned a monopoly on all French naval commerce and burst in 1720. 
Around the same time, Britain suffered from the South Sea Bubble, caused by the 
granting of monopoly trading rights with South America to the British public-private 
partnership called the South Sea Company. The company stock soared in value and 
finally burst in 1720. There was never a realistic expectation that the company could 
make a profit, as England and Spain were involved in the War of the Spanish Succession 
and all of South America was a Spanish colony.  Mackay also detailed the Dutch Tulip 
mania that occurred during an outbreak of plague and a break in the Thirty Years War in 
the early 1600’s. Of particular interest is Mackay’s analysis of other non-economic 
mania.  For instance, he argues that the entire period of the Crusades was but a mania of 
the Middle Ages. He also classifies the 16th and 17th century witch hunts as mania. He 
has a number of other mania examples such as haunted houses, duels, and fashion trends 
such as haircuts and facial hair (Mackay, 2009). 
A later work examines crowd psychology and concludes that crowds act in ways 
that are irrational. He asserts that crowds have reduced ability to reason, have their own 
unique sentiments and morality, their own crowd-beliefs, and take on definitive 
characteristics with definable and identifiable characteristics. These crowds act as an 
organism that find itself stimulated and affected by outside influences as one entity and 
not as a group of individuals (Le Bon, 2002). 
Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises by Charles P. 
Kindleberger, and in later editions Robert Aliber, is a much more contemporary look at 
modern economic mania, or economic bubbles. Kindleberger retraces Mackay’s steps 
and examines the early manias of France, Britain and the Dutch. He then examines the 
U.S. stock price bubble from 1927 to 1929 and again from 1995 to 2000, loans to 
developing countries in the 1970s, Japanese real estate in the late 1980s and southeast 
Asia in the 1990s, and finally the real estate bubbles from 2002 to 2007. The themes 
running through the book are rationality became subsumed and decision making became 
corrupted as a result of the recall ability fallacy and a collective willingness to forget 
economic theory and that the Minsky Instability Hypothesis holds true. The Minsky 
Instability Hypothesis states that periods of economic stability leads to periods of 
instability as risk becomes increasingly ignored. This implies that the longer stability is 
present, the more risk is ignored.  When the risk finally manifests itself the system is not 
prepared and incapable of mitigating the impacts of that risk and instability results.  This 
argues that a systemic process of stability followed by instability occurs (Kindleberger & 
Aliber, 2011). 
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The mania that Mackay identified with the Crusades has been resurrected in the 
form of Jihad, Intifada, and most recently suicide warfare. Suicide Warfare: Cuture, the 
Military, and the Individual as a Weapon by Rosemarie Skaine, details the evolution and 
growth of the suicide bomber mania that seemed to grip the Muslim world from the 
1990s to today (Skaine, 2013). 
UFO hysteria swept the United States and England in the 1950s and lasted 
through the 1980s.  The most authoritative work to debunk UFOs is David Clarke and 
Andy Roberts Out of the Shadows UFOs, the Establishment & The Official Cover-Up. 
Clarke and Roberts show that UFO sightings were largely founded in first and second 
generation radar systems and the Cold War. U.S. and British interceptor scrambles and 
military responses to poor quality radar information fed the hysteria. Government cover-
ups to hide the inability of the government to explain the radar images and the desire to 
not let Cold War enemies know how many false positives the radar systems were 
reporting gave legitimacy to the growing conspiracy theorists. But Clarke and Roberts 
could not explain conditions drove membership in the UFO hysteria, or what made 
people see or feel that they had witnessed or experienced encounters with UFOs. As far 
as they could go in their conclusions is that as radars improved in reliability the number 
of UFO sightings, and the scope of the UFO hysteria, has been significantly reduced 
(Clarke & Roberts, 2002). 
Some irrational phenomena of the last twenty years include the U.S. obsession 
with “beanie babies”, the original gold rush that brought British, Spanish, French, and 
Dutch colonists to the new world in the 17th Century (Thomas, 2005), Y2K fears (Hunt, 
1999), collecting the U.S. State Quarter series (Quarter Mania Grips States, 2005), 
pandemic flu (Silverman, 2007), zombies (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2011), and fear of nuclear power (Der Spiegel, 2011).  These can be considered system-
wide mass phenomena depending on how you define the system you are evaluating.  
Y2K, pandemic flu, fear of nuclear power, and gold rushes were truly global mass 
phenomena. Each was based on an irrational fear or irrational belief in a possible return. 
While it is possible that one can argue these phenomena were actually based on risk 
analysis that validated responses to the conditions at the time, such an argument would go 
against what we know about how people, groups, and communities think, make decisions, 
and evaluate information (Sloman, 2009) (Klein, 1999) (Janis, 1982). 
Outcomes and choices that are irrational may have their root in one of several 
dynamics. First, and most obvious, is that some psychological, physiological, or deviancy 
leads people who perform irrational acts to do so regardless of the cost-benefit analysis. 
Some people, regardless of the cost, will commit vile, stupid, or utterly counter-
productive acts (Chai, 2009). Under these assumptions, models of outcomes that seem 
irrational are explained by biological or psychological variables that lead individuals or 
aggregates of individuals to do things that are either risky or assuredly directly counter to 
rationality (Jacoby, 2000) (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). These types of models 
of “deviance” are not satisfactory, interesting, or aesthetically pleasing. Placing 
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explanatory and predictive power in the hands of a group’s genes, DNA, biology, and 
psychological health seems problematic as it is practically and ethically prohibitive to use 
such variables in models for most useful policy purposes. 
Less problematic have been attempts to define the environmental stress and 
opportunities that lead people with only a “propensity” to commit “irrational acts” to 
commit them. In these models, socioeconomic status, societal stress, and breakdown of 
economic opportunity “drive” people and groups to prey upon others (Lea, 1999).  
Further refinement of these models added the effects of environmental factors that led to 
an increase in “opportunity” to commit irrational acts. Examples of this would be 
reduced policing in a community, increased access to capital in investment markets, or a 
country that has failed to maintain its military equipment resulting in a substantial 
inferiority of arms. 
In the previous examples, the models with “irrational” outcomes showed how 
either the biological proclivity or the environment “pushed/drove” actors and groups of 
actors into making decisions, choices, or executing actions that were detrimental. 
Another way of looking at the problem, and perhaps more sophisticated, is by looking at 
the decision-making process as information dependent. However, a possible relationship 
exists among the environment, biology, and the outcome that isn’t grounded in genes. 
This possibility is that an effect on the perception is occurring. It could be that the error 
range that exists within models explaining/predicting behavior results from the influence 
of independent variables of interest.  It could be that pushing-motivating-influencing 
actors to make the choices they do and moving them towards an outcome that the 
variables of interest makes it more difficult to determine the relationships among 
variables and the outcome as it adds uncertainty to an actor’s decision making process.  
This is different from a lack of information leading to unfortunate outcomes. Rather it is a 
fundamental “clouding” of the decision space. Even with the correct information, the 
decision space might be unclear and the relationships among the choices and between the 
choices and each outcome are difficult to evaluate. 
“Random” outcomes and choices become more understandable in relation to why 
success at one point and failure at another, given similar conditions, is reduced. It is 
possible that much “irrationality” as defined by outcomes can be explained within this 
“clouded” decision space. If this clouded space could be defined or modeled then the 
discipline would benefit from being able to bring actors and models in line with its 
rationality assumptions and be able to deal with the paradoxes created in Social Choice 
Theory (Gaertner, 2006) and economics (Bairoch, 1995). Currently Political Science 
attempts to deal with these issues by defining uncertainty and using “fuzzy” logic. 
The concept of rationality had been so well defined and so accepted by most 
actors it became a central theme for managing risk and maximizing utility.  While 
theorists were developing concepts of uncertainty, risk, and management of risk, the 
concepts of rationality remained implicit in their models, their arguments, and their 
conclusions. The concept of maximum utility is itself a “rational” concept. In it, utility 
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can be defined and actors rationally pursue it to its maximum possible value given the 
conditions under which the actor is operating. 
While the development of probability theory and “chance” models took off and 
began to be increasingly useful and powerful tools for describing and even modeling the 
world from the 1920s to the 1990s, everything that rested its core on the concept of the 
“rational” came under attack from a growing group of divergent research paradigms and 
programs. 
The chinks in the “rational” armor began to show as thinking about rational acts 
and defined interests began to frame them in terms of “norms” that are interests that drive 
action. Norms provide a baseline that can reinforce, coincide, or rationalize interests 
(Elster J. ). Likewise, norms create obligatory or expected behavior and provide the basis 
for determining deviation from the norm.  In this situation, deviation from the norm 
would be associated with deviation from rationality. Moving from the norm would result 
in social ire, negative feedback, and require resources to move back in line with the norm. 
However, this does not preclude the baseline, or norm, from shifting.  Indeed, the norm 
would move throughout a space of possible conditions with what is “the norm” changing 
over time. It is possible that what in the short term is not a norm will be a norm in the 
long term. An irrational act comes to be seen rational it also comes to be seen as the 
“norm.”  Examples of this include same-sex relationships, protests for civil rights, or 
protests against war. 
Some have articulated an argument that social scientists have tackled the issue 
incorrectly from the beginning. Social scientists concocted a world in which they based 
their analysis on the idea that individuals use deductive reasoning. Further, deductive 
reasoning as a process was viewed as efficient, constrained primarily by the quality and 
amount of information available for evaluation. Individuals and states acting in the 
political, military and economic sphere would act in rational ways based on the 
information available. If actions looked irrational, it was only because the observer did 
not have the complete set of bounded information that the actor in question possessed. 
This approach was able to address the criticism that arose as the discipline became more 
interested in defining cultural factors affecting decision making.  Cultural factors were 
defined as information inputs to the deductive reasoning process. 
While one group rested their theories on deductive reasoning, another developed 
theories based on inductive reasoning. They believe that humans, states, and 
organizations act in accordance with inductive reasoning: they induce a number of 
working hypotheses, act upon what seems to be the most credible, and, if the chosen 
hypothesis ceases to work, replace it with a new one (Arthur, 1994). It is in this context 
that decision makers are influenced by what would be considered non-rational biological, 
physiological and psychological factors in the formation of their inductive hypothesis. 
Finally, the rise of institutionalism and rational theory has brought about the study 
of institutions, such as the state, and its rational decisions as well as the human – 
233 
 
  
institution interaction within a rational context. One group of institutionalists attempted to 
incorporate institutional constraints into the traditional rational-choice theory. In this 
hybrid theory, institutions place constraints on individual behavior based on economic 
rationality. Another group uses the concept of bounded rationality and defined 
institutions as the vessel to which individual rational behavior is cultivated and promoted. 
The first group adds variables that account for institutional effects on rational choice, 
while the second group defines the boundaries of rational choice according to the 
institutions the individuals are operating within.  The primary criticism of these 
approaches is how far apart the rationalist assumption and real situations are from each 
other in every day activity (Kato, 1996). 
Another of the many critical issues of the rational concept in political science is 
that of the difficulty associated with isolating a winning strategy, which results in the 
“winning strategy” or “higher payoff.” Individuals who perceive the world around them 
in a certain way will find it difficult to identify a strategy that will give them maximum 
payoff if the world works in a manner anathema to the way they see it (Conn, Meltz, & 
Press, 1973). The workers who choose to strike thinking that their labor is a critical part 
of customer’s shopping experience may find that customer’s get quite used to packing 
their own grocery bags or pulling an item from an open box instead of off a shelf. 
Likewise, a state that perceives that its cotton is essential to the economic wellbeing of 
the world’s premier military, economic, and political power will see going to war with a 
state three times its industrial and demographic might as a rational act, never realizing 
that the world’s premier power can get its cotton from elsewhere (Adams, 2008). 
Two identified limitations exist in determining an individual’s capability of 
choosing the correct maximizing strategy. The first is the resources required to identify 
and choose strategies. The second is the resources necessary to enact a strategy (Conn, 
1973). Likewise, without understanding the rules of the game, individuals cannot choose 
outcomes rationally. For example, without knowing the methods by which federal and 
state authorities rate school performance or their capabilities, schools cannot rationally 
proportion resources. 
In reply to the question of what decision is “rational,” it is rational for an 
individual to choose a specific thing or a specific outcome in a given situation, given the 
information that is available and evaluated and given a standard for that evaluation. In 
this definition, rationality means that for an individual’s choice to be rational, the 
individual must determine and evaluate the full set of possible outcomes and then rank 
those outcomes in preferential order. It therefore involves three considerations: the 
identification of the possible alternatives of choice, identification of what the outcomes of 
choice are, and then the conduct of an evaluation to rank the desirability of the identified 
outcomes (Conrad, 1970).  Further, because individuals order their preferences and 
choose the one with the highest payoff, the observed choice is always the rational choice. 
This concept of rationality is only useful beyond the heuristic if preferences are also static 
(Conn, 1973). 
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Modern decision theory represents the fundamental theory (Spohn, UNK) of 
rationality. It attempts to work out the issue of how to determine rationality through 
outcomes, or whether the beliefs, desires, actions, and outcomes of decisions result in a 
rational expenditure of “capital” for the outcome received. It systematizes all rationality 
claims and believes that the decision itself, versus the outcome, is the proper level of 
analysis. Decisions should be determined rational by the relative rationality of the beliefs 
and evaluations undertaken by the choice maker. These beliefs and evaluations can 
themselves, in turn, be assessed as rational in relation to other’s beliefs and evaluations. 
In this paradigm an outcome can be irrational while all decisions leading to it were 
rational. Likewise the outcome can be perfectly rational while the decisions leading to it 
were irrational. 
Max Weber, the father of the modern typology of rationality, established four 
types of rationality: practical, theoretical, substantive, and formal. Practical rationality, 
according to Weber, is that reasoning in which actions are evaluated in relation to an 
individual’s personal interests, whatever those interests may be at the time of the action. 
The second, theoretical rationality comes from a concerted effort to understand reality 
through complex concepts instead of action. Substantive rationality directly orders action 
into patterns. This is done based on a complex and holistic measure of value in relation 
to past, present, and potential values as clusters of outcomes. Formal rationality uses 
universally applied rules, laws and regulations to calculate means-end rational tendency 
(Kalberg, 1980). 
The common aspect of these approaches to rationality is a mental process that 
attempts to master reality through understanding the values of choices in reference to the 
outcome of those choices (Kalberg, 1980). Also common to most of the views on 
rational theory is the absence of a discussion of what influences the risk acceptance and 
risk perception of the individuals making choices.  Yet a characteristic must exist that 
influences the ability of an individual to process information in a logical and rational 
manner. In this instance, rational means accurately interpreting information, measuring 
its influence on the situation, understanding how it could probabilistically influence the 
outcome of decisions, and assessing whether the second- and third-order effects of a 
decision line up in accordance with the individuals values, goals, and desires. 
The same characteristic would also explain why it is that people become more or 
less risk acceptant. In other words, risk acceptance is not a force, but a misperceived 
event that occurs because of an inability to process and evaluate information accurately 
and precisely. Much like the centrifugal force in physics is not a force at all, just a 
combination of the effects of inertia and a direction change, the force of risk acceptance is 
a consequence of factors that make information processing inaccurate and imprecise. The 
result is the illusion of risk acceptance or risk aversion. The illusion also fosters 
arguments over what is rational and irrational as theorists battle to explain peoples’ 
actions when they are, from the perspective of an outside observer, clearly damaging to 
the actors goals and desires and those actions hurt the actor. 
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Geomagnetic fields affect these discussions in several ways. First, magnetic field 
would affect cognitive processes and reasoning in ways that would measurably impact 
views of utility. It also would affect subjective considerations as well as perceived risk. 
Differing measures of magnetic field would make different people with the same 
information perceive risk differently. Qualitative assessments of value and risk change 
with measures of the magnetic field fields. Theoretically, magnetic field could be 
responsible for much of the variance in not only processes of evaluation, valuation, and 
risk assessments but in the resulting outcomes.  Magnetic field may have influence on the 
rate of regression to the mean and the size of the variance around the mean. 
Magnetic fields would impact the fundamental components of analysis. The very 
process of measurement, whose efficiency, accuracy, and precision are critical to valid 
data, is affected by magnetic field’s push of mental and cognitive processes closer to or 
further way from “rational” adherence to established standards and rules. Analysis using 
data through deduction or induction would be affected by magnetic field in ways that 
would influence outcomes using both processes. 
It is of critical importance that geomagnetic field measures are included in the full 
range of processes that go into “rational” models and analysis. It offers measurable and 
significant influence on the act of collecting data, interpreting data, perceiving data and 
relationships, understanding linkages, how people perceive risk, how people assign value, 
and tendency to cooperate or not. 
Statistical models that predict or explain outcomes using average effects of 
measurable variables possess uncertainty, which is inherent in their data, measurements, 
and depiction of the relationship among the variables. The uncertainty can be divided 
into two types; systematic uncertainty and random uncertainty. Systematic uncertainty 
causes measures to be skewed in certain directions that are consistent. Random 
uncertainties are variations in measurement that are often inconsistent and remain so after 
systemic uncertainty has been corrected, either through techniques of measurement, the 
inclusion of additional information, or theoretically thorough model building and 
storytelling. 
A key point when dealing with uncertainty is that effective decision making is not 
possible without rationality and measurement. Rational decision makers use available 
information without recourse to bias, and any errors are made in their analysis or 
predictions are a consequence of random errors. Rational decision makers understand 
their preferences and use available information to meet their preferences (Bernstein P. , 
1998). 
Several works have addressed the issues associated with uncertainty and political 
choice as it is affected by perception (Alvarez M. R., 1992) (Bartels, 1986) (Franklin, 
1991) (Palfrey & Poole, 1987) (Shepsle, 1972) as well as that associated with response to 
surveys (Zaller & Feldman, 1992).  The two methods so far devised for measuring 
uncertainty in political choice are indirect measurement (Alvarez M. R., 1992) (Bartels, 
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1986) and indirect modeled (Franklin, 1991). The indirect method primarily involves 
having survey question responses that indicate the level of surety the respondent has in 
their answers (Alvarez & Franklin, 1994). The modeled method involves estimating 
uncertainty as a parameter in the model (Franklin, 1991). 
This research attempted to characterize how decisions might grapple with 
uncertainty, but it did so by focusing on a natural phenomenon that could interfere with 
how they attempted to make rational decisions in the face of uncertainty: geomagnetic 
fields.  The many models and analyses presented here could not provide a definitive 
answer to any one question about the relevance or usefulness of including magnetic field 
variable(s) in traditional models of  behavioral outcomes, because it moved over the 
models in summary form and lacked the space to develop any one of them fully. Instead 
it presented a series of statistical relationships across a number of sub-disciplinary 
subjects at each level of analysis from the system down to the individual. 
The findings were that in a great many number of cases, magnetic field variables 
were significant predictors, as judged by the traditionally accepted minimal level of 
confidence and in most of these cases far surpassed it. Often, using simulation software 
and graphical presentation the expected effects of magnetic fields were illustrated to be 
consequential. These results still would need to hold up in the face of additional control 
variables, as well as likely adjustments for autocorrelation and other model assumptions 
that might not be sustainable.  Nevertheless, for such a unconventional explanatory 
variable in Political Science, it offers a suggestive start. 
The growing literature discussing and analyzing the possible effects of magnetic 
fields on human and group behavior is compelling. Even the Federal Reserve has 
conducted an analysis of the effects of magnetic fields on stock market performance.  The 
growing medical evidence that magnetic fields affect biological and physiological 
systems supports the behavioral analysis. The mechanism of influence is compelling and 
research on it is ongoing. This basis points to a possible future for a program of study 
that evaluates how the magnetic field can help reduce uncertainty in models.  The 
potential implications are varied and relevant: 
First, evidence that magnetic fields influence decision making, risk taking, and 
behavioral outcomes is not an argument for deterministic approach to behavior. Instead it 
points to an  easily measured and used metric of the exogenous influences on decision 
making.  It potentially offers a variable that bridges the gap between theories of 
rationality and what actually happens in the world. 
Second, it offers a basis for looking at the international system as more than a 
space. The magnetic field is a characteristic of the space, a defining characteristic of the 
international system that is separate from and influences state behavior. Magnetic fields 
offer a possible solution to the problem of anarchy as the only defined characteristic of 
the international system that does not arise out of state interaction. 
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Third, magnetic fields could provide invaluable information to law enforcement. 
Estimated magnetic field effects are relevant and considerable. It is safe to assume that 
other unidentified factors act to suppress the impact of magnetic field changes. However, 
the power and efficiencies associated with the crime-magnetic field analysis begs for its 
inclusion in policy, resourcing, and pre-emptive planning to manage crime risk. 
Fourth, market volatility response to magnetic fields indicates a possible link in 
the chain of investor and market behavior. As participation in markets continues to grow 
in depth and breadth it will be important to identify and leverage all the variables 
influencing market behavior. As social norms change and individuals become 
increasingly dependent on and engaged in market activities it is important that any 
possible relationship between magnetic fields, or system characteristic, and actor 
behavior and market behavior be fully analyzed and recognized. 
Finally, magnetic fields as information for policy makers may be a useful tool.  
Magnetic fields may be able to allow policy makers to apportion resources in line with 
increases or decreases in probability associated with crime. It can inform national budget 
makers that much of the variance in U.S. budgets may be related to magnetic fields.  
Defense policy and mission planners can take magnetic fields into account when doing 
contingency and crisis planning. Magnetic fields are associated with coups and terrorism 
as well as insurgency operations and success. While not fully explored within this work, 
many applications exist that would carry policy relevance: the Federal Reserve, 
mitigating suicide, abortion, and political and judicial consensus building are just a few of 
the surveyed relationships within this work. 
Future research should expand on the research that seems to hold the greatest 
promise and utility for policy makers and in helping understand human behavior. The 
first area that meets these criteria is crime and magnetic fields. An exogenous variable, 
such as magnetic fields that can aid in refining probabilities of criminal acts occurring by 
location and count, without recourse to racial or economic profiling could prove to be 
very useful. The second area of potential use is in managing the international system. 
The probability of disputes, wars, and escalation across the full range of potential 
magnetic field values indicate that magnetic fields could have a relevant and significant 
effect on state behavior, both conflict and cooperation behaviors. 
If these conclusions are true, information on the magnetic field could become a 
valuable tool in predicting, managing, mitigating, and resolving interstate disputes. If the 
breadth of magnetic field influences significant models presented in this survey persist as 
research digs deeper into each area then any field whose research is related to individual 
or group behaviors may find value in controlling for the magnetic field. Its 
pervasiveness, variance, and demonstrated possible influence make a compelling case to 
not ignore this exogenous, causally prior variable that happens to be a characteristic of 
the very space in which actors operate. 
Copyright © Jackie R. East 2014  
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Table 65 A
ppendix I: B
ivariate A
nalysis w
ith M
agnetic Field M
easurem
ents (1 of 6) 
 
 
A
p Index 
C
9 Index 
D
ependent 
V
ariable 
M
odel 
Type 
C
oefficients 
and Standard 
Error 
Significance 
Level 
O
bs 
A
dj 
R
2 
C
oef &
 
Std Error 
Significance 
Level 
O
bs 
A
dj 
R
2 
 
M
isery Index 
R
egression 
0.2431 
0.0950 
* 
48 
0.0391 
2.4440 
0.0090 
*** 
42 
0.1397 
  
(0.1424) 
 
 
 
 
(3.3207) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
U
nem
ploym
ent 
R
egression 
0.1438 
0.0040 
*** 
48 
0.1446 
1.5282 
0.0000 
*** 
42 
0.4112 
  
(3.7980) 
 
 
 
 
(1.6205) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Inflation 
R
egression 
0.0969 
0.4280 
- 
41 
-
0.0090 
0.8688 
0.2500 
- 
40 
0.0092 
  
(3.0141) 
 
 
 
 
(2.0446) 
 
 
 
 
  
N
um
ber of 
People in Labor 
Force 
U
nem
ployed 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
R
egression 
171.1526 
0.0570 
* 
42 
0.3321 
1982.423 
0.0000 
*** 
42 
0.3321 
  
(87.4904) 
 
 
 
 
(428.706
4) 
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(1,000s) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Percent G
D
P 
C
hange From
 
Start to End of 
Y
ear 
R
egress 
-0.1134 
0.2010 
- 
27 
0.0272 
-0.2454 
0.7210 
- 
22 
-
0.0432 
  
(0.0863) 
 
 
 
 
(0.6788) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
A
ll C
rim
es 
A
nnually 
(1,000s) 
Poisson 
0.0197 
0.0000 
*** 
43 
0.0434 
0.1682 
0.0000 
*** 
42 
0.0853 
  
(0.0004) 
 
 
 
 
(0.0023) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
M
urders 
A
nnually 
(1,000s) 
Poisson 
0.0228 
0.0150 
** 
43 
0.0225 
0.1592 
0.0060 
*** 
42 
0.0301 
  
(0.0093) 
 
 
 
 
(0.0574) 
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Table 66 A
ppendix I: B
ivariate A
nalysis w
ith M
agnetic Field M
easurem
ents (2 of 6) 
 
 
A
p Index 
C
9 Index 
D
ependent 
V
ariable 
M
odel 
Type 
C
oefficients 
and Standard 
Error 
Significance 
Level 
O
bs 
A
dj R
2 
C
oefficients 
and Standard 
Error 
Significance 
Level 
O
bs 
A
dj R
2 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
R
apes 
A
nnually 
(1,000s) 
Poisson 
0.0240 
0.0000 
*** 
43 
0.0272 
0.2086 
0.0000 
*** 
42 
0.0557 
  
(0.0047) 
 
 
 
 
(0.0293) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
R
obberies 
A
nnually 
(1,000s) 
Poisson 
0.0316 
0.0000 
*** 
43 
.0739 
0.2421 
0.0000 
*** 
42 
0.1158 
  
(0.0018) 
 
 
 
 
(0.0117) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
A
ssaults 
A
nnually 
(1,000s) 
Poisson 
0.0209 
0.0000 
*** 
43 
0.0224 
0.1904 
0.0000 
*** 
42 
0.0504 
  
(0.0015) 
 
 
 
 
(0.0095) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Property 
C
rim
es 
A
nnually 
(1,000s) 
Poisson 
0.0191 
0.0000 
*** 
43 
0.0430 
0.1630 
0.0000 
*** 
42 
0.0853 
  
(0.0004) 
 
 
 
 
(0.0025) 
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Strike 
O
ccurring in 
A
rgentina 
Probit 
0.0022 
0.0840 
* 
27728 
0.0011 
-0.0124 
0.3110 
- 
27728 
0.0004 
  
(0.0013) 
 
 
 
 
(0.0123) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
N
um
ber of 
Strikes 
Initiated on 
a D
ay that 
H
as 
A
rgentine 
Strikes 
Initiated 
Poisson 
0.0015 
0.0000 
*** 
208 
0.0014 
-0.2110 
0.0000 
*** 
208 
0.0328 
  
(0.0003) 
 
 
 
 
(0.0100) 
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  Table 67 A
ppendix I: B
ivariate A
nalysis w
ith M
agnetic Field M
easurem
ents (3 of 6) 
  
 
A
p Index 
C
9 Index 
D
ependent 
V
ariable 
M
odel 
Type 
C
oefficients 
and Standard 
Error 
Significance 
Level 
O
bs 
A
dj R
2 
C
oefficients 
and Standard 
Error 
Significance 
Level 
O
bs 
A
dj R
2 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
N
um
ber of 
A
bortions 
Perform
ed 
on all races 
of w
om
en 
(1,000s) 
Poisson 
0.0715 
0.0000 
*** 
26 
0.1089 
0.0716 
0.0000 
*** 
26 
0.1100 
  
(0.0086) 
 
 
 
 
(0.0085) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Proportion 
of A
bortions 
to Live 
B
irths for all 
R
aces of 
W
om
en 
R
egression 
3.7506 
0.0680 
* 
28 
0.0884 
18.9406 
0.1100 
- 
27 
0.0631 
  
(1.9718) 
 
 
 
 
(11.4217) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
1000’s 
A
bortions 
Perform
ed 
on W
hite 
W
om
en 
R
egression 
17.1508 
0.0210 
** 
28 
0.1585 
70.4057 
0.1090 
- 
27 
0.0638 
  
(6.9534) 
 
 
 
 
(42.2987) 
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(1000’s) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Proportion 
of A
bortions 
to Live 
B
irths for 
W
hite 
W
om
en 
R
egression 
4.9996 
0.0720 
* 
28 
0.0856 
27.4134 
0.0850 
* 
27 
0.0788 
  
(2.6624) 
 
 
 
 
(15.2703) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
N
um
ber of 
A
bortions 
Perform
ed 
on M
inority 
W
om
en 
R
egression 
0.0373 
0.9920 
- 
28 
-0.0385 
-23.8372 
0.2670 
- 
27 
0.0110 
  
(3.6280) 
 
 
 
 
(20.9998) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Proportion 
of A
bortions 
to Live 
B
irths for 
M
inority 
W
om
en 
R
egression 
-0.9833 
0.5110 
- 
28 
-0.0210 
-11.1947 
0.2060 
- 
27 
0.0256 
  
(1.4744) 
 
 
 
 
(8.6305) 
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Table 68 A
ppendix I: B
ivariate A
nalysis w
ith M
agnetic Field M
easurem
ents (4 of 6) 
  
 
A
p Index 
C
9 Index 
D
ependent 
V
ariable 
M
odel 
Type 
C
oefficients 
and Standard 
Error 
Significance 
Level 
O
bs 
A
dj R
2 
C
oefficients 
and Standard 
Error 
Significance 
Level 
O
bs 
A
dj R
2 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Total SA
T 
Scores 
M
ale and 
Fem
ale 
R
egression 
-0.2962 
0.2680 
- 
198 
0.0012 
-3.5795 
0.0320 
** 
180 
0.0201 
  
(0.2669) 
 
 
 
 
(1.6564) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Fem
ale 
M
ath SA
T 
Score 
R
egression 
-0.4297 
0.3460 
- 
33 
-0.0026 
-4.5430 
0.0540 
* 
29 
0.0981 
  
(0.4486) 
 
 
 
 
(2.2585) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Fem
ale 
V
erbal 
SA
T 
Score 
R
egression 
-0.3043 
0.4040 
- 
33 
-0.0089 
-2.0248 
0.4180 
- 
29 
-0.0117 
  
(0.3595) 
 
 
 
 
(2.4600) 
 
 
 
 
M
ale 
M
ath SA
T 
Score 
R
egression 
-0.4010 
0.1930 
- 
33 
0.0235 
-3.8554 
0.0090 
*** 
29 
0.2003 
  
(0.3014) 
 
 
 
 
(1.3619) 
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M
ale 
V
erbal 
SA
T 
Score 
R
egression 
-0.0463 
0.8780 
- 
33 
-0.0315 
-0.2163 
0.9160 
- 
29 
-0.0366 
  
(0.2991) 
 
 
 
 
(2.0350) 
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Table 69 A
ppendix I: B
ivariate A
nalysis w
ith M
agnetic Field M
easurem
ents (5 of 6) 
 
 
 
A
p Index 
C
9 Index 
D
ependent 
V
ariable 
M
odel 
Type 
C
oefficients 
and Standard 
Error 
Significance 
Level 
O
bs 
A
dj R
2 
C
oefficients 
and Standard 
Error 
Significance 
Level 
O
bs 
A
dj R
2 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e 
C
ourt 
C
onsensus 
Percentage 
R
egression 
-0.8236 
0.1000 
- 
11 
0.1912 
-1.5000 
0.2750 
- 
11 
0.0338 
  
(0.4490) 
 
 
 
 
(0.9039) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e 
C
ourt 
Percent 
A
ffirm
ed 
C
ases 
R
egression 
-0.4561 
0.6300 
- 
11 
-0.0812 
-1.3693 
0.4260 
- 
11 
-0.0316 
  
(0.9135) 
 
 
 
 
(1.6437) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e 
C
ourt 
Percent 
O
ver-ruled 
Low
er 
C
ourt C
ases 
R
egression 
0.3877 
0.4190 
- 
11 
-0.0291 
1.3693 
0.4260 
- 
11 
-0.0316 
  
(0.4579) 
 
 
 
 
(1.6437) 
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G
eneral 
A
viation 
A
ccident 
C
ounts 
Poisson 
0.1268 
0.0000 
*** 
11 
0.0219 
0.1237 
0.0000 
*** 
11 
0.0211 
  
(0.0140) 
 
 
 
 
(0.0139) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
D
eaths in 
A
viation 
A
ccident 
C
ounts 
Poisson 
0.3617 
0.0000 
*** 
11 
0.0166 
0.3726 
0.0000 
*** 
11 
0.0177 
  
(0.0629) 
 
 
 
 
(0.0627) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Predicted 
C
hange in 
probability 
of a change 
in Freedom
 
H
ouse 
Scores as 
predicted 
by a Probit 
M
odel 
R
egression 
0.0370 
0.0230 
** 
1091 
0.0038 
0.1286 
0.2350 
- 
1091 
0.0004 
  
(0.0163) 
 
 
 
 
(0.1083) 
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Table 70 A
ppendix I: B
ivariate A
nalysis w
ith M
agnetic Field M
easurem
ents (6 of 6) 
 
 
A
p Index 
C
9 Index 
D
ependent V
ariable 
M
odel 
Type 
C
oef &
 
Std Error 
Significance 
Level 
O
bs 
A
dj R
2 
C
oef &
 Std 
Error 
Significance 
Level 
O
bs 
A
dj 
R
2 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
3 M
onth Treasury 
B
ond Interest R
ates 
(A
nnual A
verage 
R
ates) 
R
egression 
0.1616 
0.1120 
- 
44 
0.0366 
1.4840 
0.0140 
** 
41 
0.1238 
  
(.0997) 
 
 
 
 
(0.5754) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
C
orporate B
ond 
Interest R
ates on A
aa 
M
oody's R
ated B
onds 
R
egression 
0.1958 
0.0460 
** 
44 
0.0701 
1.9280 
0.0010 
*** 
41 
0.2285 
  
(0.0950) 
 
 
 
 
(0.5379) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
C
orporate B
ond 
Interest R
ates on B
aa 
M
oody's R
ated B
onds 
R
egression 
0.2270 
0.0420 
** 
44 
0.0735 
2.2122 
0.0010 
*** 
41 
0.2300 
  
(0.1081) 
 
 
 
 
(0.6148) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
unicipal B
ond 
Interest R
ates (H
igh 
Q
uality) 
R
egression 
0.1761 
0.0260 
** 
41 
0.0909 
1.5905 
0.0010 
*** 
41 
0.2300 
  
(0.0765) 
 
 
 
 
(0.4420) 
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M
ortgage Interest 
R
ates (A
nnual) 
R
egression 
0.3389 
0.0000 
*** 
40 
0.2638 
2.0861 
0.0000 
*** 
38 
0.3320 
  
(0.0875) 
 
 
 
 
(0.4737) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Prim
e Interest R
ate 
(A
nnual) 
R
egression 
0.2181 
0.0770 
* 
44 
0.0503 
2.0311 
0.0060 
*** 
41 
0.1550 
  
(0.1205) 
 
 
 
 
(0.7034) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
D
iscount Interest R
ate 
(A
nnual) 
R
egression 
0.1517 
0.1250 
- 
44 
0.0327 
1.3914 
0.0160 
** 
41 
0.1168 
  
(0.0969) 
 
 
 
 
(0.5547) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Federal Funds Interest 
R
ate (A
nnual) 
R
egression 
0.1978 
0.1100 
- 
44 
0.0374 
1.8199 
0.0140 
** 
41 
0.1244 
  
(0.1210) 
 
 
 
 
(0.7039) 
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  A
ppendix II: The Total (F) Field Strength 
Table 71 A
ppendix II: B
ivariate A
nalysis w
ith the total m
agnetic field, F. (1 of 3) 
  
 
 
F Field 
C
onstant 
D
ependent V
ariable 
M
odel 
Type 
C
oefficient and 
Standard 
D
eviation 
Significance 
A
dj 
R
2 
C
oefficient and 
Standard 
D
eviation 
Significance 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suprem
e C
ourt C
ases N
ot 
H
eard Per Session 
R
egression 
0.0528 
0.0170 
** 
0.7471 
-2519.4050 
0.0240 
** 
  
(0.0133) 
  
  
  
(715.6931) 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fem
ale M
ath SA
T Scores 
(100s) 
R
egression 
-0.0063 
0.0000 
*** 
0.4758 
831.0300 
0.0000 
*** 
  
(0.0011) 
  
  
  
(65.3480) 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fem
ale V
erbal SA
T Scores 
(100s) 
R
egression 
0.0041 
0.0030 
*** 
0.2341 
274.9790 
0.0010 
*** 
  
(0.0013) 
  
  
  
(71.5000) 
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M
ale M
ath SA
T Scores 
(100s) 
R
egression 
-0.004 
0.0000 
*** 
0.4557 
745.0850 
0.0000 
*** 
  
(0.0007) 
  
  
  
(43.4640) 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
ale V
erbal SA
T Scores 
(100s) 
R
egression 
0.0041 
0.0000 
*** 
0.3644 
282.0700 
0.0000 
*** 
  
(0.0009) 
  
  
  
(53.4714) 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suprem
e C
ourt C
onsensus 
(Percentage) 
R
egression 
0.0075 
0.0050 
*** 
0.3975 
-341.1150 
0.0200 
** 
  
(0.0022) 
  
  
  
(130.5420) 
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Table 72 A
ppendix II: B
ivariate A
nalysis w
ith the total m
agnetic field, F (2 of 3).- 
 
 
 
F Field 
C
onstant 
D
ependent V
ariable 
M
odel 
Type 
C
oefficient and 
Standard 
D
eviation 
Significance 
A
dj 
R
2 
C
oefficient and 
Standard 
D
eviation 
Significance 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suprem
e C
ourt Percent of 
C
ases A
ffirm
ed 
R
egression 
0.0086 
0.0660 
* 
0.1662 
-431.7271 
0.1040 
- 
  
(0.0043) 
  
  
  
(248.0240) 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suprem
e C
ourt Percent of 
C
ases O
verruled Low
er 
C
ourt D
ecisions 
R
egression 
-0.0086 
0.0660 
* 
0.1662 
531.7271 
0.0500 
* 
  
(0.0043) 
  
  
  
(248.0240) 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
ll Suicides (A
ge 
A
djusted) 
R
egression 
0.0008 
0.0000 
*** 
0.3912 
-31.7130 
0.0010 
*** 
  
(0.0001) 
  
  
  
(6.3700) 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
ll Suicides (A
ge 
A
djusted) 
R
egression 
0.0008 
0.0000 
*** 
0.3912 
-31.7130 
0.0010 
*** 
  
(0.0001) 
  
  
  
(6.3700) 
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Table 73 A
ppendix II: B
ivariate m
odels w
ith annual change in the Total (F) Field as the only explanatory variable (3 of 3) 
 
 
 
A
nnual %
 C
hange in F Field 
C
onstant 
D
ependent V
ariable 
M
odel 
Type 
C
oefficient 
and 
Standard 
D
eviation 
Significance 
A
dj 
R
2 
C
oefficient 
and 
Standard 
D
eviation 
Significance 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
hange in A
nnual %
 
C
hange in U
.S. 
Federal B
udget D
eficit 
(B
illions of U
.S. 
D
ollars) 
R
egression 
2591.4030 
0.0050 
*** 
0.2123 
5.1686 
0.0030 
*** 
(847.3083) 
 
 
 
(1.3269) 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Percent C
hange in 
Percent of V
otes C
ast 
for 3rd Party 
C
andidates 
R
egression 
-0.0002 
0.0270 
** 
0.0654 
4.3690 
0.0000 
*** 
(0.0001) 
  
  
  
(0.7261) 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Probability that the 
w
inner is a R
epublican 
(f m
easured in 1,000s) 
Probit 
0.0749 
0.0540 
* 
0.0509 
-3.4870 
0.0820 
* 
(0.0388) 
  
  
  
(2.0020) 
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Appendix III: Models with Magnetic Component Explanatory Variables 
Table 74 Appendix III: U.S budget deficit Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores (1 of 10) 
 Total Federal Deficit Female Math SAT Score 
 Model Type: Regression  Model Type: Regression  
 Observations = 33 
Adj R2 = 
.5047  
Observations = 
30 
Adj R2 
=.9323  
Explanator
y Variable 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Coefficient 
and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
H 
Component -55.56 0.057 * 2.4799 0 *** 
 (27.8823)   (0.5797)   
V 
Component 0.6465 0.755 - -2.3173 0 *** 
 (2.0542)   (0.4947)   
N 
Component 51.5179 0.039 ** -0.1299 0.02 ** 
 (23.7304)   (0.0524)   
Component -1.1597 0.884 - 0.4506 0.034 ** 
 (7.8507)   (0.2008)   
D 
Component 9.7045 0.199 - 0.2226 0 *** 
 (7.3631)   (0.0478)   
E 
Component -25.7882 0.09 *     
 (14.6283)       
Constant 80354 0.796 - -14028.17 0.081 * 
 (307622)   (7713.095)   
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Table 75 Appendix III: Scholastic Aptitude Test scores (2 of 10). 
 Female Verbal SAT Score Male Math SAT Score 
 Model Type: Regression Model Type: Regression 
 Obs = 31 
Adj R2 
=.8183  Obs = 31 
Adj R2 
=.8515  
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Coefficient 
and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
H 
Component 1.8881 0.037 ** 1.2142 0.04 ** 
 (0.8593)   (0.5602)   
V 
Component -0.0673 0.395 - -1.1631 0.023 ** 
 (0.0777)   (0.4782)   
N 
Component -1.8502 0.018 ** -0.0574 0.268 - 
 (0.7334)   (0.0507)   
I 
Component 0.2238 0.459 - 0.173696 0.38 - 
 (0.2977)   (0.1941)   
D 
Component 0.1799 0.018 ** 0.12 0.016 ** 
 (0.0709)   (0.0462)   
E 
Component         
Constant -5484.752 0.636 - -4344.567 0.565 - 
 (11434.22)   (7454.659)   
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Table 76 Appendix III: Scholastic Aptitude Test scores and suicide counts (3 of 10). 
 Male Verbal SAT Score Male Suicide Age 15-19 
 Model Type: Regression Model Type: Regression 
 Obs = 31 
Adj R2 
=.6930 Obs = 12 
Adj R2 
=.9156 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
H 
Component 0.8539 0.361 - -1.584 0.07 * 
 (0.9171)   (0.7196)   
V 
Component -0.1863 0.034 ** 0.0186 0.665 - 
 (0.083)   (0.0411)   
N 
Component -0.6175 0.438 - 1.5075 0.054 * 
 (0.7827)   (0.6291)   
I 
Component 0.6148 0.064 * -0.0926 0.602 - 
 (0.3178)   (0.1685)   
D 
Component 0.0979 0.208 - -0.1577 0.048 ** 
 (0.0757)   (0.0638)   
E 
Component         
Constant -19585.48 0.121 - 3965.773 0.576 - 
 (12202.73)   (6711.902)   
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Table 77 Appendix III: Voting in congressional elections (4 of 10). 
 
Total Number of 3rd Party Votes 
Cast Total Votes Thrown Away 
 Model Type: Regression  Model Type: Regression  
 Obs = 66 
Adj R2 = 
.1073  Obs = 66 
Adj R2 = 
.1880  
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Coefficient 
and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
H 
Component 0.7815 0.0180 ** 0.000269 0.0010 *** 
 (0.3208)   (0.000074)   
X 
Component -0.6764 0.0180 ** -0.000224 0.0010 *** 
 (0.2787)   (0.000064)   
Y 
Component -0.0533 0.0020 *** -0.000014 0.0000 *** 
 (0.0161)   (0.000004)   
Z 
Component 0.0246 0.1290 - 0.000012 0.0030 *** 
 (0.0160)   (0.000004)   
D 
Component         
I 
Component         
Constant -3474.250 0.087 * -1.119 0.012 ** 
 (1994.196)   (0.460)   
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Table 78 Appendix III: Winners and how much they win (5 of 10). 
 
Probability of a Republican 
Getting Majority of Votes 
Total Percentage Distance 
Between Winning and Losing 
Candidates 
 Model Type: Probit  Model Type: Regression  
 Obs = 66 
Adj R2 = 
.4297  Obs = 66 
Adj R2 = 
.2455  
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Coefficient 
and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
H Component -0.0051 0.0150 ** -0.1071 0.0000 *** 
 (0.0021)   (0.0240)   
X Component 0.0048 0.0070 *** 0.0860 0.0000 *** 
 (0.0018)   (0.0202)   
Y Component 0.0001 0.0790 * 0.0377 0.0100 *** 
 (0.0001)   (0.0141)   
Z Component 0.0033 0.0640 * 0.0033 0.0640 * 
 (0.0018)   (0.0018)   
D Component     -0.0197 0.0210 ** 
     (0.0083)   
I Component -0.0052 0.0740 *     
 (0.0029)       
Constant 52.408 0.136 - 728.303 0.000 *** 
 (35.150)   (151.273)   
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Table 79  Appendix III: Winning candidates and by how much they win (6 of 10). 
 
 
Ratio of Percentage Votes for 
Winning-to-losing Candidates 
Percent of Votes for Winning 
Candidate 
 Model Type: Regression  Model Type: Regression  
 Obs = 66 
Adj R2 = 
.2288 Obs = 66 
Adj R2 = 
.2455 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
H 
Component -0.0028 0.0000 *** -0.0357 0.0000 *** 
 (0.0006)   (0.0080)   
X 
Component 0.0023 0.0000 *** 0.0286 0.0000 *** 
 (0.0005)   (0.0067)   
Y 
Component 0.0012 0.0020 *** 0.0125 0.0100 *** 
 (0.0003)   (0.0047)   
Z 
Component -0.00008 0.0060 *** -0.0012 0.0060 *** 
 (0.00003)   (0.0000)   
D 
Component -0.00065 0.0050 *** -0.0065 0.0210 ** 
 (0.00022)   (0.0027)   
I 
Component         
Constant 18.640 0.000 *** 2.761 0.000 *** 
 (4.041)   (0.504)   
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Table 80 Appendix III: Second place and by how much they lose (7 of 10). 
 
Percent of Votes for Second Place 
Candidate 
Number of Votes for Democratic 
Candidates 
 Model Type: Regression  Model Type: Regression  
 Obs = 66 
Adj R2 = 
.2455 Obs = 66 
Adj R2 = 
.5873 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
H 
Component 0.0374 0.0000 *** 5.8404 0.0000 *** 
 (0.0077)   (0.8191)   
X 
Component -0.0298 0.0000 *** -4.9374 0.0000 *** 
 (0.0064)   (0.6879)   
Y 
Component -0.0150 0.0020 *** 0.8739 0.0750 * 
 (0.0045)   (0.4818)   
Z 
Component 0.0011 0.0020 *** 0.2662 0.0000 *** 
 (0.0000)   (0.0363)   
D 
Component 0.0083 0.0030 *** -0.6397 0.0027 *** 
 (0.0026)   (0.2823)   
I 
Component         
         
Constant -1.904 0.000 *** -32948.950 0.000 *** 
 (0.485)   (5141.930)   
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Table 81 Appendix III: Votes for the parties (8 of 10). 
 
Number of Votes for Republican 
Candidates 
Number of Votes for 3rd Party 
Candidates 
 Model Type: Regression  Model Type: Regression  
 Obs = 66 
Adj R2 = 
.6396 Obs = 66 
Adj R2 = 
.1073 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
H 
Component 4.8540 0.0000 *** 0.7815 0.0180 ** 
 (0.6685)   (0.3208)   
X 
Component -3.7832 0.0000 *** -0.6764 0.0180 ** 
 (0.5614)   (0.2787)   
Y 
Component 0.8065 0.0450 ** -0.0533 0.0020 *** 
 (0.3932)   (0.0161)   
Z 
Component 0.2480 0.0000 *** 0.0246 0.1290 - 
 (0.0296)   (0.0160)   
D 
Component -0.5755 0.0150 **     
 (0.2304)       
I 
Component         
         
Constant -29413.390 0.000 *** -3474.285 0.087 * 
 (4196.462)   (1994.196)   
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Table 82  Appendix III: Votes (9 of 10). 
 
 Number of Total Votes Cast for Candidates 
 Model Type: Regression  
 Obs = 66 Adj R2 = .5630 
Explanatory Variable 
Coefficient and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
H Component 11.0286 0.0000 *** 
 (1.6839)   
     
X Component -9.2687 0.0000 *** 
 (1.4143)   
     
Y Component 1.8537 0.0660 * 
 (0.9905)   
     
Z Component 0.5381 0.0000 *** 
 (0.0746)   
     
D Component -1.3485 0.0240 ** 
 (0.5803)   
     
Constant -64681.560 0.000 *** 
 (10570.750)   
263 
 
  
Table 83 Appendix III: Federal budget deficit (10 of 10). 
 Change in Total Federal Deficit 
Explanatory Variable Model Type: Regression  
 Observations = 32 
Adj R2 = 
.5047  
 
Coefficient and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Change H Component 14465.5500 0.1420 - 
 (9530.9040)   
     
Change V Component 5330.3710 0.0080 *** 
 (1848.1680)   
     
Change N Component -17448.2100 0.0800 * 
 (9563.5700)   
     
Change I Component -15146.4200 0.0120 *** 
 (5568.4760)   
Change D Component -545.0414 0.3800 - 
 (609.4114)   
Change E Component 422.6255 0.4980 - 
 (615.1447)   
Constant -3.6571 0.3880 - 
 (4.1648)   
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Appendix IV: Earth Magnetic Fields and Traditional Control Variables. 
Table 84 Appendix IV: Votes (1 of 5). 
 
Total Number of Votes Cast in an 
Election (1,000s) 
Total Number of "Thrown Away" 
Votes (1,000s) 
 Model Type: Regression Model Type: Regression 
 
Observations = 
66 
Adj R2 = 
.6701 
Observations = 
66 
Adj R2 = 
.8915 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Winning-to-loser 
vote ratio 
-757.1289 0.0170 ** -105.2540 0.0000 *** 
(307.6558)   (5.8231)   
         
Republican 
Winning 
Candidate -1484.7720 0.0040 *** -38.9777 0.0000 *** 
 (493.7090)   (9.3161)   
         
H Component 6.2886 0.0010 ***     
 (1.7880)       
         
X Component -5.1152 0.0010 *** 0.0091 0.0060 *** 
 (1.5207)   (0.0032)   
         
Y Component 3.0245 0.0020 ***     
 (0.9305)       
Z Component 0.4992 0.0000 *** 0.0045 0.0000 *** 
 (0.0707)   (0.0012)   
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D Component -1.9292 0.0010 ***     
 (0.5400)       
         
Constant -46598.950 0.000 *** 198.456 0.110 - 
 (10696.710)   (122.420)   
Table 84 Continued 
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Table 85 Appendix IV: Abortions (2 of 5) 
 Total Number of Abortions by White Women (1,000s) 
Rate of Abortions by White Women 
per 1,000 Live Births 
 Model Type: Regression Model Type: Regression 
 Observations = 7 
Adj R2 = 
.8647 
Observations = 
7 Adj R2 = .9346 
Dependent 
Variable 
Coefficient and 
Standard Deviation Significance 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Total White 
People 
Living Below 
Poverty 
-0.0406 0.0730 * -0.0013 0.0100 *** 
(0.0149)   (0.0002)   
         
Total White 
Unemployed 
97.6282 0.0090 *** 2.0760 0.0030 *** 
(15.9832)   (0.2393)   
         
C9 Index 
148.8138 0.0710 * 3.7476 0.0190 ** 
(54.0716)   (0.8097)   
         
Constant 
198.456 0.110 - -46598.950 0.000 *** 
(122.420)   (10696.710)   
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Table 86 Appendix IV: Annual Interest Rates (3 of 5) 
 
 
Annual Average Interest Rates 
on 3 Month Treasuries 
Annual Average Interest on 
Corporate Bonds rated aaa 
 Model Type: Regression Model Type: Regression 
 Obs = 30 
Adj R2 = 
.6608 Obs = 30 
Adj R2 = 
.7321 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Coefficient 
and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
H Component -0.1891 0.0960 * -0.1116 0.1660 - 
 (0.1090)   (0.0780)   
V Component -0.0944 0.0010 ***    -0.0802 0.0000 *** 
 (0.0239)   (0.0171)   
N Component 0.3366 0.0080 *** 0.2423 0.0080 *** 
 (0.1163)   (0.0832)   
I Component 0.3008 0.0010 *** 0.2650 0.0000 *** 
 (0.0806)   (0.0577)   
Unemployment 
Rate 0.5330 0.0680 * 0.9921 0.0000 *** 
 (0.2782)   (0.1992)   
Inflation Rate 0.5419 0.0000 *** 0.2189 0.0250 ** 
 (0.1274)   (0.0912)   
Constant -10418.140 0.002 *** -9352.770 0.000 *** 
 (2947.175)   (2110.662)   
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Table 87 Appendix IV: Interest Rates (4 of 5). 
 
Annual Average Interest on 
"High" Grade Municipal Bonds 
Annual Average Discount Rate 
(Interest Charged to Commercial 
Banks) 
 Model Type: Regression Model Type: Regression 
 Obs = 30 
Adj R2 = 
.6921 Obs = 30 Adj R2 = .7160 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Coefficient 
and Standard 
Deviation Significance 
H Component -0.2295 0.1010 - -0.2408 0.0210 ** 
 (0.1343)   (0.0975)   
V Component -0.0989 0.0030 *** -0.0828 0.0010 *** 
 (0.0294)   (0.0213)   
N Component 0.3724 0.0160 *** 0.3629 0.0020 *** 
 (0.1432)   (0.1040)   
I Component 0.3025 0.0060 *** 0.2500 0.0020 *** 
 (0.0993)   (0.0721)   
Unemployment 
Rate 
0.8230 0.0250 *** 0.6321 0.0180 ** 
(0.3427)   (0.2488)   
Inflation Rate 0.7673 0.0000 *** 0.5167 0.0000 *** 
 (0.1570)   (0.1139)   
Constant -10153.050 0.010 *** -8406.322 0.004 *** 
 (3631.215)   (2635.652)   
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Table 88 Appendix IV: Annual federal funds rate and annual U.S. budget deficit (5 of 5). 
  
Annual Average Federal Funds 
Rate (Rate Banks Charge Each 
Other) 
Annual United States Budget 
Deficits in Billions of Dollars 
 Model Type: Regression Model Type: Regression 
 
Observations = 
30 
Adj R2 = 
.6431 
Observations = 
30 
Adj R2 = 
.9340 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
Coefficient and 
Standard 
Deviation Significance 
H Component -0.2111 0.1350 - 25.2418 0.0000 *** 
 (0.1364)   (1.9449)   
         
V Component -0.1112 0.0010 *** -1.4930 0.0020 *** 
 (0.0990)   (0.4264)   
         
N Component 0.3870 0.0140 *** -19.4775 0.0000 *** 
 (0.1455)   (2.0747)   
I Component 0.3571 0.0020 *** 10.2730 0.0000 *** 
 (0.1008)   (1.4383)   
Unemployment 
Rate 0.4587 0.2010 - 20.1827 0.0000 *** 
 (0.3480)   (4.9630)   
Inflation Rate 0.6822 0.0000 *** -4.6521 0.0520 * 
 (0.1594)   (2.2734)   
Constant -12432.480 0.003 *** -466397.200 0.000 *** 
 (3687.407)   (52575.850)   
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Appendix V: Technical Appendix 
 
On occasion, the discussion of statistical work in this thesis did not provide, with the 
body of the text, replication-level details about the data. This appendix provides 
additional information. 
 
Chapter 2 
 
The explanatory variables of interest include the Ap geomagnetic index and the 
C9 geomagnetic index. These values come from the Space Physics Interactive Data 
Resource (National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC) 2013). The database used for this 
chapter provides daily values of each of the Ap and the C9 indexes. The average values 
are taken over the calendar year to derive the annual values for these indexes.  
Tables that have the F, or total, Field as the explanatory variable of interest come 
from the NGDC database from the Fredericksburg collection station available on their 
station data page (Space Physics Interactive Data Resource 2013). The data uses the 
mean annual geomagnetic value reported for the Fredericksburg, Maryland station. The 
Fredericksburg station is the closest station to the Capitol of the United States, 
Washington, D.C. The Total, F, value also comes from numerous other data collection 
stations.  
Geomagnetic field component data (H, X, Y, etc.) are available from the Space 
Physics Interactive Data Resource (Space Physics Interactive Data Resource 2013). The 
data comes from names data collection stations. 
Monitoring stations in the United States are located in Alaska, California, Maine, 
Maryland, Virginia, Kansas, Missouri, Colorado, Wyoming, Oklahoma, Hawaii, 
Louisiana, Florida, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and Washington. Time periods of data 
collection as well as specific components collected vary among monitoring stations. 
There are three different monitoring stations in Argentina. There are seven different 
monitoring stations in Japan. 
Monitoring stations collect data each minute. Monitoring stations report data as 
means in increments of days, months, and years. Many data stations have gaps in 
collection, either in time or days and the stations are also affected by other conditions 
such as weather, funding, etc. Almost every model is constrained by the availability 
control and dependent variable data available at time increments to match available 
geomagnetic data. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Data for the table that displays the changes in U.S. Regional Uniform Crime 
Reports 2011 come from data available at FBI.com. The data is formatted from data 
available in Table 4, Crime in the United States by Region Geographic Division and State 
2010-2011 (FBI, 2011). 
Data for the Kentucky crime index and the Local Magnetic Field comes from the 
output of statistical analysis of the dependent variable that is constructed out of the data 
presented by the Disaster Center from data compiled from the FBI.gov uniform crime 
reports (The Disaster Center, 2013). The model uses the Crime Index values for 
Kentucky from 1970 to 2008. The variable of interest comes from the Space Physics 
Interactive Data Resource for the Fredericksburg data gathering station (Space, 2013). 
The data uses the mean annual geomagnetic value reported for the Fredericksburg station. 
This station is the closest station that had data coverage for the years the crime data is 
available. Geomagnetic field component data (H, X, Y, etc.) are also available from the 
Space Physics Interactive Data Resource (Space Physics Interactive Data Resource 
2013). This data is provided for each monitoring station. 
Data for analysis of Kentucky city and country crimes in 1978 comes from the 
“Residual total intensity aeromagnetic map of Kentucky” (Johnson, et al. 1978). The map 
shows bands of geomagnetic measurements in gauss. The map has county boundaries 
annotated. The location of Kentucky cities had to be geo-located by referencing current 
political maps of Kentucky using the county boundaries. Where cities lay between two 
gauss “contour lines” the average was taken. If the city is obviously closer to one contour 
line than another, the closer line value is used. Counties that had multiple gauss lines 
within their border an average value is derived and used. 
The Kentucky annual unemployment rate is derived from data available from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013). Data is available to derive 
annual rates of unemployment for years 1976 to 2008.  
The Per Capita Income of Kentucky comes from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) (Bureau of Economic Analysis (BAE) 2013). Data is available for the 
annual per capita income starting in 1929. 
Information used to construct the table “Summary of significant and evaluated 
models using the F, total field, as the variable of interest” comes from models presented 
in Chapter 3 Appendices. 
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Information used to construct the table Summary of significant and evaluated 
models using field components as the variable of interest” comes from models presented 
in Chapter 3 Appendices. 
Information used to construct the table “Summary of significant and evaluated 
models using the different measures of the earth’s magnetic field and including other 
control variables” comes from models presented in Chapter 3 Appendices. 
Information used to construct the table “Summary of Survey Findings” comes 
from all the models presented in the Chapter 3 Appendices. 
The explanatory variables of interest include the Ap geomagnetic index and the 
C9 geomagnetic index. These values come from the Space Physics Interactive Data 
Resource (National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC) 2013). The database used provides 
daily values of each of the Ap and the C9 indexes. The average values are taken over the 
calendar year to derive the annual values for these indexes. 
The misery index is a measure of annual unemployment and inflation for the 
United States. The annual unemployment and the annual inflation rates are summed to 
derive the misery index. The annual unemployment rate comes from the website 
infoplease.com that derives annual U.S. unemployment rate from U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics data (infoplease.com 2013).  
The measure of inflation comes from the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index for All urban Consumers and covers 1913 to 2010 
(U.S. Department of Labor 2013). 
Data for the number of people in the U.S. labor force comes from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013). 
Data for the percent GDP change from start to end of year is a derived value from 
available GDP data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BAE) 2013) and additional data made available on April 30, 2008 via the 
infoplease.com website (Infoplease.com 2008). The percentage change between the 
previous year’s GDP and the current year’s GDP is used. 
The United States total count of crimes, murders, rapes, robberies, assaults, and 
property crimes come from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (Office of Justice Programs 
2013). Data is available from 1980 to 2008. 
Data on Argentina labor strikes came from the “Argentina Domestic Violence and 
Economic Data, 1955-1972 (ICPSR 5213) Data set (O'Donnel 2000). This data set also 
provides the dates of strikes allowing the derivation determining whether a given day 
experienced the start of a strike. 
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Data on abortions comes from data compiled by William Robert Johnson last 
updated on 11 March 2012 and titled “Historical abortion statistics, United States” 
(Johnston 2012) and information provided in United States Census Bureau data in 
statistical abstracts from 1970 to 2010 (United States Cencus Bureau). 
Scholastic Aptitude Scores come from the National Center for Education 
Statistics’ Digest of Education Statistics (Institute of Education Sciences 2012). This 
provides SAT scores by gender and race from 1966 to 2011 by exam portion. 
 Data on the U.S. Supreme Court came from the United States Supreme Court 
Judicial Database, 1953-1997 and came from the Ann Arbor, MI Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (Spaeth 1999). 
Counts of aviation accidents come from the National Transportation Safety 
Board’s Aviation Accident Database (National Transportation Safety Board 2013) and 
uses data from 1962 to 2009. 
Freedom House Scores come from the annual Freedom in the World scores from 
1972 to 2008 available from reports on the Freedom House website (Freedom House 
n.d.) . 
Data on treasury bills and corporate bonds, municipal bonds, mortgage interests, 
prime interest rates, discount rates, and Federal Funds rates come from the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System’s Historical Data Database (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System n.d.). 
Suicide data comes from the United States Census Bureau’s Annual Statistical 
Abstracts of The National Data Books (United States Census Bureau n.d.) of numerous 
dates to build a complete dataset. 
Data on the annual U.S. Federal Budget Deficits comes from Table 1.3 Summary 
of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) in Current Dollars, Constant (FY2005) 
Dollars, and as Percentages of GDP, 1940-2017 (The Executive Office of the President 
2009). 
Scholastic Aptitude Scores come from the National Center for Education 
Statistics’ Digest of Education Statistics (Institute of Education Sciences 2012). This 
provides SAT scores by gender and race from 1966 to 2011 by exam portion. 
Data on votes for presidential elections including the number of votes for 
winning, losing, and third party candidates comes from data compiled by infoplease.com 
(infoplease.com n.d.). 
Data on Senate vote outcomes for elections in states that have a Geomagnetic 
monitoring station within its border or in an adjacent state that has a monitoring station 
comes from the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives (Clerk of the 
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House of Representatives 2013). The vote counts for senatorial elections from 1920 to the 
present for each state are available on this page in PDF download format. 
Winning-to-loser vote ratio is derived from the election data available from the 
Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives (Clerk of the House of 
Representatives 2013). 
U.S. Poverty data came from the United States Census Bureau (U.S. Cencus 
Bureau 2013). Poverty data is available for the years 1985 to 2011. 
 The annual unemployment rate comes from the website infoplease.com that 
derives annual U.S. unemployment rate from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics data (infoplease.com 2013).  
The measure of inflation comes from the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index for All urban Consumers and covers 1913 to 2010 
(U.S. Department of Labor 2013). 
Data on the annual U.S. Federal Budget Deficits comes from Table 1.3 Summary 
of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) in Current Dollars, Constant (FY2005) 
Dollars, and as Percentages of GDP, 1940-2017 (The Executive Office of the President 
2009). 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 The analysis uses the Militarized Interstate Dispute Datasets associated with the 
Correlates of War project (Ghosn, et al. 2004) (Ghosn, Faten and Bennett 2003) (Jones, 
Bremer and Singer 1996). The data is merged with a dataset of daily and annual global 
measures of geomagnetism.  The original MID dataset is expanded so that each day is 
coded for the initiation, occurrence of, participation by, the joining of, or the conclusion 
of a dispute. Total number of disputes, total number of participants, and geographic 
regions disputes occur are determined for each day. The resulting dataset has a case for 
each day of the year from 1816 to 2001. The global indices of geomagnetic activity are 
used (Space 2013) as the variables of interest. The global indices are matched to cases of 
the same day. A 30 day trailing average value is figured for each case as well. A 30 day 
average is used as a measure of the additive influence of daily exposure to geomagnetic 
activity. However, some consideration had to be given for “wearing off” of effects. 
Therefore, the 30 day average is used. 
 Many of the early models in chapter 4 have their variables either derived from the 
Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (Ghosn, Faten and Bennett, Codebook for the 
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Dyadic Militarized Interstate Incident Data, Versions 2.10 2003) or the Space Physics 
Interactive Database (Space 2013). 
 Data on the number of U.S. Soldiers deployed overseas, less Europe and stationed 
aboard ship, comes from The Heritage Foundation dataset The Troop Dataset 1950-2003 
(The Heritage Foundation 2004). 
 Data on defense spending in the United States comes from Congressional Budget 
Office tables made available on the Executive Office of the President’s webpage (Office 
of Management and Budget 2013) 
The data for the analysis on recurring civil war comes from Walter’s 2004’s data 
she used to write “Does Conflict Beget Conflict” (Walter, 2004) combined with global 
geomagnetic indices from the Space Physics Interactive Database  (Space 2013). Walter’s 
dataset contains 1,151 country-years observations from 1945 to 1996 which were derived 
from the Correlates of War Project (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Walter uses and creates 
many of the standard variables used in the conflict literature; Subsequent War, Repeat 
War, New War, Ethnic Civil War, Total Goals, Non-Total Goals, War-Related Deaths, 
Duration of War, Displaced People, Grievances Settled, Decisive Victory, Partition, 
Infant Mortality Rate, Life Expectancy at Birth, Adult Illiteracy, and Real GDP Per 
Capita. She also used the Democracy/Autocracy Scale from the Polity III Dataset 
(Jaggers, Keith and Gur 1995). Finally, Walter uses a Peace Year variable as a spline. 
Walter’s data set is merged with system measures of the earth’s geomagnetic field. 
Models of the severity of civil war come from Lacina’s data used in the 2006 
work, “Explaining Severity of Civil Wars”. The analysis included the severity of battle 
violence as the dependent variable. Severity of battle violence is measured as the natural 
log of the total count of battle deaths. She controls for both duration and population 
within the regression analysis. For state strength Lacina uses the measure of military 
quality, which is defined as military expenditures divided by the number of military 
personnel and lagged one year (logged) (Bennett & Stam, 1996), the per capita GDP that 
is adjusted for purchasing power parity and inflation (logged), a dummy variable for 
possible external support that is coded 1 if the war occurred during the cold war, and the 
percent of the country experiencing civil war that is “rough” (logged). The measure of 
regime characteristic is a dummy variable that codes a state with a composite score of 6 
or higher on a combined Polity scale of regime type as a democracy (1) (Marshall & 
Jaggers, 2003).  This dataset was merged with the global indices of geomagnetic value 
(Space 2013). 
Data on Coups come from Johnathan Powell and Clayton L. Thyne’s “Global 
Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset.” (Powerll and Thyne 2011). The 
coup locations are coded for region of the world and combined with the global indices of 
geomagnetic values. 
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Data on casualties (killed and wounded) from Iraqi insurgency attacks comes 
from http://www.icasualties.org/Iraq/USCasualtiesByState.aspx which aggregates the 
numbers by month to match the available data on insurgent attacks (icasualties.org, 
2008). 
 Data on the number of Iraqi insurgent attacks per month is available from The 
Brookings 
Iraq (O'hanlon & Campbell, 2007).  Brookings assembled the information from a variety 
of sources. The list of sources is available on their website. 
 Data on terrorism comes from the “Global Terrorism Database, 1970-1997” 
(LaFree and Dugan 2006) and is merged with the global indices of geomagnetism (Space 
2013). 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 Data on crimes in the state of Kentucky and its cities and counties come from the 
annual Kentucky State Police publication Crime in Kentucky (Police, 1978). This data 
source provides monthly, quarterly, and annual statistics on the different violent and non-
violent crimes as well as crime indices.  
 Data for city, county, and state population of Kentucky comes from the 1980 
census and Kentucky state government historical files (United States Cencus Bureau 
2013). 
 Data for the percent of population living below poverty in 1978 comes from the 
census bureau data archive as well as state of Kentucky record archives (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2013). 
 Per capita spending on police, per capita welfare spending, per capita income, 
unemployment, and per capita spending on education all come from county reports of 
statistical abstracts, the bureau of labor statistics, and U.S. census bureau (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2013). 
 Data for the states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Texas, and Wisconsin including crime counts, per capita spending on 
judiciary, number of sworn law enforcement personnel, per capita law enforcement 
spending, unemployment rates, per capita income, spending on corrections operations, 
spending on judiciary, population come from the various state managed statistical 
abstract archives for the period 1960 to 2007. 
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 Crime data from the states comes from the Office of Justice Statistics in the 
Justice Bureau (Office of Justice Programs 2013). 
 
Chapter 6 
 
 Data on the daily Dow Jones and NASDAQ average comes from Yahoo Finance 
historical price archive (Dow Jones 2010). 
 Data on presidential messaging comes from Martin’s dataset. 
 Data on The Federal Reserve Board’s Fund Rate came from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York (Federal Reserve Bank n.d.). 
 Data on the national unemployment rate comes from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013). 
 Data on the national inflation rate comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013). 
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